Leviathan
Part 4. The Kingdom of Darkness

Thomas Hobbes

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[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small `dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. Larger omissions will be reported, between [brackets], in normal-sized type.

Hobbes wrote Leviathan in Latin and in English; it is not always clear which parts were done first in English and which in Latin. The present text is based on the English version, but sometimes the Latin seems better and is followed instead; and the whole of chapter 46 and some of 47 are given in both English and Latin versions. Edwin Curley’s fine edition of the English work (Hackett, 1994) has provided all the information used here regarding the Latin version, the main lines of the translations from it, and other information given here between brackets. First launched: August 2007

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Chapter 44. Spiritual darkness from misinterpretation of scripture

As well as the sovereign powers, divine and human, that I have been talking about, Scripture mentions another power, namely, that of ‘the rulers of the darkness of this world’, 1 ‘the kingdom of Satan’, 2 and ‘the reign of Beelzebub over demons’ 3 – i.e. his rule over phantasms that appear in the air. It’s because that’s what demons are that Satan is called ‘the prince of the power of the air’; 4 and because he rules in the darkness of this world… those who are under his dominion are called the ‘children of darkness’, in contrast to the faithful, who are the ‘children of the light’. For seeing that Beelzebub is prince of phantasms [here = ‘illusions’], the expressions

• the inhabitants of his dominion of air and darkness,
• the children of darkness, and
• these demons, phantasms, spirits of illusion,

all refer allegorically to the same thing. So the kingdom of darkness, as presented in these and other places in the Bible, is nothing but a conspiracy of deceivers who want to get dominion over men in this present world, and to that end try by dark and erroneous doctrines to extinguish in them the light of nature and of the gospel, thus making them unfit for the kingdom of God to come. Men who were born blind have no idea at all of the light that the rest of us see through the bodily eye; more generally, no-one conceives in his imagination any greater light than he has ever perceived through his outer senses; and it’s like that also with the light of the gospel and the light of the understanding—no-one can conceive there being any degree of it greater than any that he has already achieved. That’s why our only way of acknowledging our own darkness is by reasoning from the unforeseen mischances that befall us along the way. The darkest part of the kingdom of Satan is the part that lies outside the Church of God, i.e. among those who don’t believe in Jesus Christ. But we can’t infer that the Church enjoys . . . all the light we need for the performance of the work God has told us to do. If we weren’t lost in the dark, or at least in a mist, how would it come about that in Christendom there has been, almost from the time of the apostles, so much jostling for position in foreign and civil wars? such stumbling at every little hardship someone suffers in his own fortune and every little success that he sees others have? such a variety of ways of running the race towards happiness? We are therefore still in the dark.

In the night of our natural ignorance, the enemy has come in and sown the weeds of spiritual errors, doing this in four distinct ways. (1) By misusing the Bible, putting out its light; for we go wrong when we don’t know the Bible. (2) By introducing the demonology of the heathen poets, i.e. their fables about demons, which are really mere. . . phantasms of the brain, with no real nature of their own other than

1 Ephesians 6:12. 2 Matthew 12:26. 3 Matthew 9:34. 4 Ephesians 2:2
what human imagination gives them—I'm talking about
dead men’s ghosts, fairies, and other subjects of old wives’
tales. (3) By mixing in with the Bible various left-overs
from Greek religion and much of the Greeks’ futile and
erroneous philosophy, especially Aristotle’s. (4) By adding
to the mix false or uncertain traditions, and invented or
uncertain history. And so we come to err, by taking seriously
seducing spirits and the demonology of those who speak lies
in hypocrisy. . . . In this present chapter I shall say a little
about (1) the business of leading men astray by misusing
Scripture. ·I shall discuss (2) in chapter 45 [not included in this
version], and (3) and (4) in chapter 46 .

·FIRST MISUNDERSTANDING: 'THE KINGDOM OF GOD'.

The greatest misuse of Scripture, and the main one—to
which most the others are related, either as causes or
effects—is the wrenching around of the Bible so as to make
it say that the ‘kingdom of God’, mentioned so often in the
Bible, is

•the present Church, or
•the multitude of Christian men now living, or
•the multitude of Christian men who have lived and
will rise again on the last day.

In fact, the kingdom of God was first set up only over the
Jews, by the ministry of Moses; which is why the Jews were
called God’s special people. Later on, this ceased with the
choice of Saul ·as king of the Jews', when the Jews had
refused to be governed by God any more, and demanded
a king of the sort that other nations had—to which God
consented. (I have laid this out in more detail in chapter
35 [not included in this version].) From then on there was no
‘kingdom of God’ in the world except in the sense that He
always was, is, and shall be king of all men and of all
creatures, governing according to His will by His infinite
power. But He did promise, through His prophets, to restore
His government to them [i.e. the Jews] again, when the time
He has secretly chosen for this arrives, and when they shall
turn to Him by repenting and amending their lives. In
addition to that, He invited the gentiles to come in and
enjoy the happiness of His reign, on the same conditions of
conversion and repentance ·as are set for the Jews.· And He
promised also to send His son into the world, to expiate [=
‘make amends for’ or ‘pay the penalty for’] the sins of them all, by
his death, and to prepare them by his doctrine to receive
him at his second coming. As the second coming hasn’t yet
happened, the kingdom of God hasn’t yet come. The only
kings that now rule over us by a pact ·or agreement· are our
civil sovereigns—except for the fact that Christian men are
already in the kingdom of grace, in that they have already
been promised that they'll be received at the second coming.

This error about what ‘the kingdom of God’ is or was leads
to at least four very bad consequences, the first of which
generates four all of its own. I shall now describe these·.

1. If the present Church were Christ’s kingdom—which it
isn’t—there would be (i) some one man or assembly through
whose mouth our Saviour, now in heaven, would speak, give
law, and represent his person to all Christians; or (ii) several
men or assemblies playing this ·mouthpiece· role in different
parts of Christendom. (i) The Pope claims to have this ‘royal
power under Christ’ in relation to the whole world; and (ii) in
various particular commonwealths that power is claimed by
assemblies of the pastors of the place (though the Bible gives
it only to civil sovereigns). Disputes concerning this power
are so passionate that they extinguish the light of nature,
causing such a deep darkness in men’s understandings that
they can’t see who it is to whom they have promised their
obedience.

1a. The Pope’s claim to be Christ’s deputy in the present
world-wide Church. . . . generates ·the doctrine that a Chris-
A Christian king must receive his crown through a bishop, as though that ceremony gave him the right to include ‘by the grace of God’ [Latin deo gratia] because he isn’t a king by the favour of God unless he is crowned by the authority of God’s deputy-king of the whole world.

1b. And it generates the further doctrine that every bishop, whoever his sovereign is, takes an oath of absolute obedience to the Pope when he is first made a bishop.

1c. The papal claim also generates the doctrine of the fourth Lateran Council: ‘If a king doesn’t purge his kingdom of heresies when told by the pope to do so, is excommunicated because of this failure, and doesn’t make up for this within a year, then his subjects are released from the bond of their obedience to him.’ (That is from chapter 3 of Heretics, by Pope Innocent III under whose auspices that Council was held. In this context, ‘heresies’ are all opinions that the Church of Rome has forbidden to be maintained.)

1d. It’s because of this doctrine that, in any of the frequent clashes between the Pope’s political plans and those of other Christian princes, there arises such a mist among their subjects that they can’t distinguish a stranger who has thrust himself into the space of their lawful prince from the person whom they themselves had placed there; and in this mental darkness they fight against one another without distinguishing their enemies from their friends—all this being staged by one man’s ambition.

2. [In this paragraph Hobbes writes as though he were drawing on facts about the origins, the etymology, the deep latent meanings, of ‘clergy’ and ‘laity’. If that’s what he thought he was doing, he seems to have been in error.] The opinion that the present Church is the kingdom of God has affected how different people are labelled. Pastors, deacons, and all other ministers of the Church call themselves ‘the clergy’,labelling everyone else as ‘the laity’, i.e. simply people. There’s an issue about money connected with this, as I’ll now explain. During His reign over the Israelites, God set aside a part of the revenue and assigned it to the tribe of Levi, to be their inheritance; that was fair because they were to be His public ministers, and had no portion of land set aside for them to live on, as did their brethren. Now, the label ‘clergy’ today signifies those whose upkeep comes from that same set-aside-by-God part of the national revenue. So the Pope—claiming that the present Church is the kingdom of God, just as the kingdom of Israel once was—claims for himself and his subordinate ministers a similar revenue as an inheritance from God; and the name ‘clergy’ was suitable for that claim. And so we find that the tithes and other tributes paid to the Levites as God’s right amongst the ancient Israelites have for many years been demanded and taken from Christians by ecclesiastics, who say that they do this jure divino, i.e. by God’s right. Because of this, the people everywhere were bound to pay a double tribute—one to the state, another to the clergy. And the one paid to the clergy is disgracefully large, namely a tenth of the lay-person’s income. That’s double what a certain king of Athens (one regarded as a tyrant) demanded from his subjects to pay all public expenses; he demanded a mere twentieth part of each person’s income, which was plenty for the maintenance of the commonwealth. And in the kingdom of the Jews during God’s priestly reign, the tithes and offerings were the whole public revenue, not a church-related payment on top of a government-related one.

3. The wrong doctrine that the present Church is the kingdom of God has led to the distinction between

• civil laws, i.e. the acts of sovereigns in their own dominions, and
• canon law, i.e. the acts of the Pope in those same dominions.

These ‘canons’ started out by being nothing but canons,
i.e. rules propounded and voluntarily accepted by Christian princes, and this was the case until Charlemagne became emperor; but from then on, as the Pope’s power increased, the canon law became rules that were commanded, and the emperors themselves were forced to let them count as laws, for fear of greater mischiefs that the people, blinded by the darkness of biblical error, might otherwise be led into.

That’s why it is that in every country where the Pope’s ecclesiastical power is entirely accepted, Jews and Turks and pagans are tolerantly allow to practice and profess their own religion as long as they don’t in any way offend against the civil power; whereas in those same countries a foreigner who comes in and is a Christian but not a Roman Catholic has committed a capital offence, because the Pope claims that all Christians are his subjects. If it weren’t for the mixing of canon ‘law’ with civil law, it would be as much against the law of nations to persecute a Christian foreigner for professing the religion of his own country as to persecute an unbeliever—or rather more, because those who are not against Christ are with him.

4. That same mistake regarding the kingdom of God brings it about that in every Christian state certain men are exempt, by ecclesiastical liberty, from the tributes and from the tribunals of the civil state. [Ecclesiastical liberty’ is the official name of the setup in which the clergy don’t have to pay civil taxes and aren’t answerable for crimes in the civil courts.] That’s the situation of all the Roman Catholic priests— not just the monks and friars but also the ordinary clergy who don’t belong to any special religious order. ·And there are ever so many of them·: in some places they are such a big proportion of the total population that they could make up an army all by themselves, if the Church militant wanted to employ them against their own or other princes. [After dealing with the second and third misunderstandings, Hobbes will return to this one, devoting four pages to detailed discussion—some of it very intricate—of biblical passages that might seem to support the view that the kingdom of God exists now, having begun with the resurrection of Jesus. ·If that is right, Hobbes demands, then why do Christians now pray ‘Let thy kingdom come’? ·Another of his points:—Some theologians have held that in Genesis 1:16—God made two great lights, the greater light to rule the day and the lesser light to rule the night—the greater light signifies the Pope and the lesser one the king. Hobbes remarks scornfully: ‘One might as well argue that in Genesis 1:1 ‘heaven’ refers to the Pope and ‘earth’ refers to the king.]

SECOND MISUNDERSTANDING: ‘CONSECRATION’.

A second general misuse of Scripture is interpreting ‘consecration’ as standing for something magical—i.e. conjuration or enchantment. In the Bible, to ‘consecrate’ something is to offer, give, or dedicate it. . . . to God, by separating it from common use; i.e. to sanctify it, to make it God’s, and to set it aside to be used only by those whom God has appointed to be His public ministers. (I have already shown this in chapter 35. The consecrated ‘thing’ may, of course, be a man.) This ceremony doesn’t change the thing that is consecrated; all it changes is how that thing is used, barring everyday non-religious use of it and reserving it for uses that are holy and are especially in the service of God. When it is claimed that such ceremonial words change the nature or quality of the thing itself, that’s not consecration. It is either an extraordinary work of God, or a futile and impious bit of supposed magic.

But it happens—or is alleged to happen—much too often to count as an extraordinary work; so it has to be a conjuration or incantation—a bit of magic. They want us to believe that this can alter something’s nature in a way that is contrary to fact and contrary to the testimony of our sight.
and of all the rest of our senses. There's an example of this in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. The officiating priest ought to consecrate bread and wine to God's service in the sacrament, i.e. to separate it from its common use, taking it to signify—i.e. remind men of—their redemption by the passion of Christ, whose body was broken and blood shed on the cross for our transgressions. But he doesn't do that; or anyway that's not all that he does. He claims that by saying the words of our Saviour, 'This is my body' and 'This is my blood', he brings it about that what's there is no longer something with the nature of bread but rather the actual body of Christ; although there is no sensorily detectable change from what was there before the consecration.

The Egyptian magicians who are said to have turned their rods into serpents, and water into blood, are thought to have merely deluded the senses of the spectators by a false show of things, and yet they are admired as enchanters. But what would we have thought of them if their rods had looked nothing like serpents, and the 'enchanted' water didn't look like anything except water, and they coolly insisted to the king that these were serpents that looked like rods, and blood that seemed to be water? That would have been both enchantment and lying! And yet the priests in this daily act of theirs do just that, treating the holy words as though they were a charm that makes no difference to what we see or otherwise sense; and they coolly insist that their charm has turned the bread into a man—indeed, into a God—and require men to worship it as if it were our Saviour himself present, both God and Man. This is the most gross idolatry. If it could be excused from that by the plea that what is being worshipped in the sacrament 'is no longer bread, but God', then why shouldn't the same excuse serve the Egyptians, if they were willing to brazen it out and say that the leeks and onions that they worshipped weren't actual leeks and onions but rather a divinity that looked just like them?

Properly understood, the words 'This is my body' are equivalent to 'This signifies or represents my body': it's an ordinary figure of speech, and taking it literally is just misusing it. And even if we do take it literally, it can't apply to anything except the bread that Christ himself consecrated with his own hands. He didn't say that any bread whatsoever of which any priest whatsoever said 'This is my body' or 'This is Christ's body' would immediately be transubstantiated [that is, turned into the body of Christ. The thesis is that the substance of the bread is changed into the substance of Christ's body, though it still retains the qualities of bread. Hence the label 'transubstantiation'—the going across of a substance.] And the Church of Rome didn't establish this 'transubstantiation' until the time of Pope Innocent III, less than 500 years ago, when the power of Popes was at its highest and the darkness of the time at its deepest.

[Hobbes continues with criticisms of other examples of the mistake of taking a consecration of something to be the magical production of a change in it. He does this with a scornful elaboration of detail concerning baptism, and then more briefly concerning marriage, extreme unction [the sacrament for the dying], the consecration of churches, exorcism, and others. In the Latin version he adds a fierce little paragraph about demons, thus:] It should be noted that in the exorcisms that I have just mentioned, unclean spirits, i.e. demons, are called 'phantasms'; from which it follows that unclean spirits or demons are not regarded by the Roman church as real beings, as they say; and therefore they are not substances but only idols, i.e. nothing.

[With this, as with the first misunderstanding, Hobbes will return a bit later to discuss what the Bible says about consecration. Thus:] As for the rites of consecration, although they mainly depend on the discretion and judgment...
of the governors of the Church, and not on the Bible, those governors are obliged to abide by any constraints that are imposed by the nature of the consecrating action—e.g. that the ceremonies, words and gestures be both decent and significant, or at least appropriate to the action. When Moses consecrated the tabernacle, the altar, and the vessels belonging to them, he anointed them with the oil that God had commanded to be made for that purpose, and they were holy.\(^5\) Nothing was exorcised so as to drive away phantasms. [Hobbes says similar things about Moses’ consecration of Aaron and his sons, and about Solomon’s consecration of the temple he had built,\(^6\) noting that each man was at the relevant time ‘the civil sovereign of Israel’. The Solomon passage includes this:] Here was no procession; the King stood still in his first place; no exorcised water; no calling of attention to himself; nothing but a decent and rational speech that was very suitable to the occasion of presenting to God his new-built house.

We don’t read that John the Baptist exorcised the water of the river Jordan, or that Philip exorcised the water of the river in which he baptized the eunuch. Nor do we read that any pastor at the time of the apostles took his spittle and put it to the nose of the person to be baptized, saying ‘for a sweet savour unto the Lord’. Such a ceremony of spittle couldn’t be justified, because it is unsanitary; and such a use of that biblical passage can’t be justified either, because it’s frivolous. [The biblical passage Hobbes evidently has in mind here, and is implying shouldn’t be accepted as literally true, is Mark 7:32–5, which reports Jesus as curing a man of deafness by spitting in his ears.]

Third misunderstanding: ‘eternal life’ etc.

Another general error comes from misinterpreting the words ‘eternal life’, ‘everlasting death’, and ‘the second death’. Here is the account that we read plainly in Holy Scripture:

\[\text{God created Adam as someone who was to live for ever if he didn’t disobey God’s command -not to eat fruit from the *tree of the knowledge of good and evil*.}\]
\[\text{Immortality wasn’t essential to human nature; it was a consequence of the power of the *tree of life*, from which Adam was allowed to eat as long as he hadn’t sinned; and he was thrown out of Paradise after he had sinned -by disobeying God’s command-, so that he wouldn’t eat fruit from the *tree of life* and live for ever -as a consequence-. Christ’s Passion [i.e. his suffering and death] is a discharge of sin to all who believe in Him, and so it’s a restitution of eternal life to all the faithful, but not to anyone else.}\]

But what has been taught for centuries is not that, but this:

\[\text{Every man has eternal life by nature, because his soul is immortal. So the flaming sword at the entrance of Paradise, while it stops a man from coming to the *tree of life*, doesn’t have the role of preventing him from regaining an immortality that God stripped from him because of his sin, or of needing Christ’s sacrifice as a way to regain his immortality. Thus, it’s not only the faithful and righteous who will have eternal life; so also will the wicked and the heathen.}\]

On this account, there isn’t any death at all, let alone a second and everlasting death -such as is spoken of in the Book of Revelation-.\(^7\) To square the doctrine of natural immortality with the passages about ‘the second death’, they say that the Bible’s ‘second and everlasting death’ really means a second and everlasting life, but in torment. If that’s a genuine figure of speech—‘*death* meaning ‘life in

\[^5\text{Exodus 40.}\]
\[^6\text{1 Kings 8.}\]
\[^7\text{Revelation 20:6,14 and 21:8.}\]
torment’—this is the only instance of it! This doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul isn’t needed for the Christian faith. Suppose that when a man dies, nothing remains of him but his carcass; can’t God, who raised dust and clay into a living creature by His word, just as easily raise a dead carcass to life again, and either keep him alive for ever or make him die again by another word? And the entire biblical basis for the doctrine consists in some of the obscurer passages in the New Testament—passages that can clearly be given a different sense if they are seen in the light of the Bible as a whole. In Scripture, ‘soul’ always signifies either the life or the living creature, and ‘body and soul’ together signify the living body. [Hobbes proceeds to cite evidence for this, from Genesis 1 and 2 and from Deuteronomy 12. Then:] What makes it the case that the souls of the faithful will remain in their bodies from the resurrection to all eternity is not their own inherent nature, but rather God’s special grace. I think I have already sufficiently proved this on the basis of the Scriptures, in chapter 38. . . . This thesis that the soul is naturally immortal is a window through which some dark doctrines enter. They proceed in a kind of sequence, with each one encouraging one or more of those that follow it:

• eternal torments,
• purgatory, where these incorporeal substances—these immortal souls—are supposed to be cleansed by burning so that they’ll be fit for heaven,
• the walking around—especially in places that are consecrated, solitary, or dark—of the ghosts of men who have died,
• the claims regarding the exorcism and conjuration of phantasms,
• the invocation of men who are dead,
• indulgences, i.e. reduction—perhaps to zero—of the time one has to spend in the fire of purgatory.

• Here is how the doctrine of purgatory came into being. Before the time of our Saviour, men were generally infected by the contagion of the demonology of the Greeks, which led to their believing that the souls of men are substances distinct from (and separable from) their bodies; and therefore that when a man’s body is dead—any man, whether godly or wicked—his soul must exist somewhere by virtue of its own nature, with no involvement of any supernatural gift on God’s part. The great teachers of the Church wondered for a long time where these souls were to be until they are reunited with their bodies in the resurrection. For a while, they were supposed to lie under the altars in churches; but then the Church of Rome found it more profitable to build for them this place called ‘Purgatory’, though in more recent times some other Churches have demolished it.

[After revisiting the first two misunderstandings to see what biblical support there is for them, Hobbes does the same for this third misunderstanding. Thus:] As a reminder, here is the thesis I have been opposing:

The soul, separated from the body, lives eternally because this is something that follows naturally from the essence of mankind. So it doesn’t apply only to the souls of those who are chosen—a special grace which restores to us the eternal life that Adam lost through sin and our Saviour restored by the sacrifice of himself—but also to the souls of reprobates.

Various biblical passages seem at first sight to support this; but when I compare them with the passage from Job 14 that I discussed earlier, I find it much easier to re-interpret these passages that seem to support the thesis than to re-interpret the passage from Job that seems to contradict it!

(1) There are the words of Solomon, ‘Then shall the dust return to dust as it was, and the spirit shall return to God.
that gave it.’

The bit about ‘the spirit shall return’ etc. could mean merely that only God knows, man doesn’t, what becomes of a man’s spirit when he dies. That is, we can interpret it in that way if there are no other passages that go directly against this interpretation. In fact, this same Solomon, in the same book, explicitly says the very thing that I have put into that interpretation: speaking of men and beasts, he says ‘All go to the same place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again; who knows that the spirit of man goes upward and that the spirit of the beast goes downward to the earth?’ That is, only God knows; there is nothing unusual about saying of things we don’t understand ‘God knows what,’ and ‘God knows where’.

(2) Hobbes now presents a passage (Genesis 5:24) about Enoch being taken up to heaven without dying first. He questions whether it supports the disputed thesis, and then moves on to a different passage which he thinks clearly contradicts the thesis. Thus:] How can we interpret in any way except literally these words of Solomon’s? ‘That which befals the sons of men befals beasts, even one thing befals them; as the one dies, so does the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man has no pre-eminence above a beast, for all is vanity.’ Taken literally, this doesn’t imply natural immortality for the soul, or anything that conflicts with the eternal life that the elect will enjoy through God’s grace. . . .

(3) Another passage that seems to imply a natural immortality for the soul is the one where our Saviour says that Abraham, Issaac, and Jacob are living. But this refers to God’s promise, which made it certain that they would rise again, not to a life that was then actual. It’s in that same sense that God said to Adam that if he ate the forbidden fruit then on that day he would certainly die; from the moment he ate the fruit, he was a dead man by sentence but not by the carrying out of the sentence almost a thousand years later. Similarly, Abraham, Issac, and Jacob were alive by promise at the time when Christ spoke, but aren’t actually alive until the resurrection. . . .

(4) Other passages in the New Testament seem to attribute immortality directly to the wicked. It’s clear that they will all rise on judgment day; and in many passages it is said that they will go into ‘everlasting fire’, ‘everlasting torments’, ‘everlasting punishments’; and that ‘the worm of conscience never dies’; and all this is brought together in the phrase ‘everlasting death’, which is ordinarily interpreted as meaning ‘everlasting life in torment’. But I can’t find any support for that interpretation; i.e. I can’t find any passage saying that any man will live in torment everlastingly. Also, it seems hard to say that God,

• who is the father of mercies,
• who does whatever he wants to, in heaven and earth,
• who has the hearts of all men at his disposal,
• who is at work in men’s actions and intentions, and
• without whose free gift a man has no inclination to good or repentance of evil,

would punish men’s transgressions without any end in time, and with all the extremity of torture that men can imagine, and more. Let us, then, consider what is meant by such biblical phrases as ‘everlasting fire’.

I have already shown that the kingdom of God by Christ begins on the day of judgment; that on that day the faithful will rise from the dead, with glorious and spiritual bodies, and be God’s subjects in his kingdom which will be eternal; that they will not marry or eat or drink as they did in

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their natural bodies, but will live for ever in their individual persons without the specifical eternity of generation [those last six words seem to mean: I’m talking about real everlastingness of *individuals*, not the everlastingness of their *species* through the constant begetting of new members of the species]; that *the* reprobates will also rise again to receive punishments for their sins; and that *those* of the elect who are still alive in their earthly bodies when judgment day comes will on that day have their bodies suddenly changed and made spiritual and immortal. Now for the thesis

that the bodies of the reprobate, who constitute the kingdom of Satan, will also be glorious or spiritual bodies; that they will be like the angels of God, not eating or drinking or procreating; that their life will be eternal in their individual persons, as the life of every faithful man is, or as the life of Adam would have been if he hadn't sinned.

No passage in Scripture supports this, except for the ones concerning ‘eternal torments’, which can be interpreted so that they don’t support it either.

We can infer from this that just as the elect after the resurrection will be restored to the situation Adam was in *before* he had sinned, so the reprobate will be in the situation Adam and his posterity were in *after* he had sinned—but without God’s promise of a redeemer . . . .

In the light of all this, the texts that mention ‘eternal fire’, ‘eternal torments’, or ‘the worm that never dies’ don’t contradict the doctrine of a second and everlasting death, when ‘death’ is understood in its literal and natural sense. The fire or torments prepared for the wicked . . . .may continue forever; and there may always be wicked men to be tormented in them, without anyone’s being in them eternally . . . . St. Paul, speaking of the ‘resurrection’, means by this only the resurrection to eternal life, not the resurrection to punishment. Writing about the former—the resurrection of the saved people to eternal life—he says that the body is ‘sown in corruption, raised in incorruption; sown in dishonour, raised in honour; sown in weakness, raised in power; sown a natural body, raised a spiritual body.’ Nothing like that can be said about the bodies of those who rise from the dead to be punished.

Similarly, when our Saviour speaks of the condition of man after the resurrection, he means the resurrection to life eternal, not the resurrection to punishment. This is a fertile text:

The children of *this* world marry, and are given in marriage; but they that shall be counted worthy to obtain *that* world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage; neither can they die any more: for they are equal to the angels, and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection.

The children of this world, who are in the situation that Adam left them in, will marry and be given in marriage; that is, they will go through a series of births and deaths (which gives immortality to the human species but not to individual men). They aren’t worthy to receive an absolute resurrection from the dead in the next world, but only a brief time in that world—so as to be punished with a severity that fits their obstinate disobedience. It is only the elect who

*are the children of the resurrection, i.e.*

*are heirs of eternal life;*

*can die no more,*

*are equal to the angels, and*  

*are the children of God*— *only* the elect, and not the reprobate. What the reprobate

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12 1 Corinthians 15.  
will get after the resurrection is a second and eternal death, and the period between that resurrection and their second death they will incur punishment and torment. This torment will last—through a series of sinners—for as long as the human species survives by propagation, i.e. eternally. [The chapter ends with five pages about the doctrine of purgatory.]

Hobbes contends that there is no clear biblical basis for this doctrine, and discusses at some length eight passages that might seem to support it, weaving this in with arguments against Cardinal Bellarmine, who defended the doctrine on the basis of the Bible.]

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Chapter 45 is omitted ('Demonology and other relics of the religion of the gentiles')

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[The English version of Chapter 46 is very different from the Latin version. Both will be given here, starting with the English version.—In this chapter, the word 'philosophy' will be left untouched; but remember that in Hobbes’s use it covers science as well as what we know as ‘philosophy’.]

**Chapter 46. Darkness from vain philosophy and fabulous traditions** (English version)

Philosophy is understood to be

- knowledge acquired by reasoning so as to be able to produce—so far as the materials and our abilities are up to the task—such effects as human life requires. The reasoning in question is either *from the way something comes into being to *its properties, or *from something’s properties to *some possible way of bringing it into being.

So the geometrician reasons his way to many properties of figures from how they are constructed, and from those properties he reasons his way to new ways of constructing the figures. What this is all for is measuring land and water, and countless other uses. And the astronomer reasons from *the rising, setting, and moving of the sun and stars in various parts of the heavens to *the causes of day and night, and of the different seasons of the year, this being knowledge that he uses in keeping an account of time. And similarly with other sciences.

This definition shows clearly that we aren’t to include in ‘philosophy’ any part of that basic sort of knowledge called ‘experience’, which is the main ingredient in prudence. Why? Because it isn’t reached by reasoning, and is just as much in
brute beasts as in man; it is merely a memory of sequences of events in times past, in which the omission of any little detail -in a cause- may alter the effect, frustrating the expectation of even the most prudent person. · That means that such ‘knowledge’ is essentially fragile; whereas anything that is learned through sound reasoning is universally, eternally, and unchangeably true.

Nor should we label as ‘philosophy’ any false conclusions. Someone who reasons soundly in words that he understands can’t ever reach a false conclusion.

Nor anything that someone knows by supernatural revelation; because that isn’t acquired by reasoning.

Nor anything that is acquired by reasoning from the authority of books; because that isn’t reasoning from cause to effect, or from effect to cause. What it yields is not knowledge but faith.

Because the faculty of reasoning results from the use of speech, it was inevitable that some general truths would be discovered through reasoning almost as far back in time as language itself. The savages of America have some good moral judgments; and they have a little arithmetic with which they add and divide fairly small numbers; but that doesn’t make them philosophers. Just as

there were a few corn-plants and grape-vines scattered through the fields and woods before men •knew what they were good for or •used them for nourishment or •planted them in separate fields and vineyards, during which time men ate acorns and drank water,

so also

there have been various true, general, and useful bits of theory from the beginning, these being the natural plants of human reason. But at first there were so few of them that men lived on unrefined experience; there was no method—i.e. no sowing or planting of knowledge by itself, separated from the weeds and common plants of error and conjecture.

They couldn’t do any better than that as long as procuring the necessities of life and defending themselves against their neighbours left them with no leisure ·to engage in speculation·. What made a change possible was the establishment of great commonwealths.

Leisure is the mother of philosophy; and commonwealth is the mother of peace and leisure. The first great and flourishing cities were the scenes of the first study of philosophy. The Gymnosophists of India, the Magi of Persia, and the Priests of Chaldaea and Egypt are regarded as the earliest philosophers, and those countries were the earliest kingdoms. There was no philosophy among the Greeks, or other people of the west, while their commonwealths (little states possibly no bigger than Lucca or Geneva) had no peace except when their fears of one another were evenly balanced, and no leisure to observe anything but one another. Eventually, when war had united many of the lesser Greek cities into fewer and greater ·political entities·, seven men in different parts of Greece began to get a reputation for wisdom—some for their moral and political judgments, others for astronomy and geometry, which they learned from the Chaldaeans and Egyptians. There is still no mention of schools of philosophy.

·SCHOOLS (GREEK AND JEWISH) AND UNIVERSITIES·

Then the Athenians overthrew the Persian armies and came to have dominion of the sea, and thus to dominate all the islands and maritime cities—Asian and European—in the ·Greek· archipelago. They became wealthy; and those who had no employment at home or abroad had little to pass their time with except •gossiping and •discussing philosophy publicly with the youth of the city. [Hobbes goes on with
details about the places the philosophical ‘masters’—Plato, Aristotle, etc.—chose for public philosophising. He mentions Carneades, who did the same thing in Rome, greatly alarming some who thought he was corrupting the young men who gathered around him. Then:] The place where any of them taught and debated was called schola, which is Greek for ‘leisure’, and their debates were called diatribae, which is Greek for ‘passing the time’. . . . Men were so much taken with this practice that in time it spread itself over all of Europe and most of north Africa, until there were publicly established and supported schools, for lectures and debates, in almost every Commonwealth.

The Jews had schools too, both before and after the time of our Saviour, but they were schools of Jewish law. They were called ‘synagogues’, meaning in Greek ‘congregations of the people’; but they weren’t different (except in name) from public schools, because every Sabbath day the law was read, expounded, and debated in them. They existed not only in Jerusalem but in every Gentile city that had a population of Jews. [He names some of the places that had synagogues. Then:] But what use were those Greek schools? What knowledge does anyone get today from their readings and debating? Geometry is the mother of all natural science, and we aren’t indebted to the schools for our geometrical knowledge. The best Greek philosopher, Plato, wouldn’t admit into his school anyone who wasn’t already something of a geometrician. Many people studied that science, to the great advantage of mankind; but there is no mention of schools of geometry. There was no sect of geometricians, and the geometricians weren’t labelled as ‘philosophers’.

The natural philosophy [here = ‘philosophy and science’] of those schools was more a dream than a body of knowledge, and it was expressed in senseless and insignificant language that can’t be avoided by anyone trying to teach philosophy without having learned a great deal of geometry. Why is geometry so important to philosophy? Because nature works by motion, and the directions and speeds of motion can’t be known without knowledge of the proportions and properties of lines and figures—which is geometry.

The moral philosophy of the ancient Greeks is merely a description of their own passions. They base their rules of good and bad conduct on their own likes and dislikes, and these vary so much that there is nothing generally agreed on. Everyone one does (as far as he dares) whatever seems good to him, a state of affairs that subverts political society.

Contrast that with the truth about these matters: The rule of conduct where there is no civil government is just the law of nature; and where there is civil government it’s the civil law that settles what is honest or dishonest, just or unjust—quite generally what is good or evil.

The logic of the Greeks, which should be the method of reasoning, is nothing but verbal puzzles and tricks for dealing with them.

To conclude, there’s nothing so absurd that it hasn’t been maintained by some of the ancient philosophers. Cicero said so, and he was one of them! In my view, there is almost nothing more absurdly said in natural philosophy than what is now called ‘Aristotle’s metaphysics’, more in conflict with government than much of his Politics, or more ignorant than a great part of his Ethics.

The school of the Jews was originally a school of the law of Moses, who commanded that at the end of every seventh year, at the Feast of the Tabernacles, the law should be read to all the people so that they could hear and learn it (Deuteronomy 31:10). So the reading of the law... every Sabbath day ought to have aimed only at acquainting the people with the commandments they were to obey, and expounding to them
the writings of the prophets. But the many criticisms of them by our Saviour make it clear that they •corrupted the text of the law with their false commentaries and pointless traditions, and •had so little grasp of the prophets that they didn’t acknowledge Christ or his works, which the prophets had prophesied. Thus, the lectures and debates in their synagogues had the effect of turning the theory of their law into a fantastical kind of philosophy about the incomprehensible nature of God and of spirits. They put this together out of •three ingredients•: •the pointless philosophy and theology of the Greeks, •their own fancies, based on obscure bits of the Bible that they could most easily forced to serve their purposes, and •the traditional fables of their ancestors. What we now call a ‘university’ is a joining together and incorporating under one government of many public schools in one and the same town. The principal schools •or departments• in universities were dedicated to the three professions,

•Roman religion.
•Roman law, and
•the art of medicine.

The only way philosophy gets a place in this scheme is as a handmaid to the Roman religion; and since the authority of Aristotle dominates there, what goes on...isn’t really philosophy but Aristotelity! What about geometry? Until very recently, it had no place at all •in any university•, because it is subservient to nothing but rigid truth. If anyone was able, through his own individual talent, to gain considerable geometrical knowledge, it was usually thought that he was a magician and that his art was diabolical.

•Ancient Greek Metaphysics•

Now let us look into the particular tenets of pointless philosophy that the Church got from the universities, and that they got partly from Aristotle and partly from stupidity.

I shall first consider their principles. There is a certain philosophia prima [Latin = ‘primary philosophy’ or ‘first philosophy’] on which all other philosophy ought to depend. It mainly consists in correctly limiting the meanings of the most universal appellation or names, so as to avoid ambiguity and equivocation in reasoning. The usual label for a such a delimiting is ‘definition’— examples are the definitions of ‘body’, ‘time’, ‘place’, ‘matter’, ‘form’, ‘essence’, ‘subject’, ‘substance’, ‘accident’, ‘power’, ‘act’, ‘finite’, ‘infinite’, ‘quantity’, ‘quality’, ‘motion’, ‘action’, ‘passion’, and various others that are also needed to express one’s ideas regarding the nature and generation of bodies.

The explanation (i.e. the settling of the meaning) of terms like these is commonly called ‘metaphysics’ in the schools, because it is a part of the philosophy of Aristotle, which is called ‘metaphysics’. But it is in another sense—i.e. what we have here is an unintended pun•. In the context of Aristotle, ‘metaphysics’ simple means ‘written or placed after his natural philosophy [= ‘his physics’]: but the schools take those books to concern supernatural philosophy, i.e. topics that are above physics•; and the word ‘metaphysics’ can carry either of those meanings. And -in an unintended way the schools are right•: most of what is written there as ‘metaphysics’ is so far from the possibility of being understood, and so much in conflict with natural reason, that anyone who thinks that it could mean something must think it is supernatural!

These metaphysics (which are mingled with the Bible to make school theology) tell us that the world contains certain essences separated from bodies; they are called ‘abstract essences’ and ‘substantial forms’; and if you are to understand this jargon you’ll have to attend especially carefully. I’ll be writing this for readers who are used to this kind of discourse; please pardon me if you are not one of
AS BACKGROUND: HOBBEES’S MATERIALISM.

The world—not this planet, but the entire universe—is corporeal, i.e. it is body; it has length, breadth, and depth; and every part of body is body too, and also has length, breadth and depth. So every part of the universe is body, and what isn’t body isn’t part of the universe: and because the universe is all there is, what isn’t a part of it is nothing and consequently nowhere. [Hobbes is about to mention ‘spirits’. This could mean ‘minds’; it could also refer to the super-fine gaseous matter that was thought to have a role in animal physiology. For Hobbes this wasn’t an ambiguity, because he held that minds are ‘spirits’ in the sense of super-fine matter.] This doesn’t imply that spirits are nothing. They have dimensions, and are therefore really bodies; though in common speech ‘body’ is usually applied only to bodies that can be seen or felt, i.e. that have some degree of opacity. But the schoolmen call spirits ‘incorporeal’ [= ‘not bodies’], a more honourable label and thus one that can with more piety be applied to God himself. In thinking this we aren’t thinking about what adjective best expresses God’s nature (which is incomprehensible) but only about what best expresses our desire to honour him.

THE ERROR THAT LED TO ‘ABSTRACT ESSENCES’.

Why do they say that there are ‘abstract essences’ or ‘substantial forms’? Well, consider first what those words do properly signify. [In this context, ‘name of x’ means ‘word that can be applied to x’; a ‘name’ in this sense may be a general noun or an adjective.] The use of words is to register to ourselves and make manifest to others the thoughts and conceptions of our minds. (1) Some words are the names of the things conceived or perceived, such as the names of all sorts of bodies that affect our senses and leave an impression in the imagination. (2) Others are the names of the imaginings themselves, i.e. the ideas or mental images we have of the things we see or remember. (3) Others again are names of names, e.g.

or of other parts of speech or forms of speech, e.g.


(4) Yet others serve to show the logical relations between names, i.e. that one name implies or is inconsistent with another. If you say ‘A man is a body’, you mean that the name ‘body’ follows necessarily from the name ‘man’, because these are two names for one thing, man; and this relation is signified by using ‘is’ to couple them together. Corresponding to our use of the verb ‘is’, the Latins use ‘est’ and the Greeks ‘esti’. I don’t know whether all nations have something corresponding to ‘is’ in their various languages, but I am sure that they don’t need such a word. What gives words their force is customary usage; and the speakers of some language might have the custom of signifying that one word is implied by another just by placing the two in order, e.g. saying ‘men mortal’ instead of ‘men are mortal’ and so on, thus removing any need for ‘is’, ‘be’, ‘are’ and so on.

That would be a language that had no verb corresponding to ‘est’ or ‘is’ or ‘be’; yet the users of it would be every bit as capable of inferring, concluding, and of all kind of reasoning as were the Greeks and Latins. But then what would become of the terms ‘entity’, ‘essence’, ‘essential’, ‘essentiality’ that are derived from it—specifically, from the Greek verb ‘to be’—and of many more that depend on these in their common use? So these words aren’t names of things; they are signs by which we show that we conceive of one name or attribute as following from another: when we say ‘a man is a living body’, we do not mean that the man is
one thing, the living body another, and the ‘is’ or being is a third; but that the man is the same thing as the living body, because the conditional ‘If he is a man, he is a living body’ is a true consequence, signified by the word ‘is’. Therefore, ‘to be a body’, ‘to walk’, ‘to be speaking’, ‘to live’, ‘to see’ and other such infinitives, and also the abstract nouns ‘corporeity’, ‘walking’, ‘speaking’, ‘life’, ‘sight’ and so on—which signify just the same—are not names of anything, as I have explained in more detail earlier.

· An aside: why bother?

You may ask: ‘What’s the point of going into such subtleties in a work of this kind, in which you purport to treat of nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of government and obedience?’

The point is to stop men from being abused by this doctrine of ‘separated essences’, built on the empty philosophy of Aristotle, which would scare them away from obeying the laws of their country, like a farmer scaring birds with an empty coat, a hat, and a crooked stick. This doctrine is at work (1) when they say that after a man has died and been buried, his soul—i.e. his life—can walk separated from his body, and is seen by night among the graves. And (2) when they say that the shape-and-colour-and-taste of a piece of bread has a being—i.e. exists—in a place where there is no bread. And (3) when they say that faith and wisdom and other virtues are sometimes poured into a man and sometimes blown into him, from heaven, as though virtues could exist apart from virtuous people. [Hobbes is mockingly relying on the fact that the Latin source of ‘infused’ means ‘poured’, and of ‘inspired’ means ‘breathed’. His main point is not that little joke, but the wrongness of treating ‘faith’ and ‘wisdom’ as names of transferable commodities; similarly with ‘life’ in (1) and ‘shape’ etc. in (2).] These absurdties· and many others like them serve to make people less dependent on the sovereign power of their country. (3) Who is going to try to obey the laws if he expects obedience to be poured or blown into him? (2) If a priest can make God out of bread in the Eucharist·, who won’t obey him rather than his sovereign—indeed, rather than obeying God himself? (1) Of those who are afraid of ghosts, who won’t have great respect for those who can make the holy water that drives ghosts away? These are enough examples of the errors that have entered the Church from the ‘entities’ and ‘essences’ of Aristotle. It may be that he knew this was false philosophy, and wrote it merely as something that supports their religion, fearing the fate of Socrates.

· Ancient Greek metaphysics: details·

Once they have fallen into this error of ‘separated essences’ or ‘forms’, they are inevitably involved in many other absurdities that follow from it. [The ‘they’ in question are any philosophers or theologians, ancient or modern, who follow Aristotle.] Because they insist that these ‘forms’ are real, they have to put them in some place. But because they regard them as incorporeal, without any length, breadth or depth, and everyone knows that any place has length, breadth and depth, and can’t be filled by anything that isn’t corporeal, they are forced to proposition up their story with a distinction: the ·forms or essences·, they say, aren’t indeed anywhere ·circumscripive’, but ·are somewhere· ·definitive’. These mere words don’t mean anything in this context, and their emptiness is hidden only by their being put in Latin. [Hobbes’s point is that these terms already are virtually in Latin.] ·Circumscribing something is simply determining or ·defining its place; so there is no difference between the two sides of the supposed distinction. In the particular case of the essence of a man: they say that this ‘essence’ is his soul, of which they affirm that ·all of it is in his little finger, and
• all of it is in each other part, however small, of his body; and yet
• there is no more soul in the whole body than in any one of those parts.
Can anyone think that God is served by such absurdities? Yet you have to believe all this if you believe there is an incorporeal soul distinct from the body.

When they come to explain how an incorporeal substance can suffer pain and be tormented in the fire of hell or purgatory, they have nothing at all to say—only that *it can’t be known* how fire can burn souls.

Again, motion is change of place, and incorporeal substances can’t be in any place, so these philosophers have a problem about making it seem possible for a soul to set off for heaven, hell, or purgatory without its body; and how the ghosts of men (not to mention the clothes the ghosts wear!) can walk by night in churches and cemeteries. I don’t know what they can say about this, except perhaps that the ghosts ‘walk definitive’ but don’t ‘walk circumscriptive’, or that they walk spiritually but not temporally: for such outrageous distinctions are equally applicable to any difficulty whatever.

[This paragraph is amplified and re-arranged in ways that the standard dots etc. can’t indicate.] The philosophers and theologians I am attacking have many bold opinions about the incomprehensible nature of God, and are driven to absurdities in defence of them. For example, they hold that this:

> When God knows that such-and-such will happen in the future, this knowledge comes from his having *earlier* decided to make it happen; his act of the will *causes* his foreknowledge is *false*. They keep it at bay by saying that there is no ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ in the life of God, because God doesn’t exist in time. That forces them to say that God’s *eternal* existence is not his existing *through an infinite length of time*, and thus to give a different account of what eternity is. According to them, eternity is the standing still of the present time, a *nunc-stans* as the scholastics say; which no-one understands—even they don’t understand it—any more than they would understand a *hic-stans* for an infinite greatness of place. [*nunc stans* is Latin for ‘a standing now’, and *hic stans* for ‘a standing here’.]

[Then Hobbes accuses the target philosophers of holding that one body can be in two places at once, and that two bodies can be in one place at the same time, which he (wrongly) thinks is implied by the doctrine of transubstantiation in the Eucharist. ‘These are just a few of the incongruities they are forced into’, he says, because they have utterly misunderstood the nature and purpose of theological language. When we praise God, who is incomprehensible, what we are doing is signify our desire to honour him with the best words we can think of. But these philosophers think that our honorific labels are meant to signify what God is, and that launches them on philosophical debates when they should be engaged in worshipping God. He continues:] Those who venture to reason concerning God’s *nature* on the basis of these attributes of *honor* lose their understanding [Hobbes’s phrase] in the very first step they take, then fall from one difficulty into another, endlessly. They could be compared with a man who is ignorant of the ceremonies of court, and comes into the presence of a greater person than he is used to speak to; he stumbles at his entrance, to save himself from falling he lets slip his cloak, to recover his cloak he lets fall his hat, and with one clumsiness after another he reveals himself as a bewildered rustic.

· Ancient Greek natural science.

Then for natural science [Hobbes’s word is ‘physics’, but it covers much more than ‘physics’ does for us], i.e. the knowledge of the natural causes of natural events, these ·Aristotelian philosophers· offer nothing but empty words. If you want
to know why some kinds of bodies sink naturally down toward the earth while others naturally rise up from it, the Schools will follow Aristotle in telling you that the bodies that sink downwards are heavy, and that this heaviness is what causes them to descend. But if you ask what they mean by 'heaviness' they will define it as 'an endeavour to go to the centre of the earth'; so the cause why things sink downward is an endeavour to be below, which amounts to saying that *bodies descend because they do*. (Or *ascend because they do*, because the Aristotelians tell the analogous story about things that naturally rise.) Or they'll tell you that the centre of the earth is the place of rest and conservation for heavy things, which is why heavy things endeavour to be there; as though

- pebbles and coins wanted to be in a certain place and knew where it was, as man does;
- pebbles and coins loved being immobile, as man does not, or
- a piece of glass were less safe in the window than falling into the street.

[Then a somewhat obscure passage mocking the scholastic explanation for 'why a single body can seem larger at one time than at another'. Then:] *What causes the soul of man? They answer *creatur infundendo* and *creando infunditur*—i.e. 'It is created by pouring it in' and 'It is poured in by creation'.

What causes sensory intake? The fact that there are 'species' everywhere, *they* say. These 'species' are supposed to be the *shows* or *appearances* of objects—sights, hearings, tastes, smells, feelings, depending on which part of the body they appear to. [This use of 'species' is explained in a note on page219.] They call the act of will to do any particular action *volitio*, and call the general ability men have to will sometimes one thing and sometimes another *voluntas*. What causes any particular *volitio*, according to them, is *voluntas*; that is, the power or ability to perform the act is what causes the act. Compare: 'The reason why this man performed that good (or bad) act was that he was able to perform it!'

And in many cases they announce as the cause of some natural event *their own ignorance*, except *of course* they use words that disguise what's going on. For example: they say that 'fortune' is the cause of contingent events, where calling something 'contingent' is saying that one doesn't know what caused it. Another example: they describe many things as *effects of 'occult' [= 'hidden'] qualities*, which means qualities they don't know, from which they infer that no-one else knows them either. Or as *effects of 'sympathy', 'antipathy', 'antiperistasis', 'specifical qualities' and other such terms, which don't tell us what the causally acting thing was or how it operated.*

If such metaphysics and physics as this isn't pointless philosophy, there never was any, and St. Paul didn’t need to warn us against it [presumably a reference to Colossians 2:8: 'Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit. . .'].

*ANCIENT GREEK ETHICS*

Their moral and political philosophy has the same absurdities, or greater ones. If a man performs an unjust act, i.e. an act contrary to the law, they say that God is

- the prime cause of the law,
- and also the prime cause of that and all other actions; but that he is

**not** the cause of the injustice, although that consists in the action's not fitting the law. This is pointless philosophy. It's no better than saying that one man drew two lines, one straight and one crooked, while another man made the lines different from one another. This absurdity was invented in defence of the doctrine of free will, i.e. of a will of man that isn't subject to the will of God.
It’s a good example of the kind of philosophy that men get into when they decide on their conclusions before knowing what their premises will be—other examples are ones I have just described—pretending to comprehend something that is incomprehensible, and treating attributes of honour as though they were soberly descriptive.

Aristotle and other heathen philosophers define good and evil in terms of the appetites [= ‘drives and desires] of men. That’s all right as long as we’re considering men as each one governed by his own law; because when men have no law except their own appetites, there can’t be any general rule laying down which actions are good and which evil. But in a commonwealth this account is false: for then the standard for what is good or evil is not the appetite of private men but the law, which is the will and appetite of the state. Yet this doctrine of Aristotle’s is still accepted and acted on: men judge the goodness or wickedness of their own and of other men’s actions, and the actions of the commonwealth itself, on the basis of their own passions. What anyone calls ‘good’ or ‘evil’ is just what is so in his own eyes, with no regard to the public laws; except for monks and friars, who have taken a vow that obliges them to simple obedience to their superior—just as every subject ought to think that the law of nature obliges him to simple obedience to the civil sovereign. This private standard of good—making every man his own judge—is not only absurd philosophy but also pernicious to the public state.

It is also bad and false philosophy to say that the work of marriage [Hobbes’s phrase] is inconsistent with chastity and continence [= ‘sexual restraint’], and on that basis to make such actions moral vices. Does anyone say such things? Yes, those who claim to base their denial of marriage to the clergy on the claims of chastity and continence. . . . They make marriage a sin, or at least a thing so impure and unclean as to render a man unfit for the altar. The law about the celibacy of priests might be based not on the view that

• having relations with a wife is contrary to chastity, so that all marriage is vice, but rather on the view that
• having relations with a wife is too impure and unclean for a man consecrated to God;

but in that case other natural, necessary and daily works that all men do render them all unworthy to be priests, because they are even more unclean!

But the real basis for this prohibition of marriage for priests isn’t likely to have been anything as flimsy as such errors in moral philosophy, or on the preference for single life over the estate of matrimony (which came from the wisdom of St. Paul, who saw that in those times of persecution when preachers of the gospel were forced to fly from one country to another, it would be very troublesome to be burdened with the care of wife and children). The real secret basis for the prohibition is probably the plan of the popes and priests of later times to make themselves—the sole heirs to the kingdom of God in this world. To achieve this they had to forgo marriage, because our Saviour said that at the coming of his kingdom the children of God ‘shall neither marry nor be given in marriage, but shall be as the angels in heaven’ [Matthew 22:30]. Being ‘as the angels in heaven’ is being spiritual; and because that clergy had already given themselves the title ‘spiritual’, it would have been incongruous for them to allow themselves wives when there was no need to do so. [Perhaps Hobbes thinks of the label ‘spiritual’ as implied by the common use of ‘Reverend’ in the name of a priest.]

From Aristotle’s civil [here = ‘political’] philosophy, they have learned to describe as ‘tyranny’ every kind of commonwealth except the popular kind [here = ‘democracy’]—that being what
Athens had in Aristotle’s time. They called all kings ‘tyrants’, and they labelled as ‘the thirty tyrants’ the aristocracy of the thirty governors that were set up in Athens by the Spartans who had beaten them in the Peloponnesian war. [Twenty-odd years earlier, Hobbes had published a translation of Thucydides’ famous history of that war.] Their name for the condition of people in a democracy was ‘liberty’. Originally ‘tyrant’ merely meant ‘monarch’. But later, when that kind of government was abolished in most parts of Greece, the name began to signify not only what it did before but also the hatred that the democratic states had for it. In the same way the title ‘king’ became odious after the deposing of the kings in Rome; men find it natural, when they have applied some label to a hated enemy, to start thinking of that label as having something nasty embedded in its very meaning.

And when those same men become displeased with those who are administering the democracy, or the aristocracy, they don’t have to look far for disgraceful names in which to express their anger: they glibly call one ‘anarchy’, and the other ‘oligarchy’ (which means ‘the tyranny of a few’). And in such cases what offends the people is just the fact that the way they are governed is not what each of them would himself have chosen, but what has been chosen by the public representative, whether one man or an assembly of men. This leads them to give nasty names to their superiors, never knowing—except perhaps a little after a civil war—that without such a government driven by the governors’ choices there will be perpetual civil war, and that the force and power of the laws comes from men and weapons, not words and promises.

That brings me to another error in Aristotle’s politics, namely his thesis that a well-ordered commonwealth should have a government not of men but of laws. What man in his right mind, even if he can’t write or read, doesn’t find himself governed by those whom he fears and thinks can kill or hurt him if he disobeys? Or does believe that he can be hurt by the law, i.e. by words on paper, without hands and swords of men? This is one of the pernicious errors—the ones that induce men who dislike those who govern them to ally themselves with those who call the governors ‘tyrants’, and to think it lawful to raise war against them. Yet such people are often cherished from the pulpit by the clergy!

These philosophers have another error in their civil philosophy—one that they didn’t learn from Aristotle or Cicero or any other of the heathens. It concerns law, which is really a rule for actions, but which they say can cover not only how men act but also what they think. That would make it legitimate to take someone whose speech and actions are lawful and inquire into his thoughts and his conscience. Such an inquisition [Hobbes’s word] could lead to a man’s being punished for truthfully declaring his thoughts, or constrained to lie about them for fear of punishment. It is true that someone being considered for the post of governmental minister in charge of teaching may be asked if he is content to preach such-and-such doctrines, and if he says No, it may be all right to deny him the post. But to force him to accuse himself of having this or that opinion, when his actions aren’t forbidden by law, is against the law of nature—especially in those who teach that a man will be damned to eternal and extreme torments if he dies holding a false belief concerning some part of the Christian faith. If a man thinks he knows that an error can put him in such danger, his natural care of himself will compel him to hazard his soul on his own judgment rather than that of someone else who is not involved in his damnation.

The following can happen: A private man undertakes to interpret the divine law according to his way of thinking, without being authorised by the Commonwealth—i.e. without
being permitted by its sovereign—to do this. That is another error in the politics, but it doesn’t come from Aristotle or from any other of the heathen philosophers. For none of them deny that the power of making laws includes the power of explaining them when there is a need for that. And in every country where the Scriptures are law, they are made to be law by the authority of the Commonwealth, which means that they come to be part of the civil law.

Another error of the same kind is in play when anyone other than the sovereign restricts in other people a power that the Commonwealth hasn’t restricted. An example is confining the preaching of the gospel to one class of men, where the laws have left it open to all. If the state gives me leave to preach or teach—i.e. if it doesn’t forbid me—then no man can forbid me. If I find myself amongst the idolaters of America, shall I—a Christian, though not an ordained priest—think it a sin to preach Jesus Christ before receiving orders from Rome? Or when I have preached, shall I not answer their doubts and expound the Bible to them—i.e. shall I not teach? . . . To deny these functions to those to whom the civil sovereign hasn’t denied them is to take away a lawful liberty, which is contrary to the doctrine of civil government.

Other defects in scholastic philosophy and theology.

Other examples of futile philosophy brought into religion by the professors of academic theology might be produced; but you can observe them for yourself—without help from me. I shall add just this one point:—The writings of School theologians are mostly nothing but meaningless strings of strange and barbarous words, or of words used in senses other than they have in ordinary Latin—senses that would puzzle Cicero, Varro, and all the grammarians of ancient Rome. If you want proof of this, try to translate something written by any School theologian into any of the modern tongues—French, English, or any other well-endowed language. Something that can’t be made intelligible in most of these languages isn’t intelligible in Latin either. This use of senseless language doesn’t count as false philosophy; but it is friendly to philosophical error because it is able not only to hide the truth but also to make men think they have it, which puts them off from searching further.

Then there are the errors brought in from false or suspect history, mere old wives’ fables. That’s how I would describe all the legends of fictitious miracles in the lives of the saints, all the stories of apparitions and ghosts told by the teachers in the Roman Church (to support their doctrines of hell and purgatory, the power of exorcism, and other doctrines that aren’t backed up by reason or by Scripture), and all the traditions that they call the ‘unwritten word of God’. Such stories appear from time to time in the writings of the Fathers of the early Church, but those Fathers were men who would be too prone to believe false reports. Sincere men who don’t know much about natural causes, such as they were, are often the most likely to fall for fraud, because the best men are naturally the least suspicious of the motives of others.

[The next sentence has the phrase ‘examine spirits’. Hobbes attaches to it a footnote saying ‘According to the counsel of St. John, 1 John 4:1’. That verse reads: ‘Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God; because many false prophets are gone out into the world.’] So their acceptance of these stories shouldn’t carry much weight with those who examine spirits, any more than their acceptance of anything else that concerns the power of the Roman Church. . . .

We can bracket the introduction of false philosophy with the suppression of true philosophy by men who have neither the authority nor the knowledge to be competent judges of the truth. . . . Every day brings further evidence that years
and days are determined by motions of the earth. And yet men who have in their writings merely supposed that the earth moves, not asserting it but setting it up for discussion pro and con, have been punished for this by ecclesiastical authority. [This refers to Galileo, who was punished by the Church of Rome, although his revolutionary work had been presented as a dialogue between supporters and opponents of the thesis that the earth moves, with neither side being openly declared the winner.] But what reason is there for this treatment? (1) Is it because such opinions are contrary to true religion? That can’t be so, if they are true. So let the truth be first examined by competent judges, or confuted by those who claim to know the contrary. (2) Is it because they are contrary to the established religion? Then let them be silenced by the civil laws, to which the teachers of the opinions in question are subject. Disobedience may lawfully be punished in those who teach illegally, even if what they teach is true philosophy. (3) Is it because they are likely to produce disorder in government by countenancing rebellion or sedition? Then let them be silenced, and the teachers of them punished, by the power to which the care of the public quiet has been committed, namely the civil authority. Whenever ecclesiastics (in any place where they are subject to the state) lay claim to any power in their own right, even if they call it God’s right, they are simply usurping the lawful power of the state.

What follows is the Latin version of chapter 46, based on Curley’s translation of it.

**Chapter 46. Darkness from vain philosophy** (Latin version)

Don’t expect me to heap abuse on philosophy or philosophers. What should you expect? I distinguish philosophers from non-philosophers, and true philosophy (the wisest guide of human life, the special mark of human nature) from the painted, chattering whore that has for so long been regarded as philosophy. For philosophy (i.e. the study of wisdom) as far as it extends, is wisdom, i.e. the knowledge gained by correct reasoning of effects from their conceived causes or origins, and of possible origins from known effects. No-one rejects that kind of knowledge, and Scripture doesn’t prohibit it.

This definition distinguishes philosophy (1) from experience and the kind of prudence that men share with other animals, which is acquired not by reason but by mere memory; and (2) from faith and supernatural revelation, which is not acquired by reason but handed over as a gift.

The first origin of philosophy goes back almost to the origin of speech. For both were present among the most
primitive men of the earliest times, who wondered at God's works and were stimulated by their wonder to look for the causes of the things they wondered at. But what most nourished and aided philosophy was leisure—the Greek word being *schole*—and what gives birth to leisure is *peace*, which isn't usually found anywhere but in great cities. That is why the first professed students of wisdom were the Gymnosophists of India, the Magi of Persia, and the Priests of the Chaldeans and Egyptians, at a time when philosophy hadn't yet arisen among the Greeks and western peoples. But when the Athenian republic began to flourish after the defeat of the Persians, Athenians who had nothing else to do... began to gather in public places for conversation. As St. Luke says (Acts 17:21), they 'spent their time in nothing but telling or hearing some new thing'. [Hobbes refers to this also in the English version of the chapter. In neither version does he remark that the author of the Acts of the Apostles was talking about Athenian gossips about 500 years after Athens's victory over the Persians.] So those who seemed to have got somewhere in philosophy began to teach others, Plato in the Academy, Aristotle in the Lyceum, others in the Stoa; they called these places 'schools' [from *schole*, leisure], and called their debates 'diantribes' [from a Greek word meaning 'passing the time in conversation']. And their followers were distinguished by labels based on those places—'academics', 'peripatetics' [meaning 'people who walk up and down', as Aristotle was said to do while teaching in the Lyceum], 'stoics' and so on. These demarcating labels and their link to the corresponding doctrines remained until the time of our Saviour, became known throughout most of Europe and Asia, and were used also to distinguish the philosophers of those later times from one another. There were public schools in Judea too; but they were in the synagogues, where the laws of the Jews were publicly explained and debated. Examples were the schools of the freedmen, the Cyrenians, the Alexandrians, and the Cilicians.

But what use were the Greek schools to the human race? Plato, indeed, was a philosopher and a noteworthy geometer, but he didn't owe that to any school. We owe our present good knowledge of physics and geometry to Archimedes—a man who didn't belong to any school. The 'peripatetic' school talked so much that the other schools fell silent; but what did it have to offer apart from rhetorical and dialectical tricks? For what natural phenomenon did it give a causal explanation other than ones that were obvious to everyone? But although the schools were useless, they were still harmless at this point. The sects might disagree among themselves till they came to blows, but philosophy itself was still free. Aristotle's doctrines were more widely received than those of the other sects, but no-one was forced to swear by them.

The schools of the Jews also did them no good. The law and the prophets were regularly explained in them, yet when the Messiah they were waiting for *came*, they hadn't learned to recognize him. The Jews didn't look to the doctrines of the Greeks for help; they regarded the sacred scriptures of the Old Testament as the whole of philosophy.

But Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle's, was highly honoured at the time of the early church, when every day there were Greeks accepting the Christian faith in great number. Some of them were philosophers; but they embraced Christianity in a half-baked way, being reluctant to desert the teachings of their masters, and retaining as many of those *Greek* teachings as they could somehow reconcile with Christian doctrine. This was the first origin of *sects* (the Greek word is *'heresies*) in the church of Christ. [Hobbes gives some details about how the different sects disagreed about 'the nature of Christ, whom the apostles had shown by miracles to be God': that the whole story was
an allegory, that Christ was not a real man but ‘a phantasm without a body’, that Christ was not the whole but only a part of God. He continues: The bishops and presbyters in their synods examined these new doctrines: the ones they condemned they called ‘heresies’; those they accepted they called ‘the Catholic faith’. That was when ‘Catholics’ were first distinguished from ‘heretics’. This is the context in which the heresy of Arius arose, denying that Christ was God; which was the reason for calling the Nicene Council. But that synod condemned not only Arius but all the heresies that had arisen since the birth of Christ, and briefly summed up the orthodox faith in the so-called ‘Nicene Creed’. This was taken from Scripture itself, with Greek philosophy stirred into the mix: Christ is

- true God,
- born the son of God, and
- of the same substance as God;

and the next three councils confirmed this faith, adding an article concerning faith in the Holy Ghost. They also condemned the heresy of the Africans which had arisen under Cyprian, concerning the rebaptism of those who had returned to paganism, and it added to the creed the article:

- ‘I believe in one baptism for the remission of sins.’

These doctrines, acknowledged by the synod of Nicaea from sacred Scripture, and not yet supported by pagan philosophy, found favour and were confirmed. For at that time philosophers were not a majority of the church Fathers. But less concern for the opinion of Scripture is shown in explanations of the Nicene creed—and there are a lot of those: judging by the writings that are still extant, almost every doctor of the church in the ensuing five hundred years published some explanation of that creed. The Athanasian creed says that

\[ \text{God and man are one Christ, in the same way that the rational soul and the flesh are one man.} \]

Where in sacred Scripture (or in the Nicene creed itself) do we find \textit{that}? A man’s being constituted by flesh and soul was never regarded as a mystery; but Christ in the flesh is the greatest mystery. No-one says that a man \textit{is his soul or is his body,} but it is rightly said of Christ that he \textit{is man and is God.} Where do we read in Scripture that a Christian man is to be damned unless he accepts the comparison of the incarnation [= ‘God’s becoming flesh, in the person of Jesus Christ’] with the soul and flesh of a man? Where in sacred Scripture or in the Nicene Creed do we read that there are three ‘hypostases’, i.e. three substances, i.e. three Gods, or anything equivalent to this? . . .

Another example: the Athanasian creed says that ‘the Son is from the Father alone’, and the Nicene creed’s version of that doesn’t have the word ‘alone’. Scripture is on the Nicene side in this matter, because Matthew 1:20 says that ‘what has been produced in the Virgin Mary is from the Holy Spirit’. You may want to object: ‘Eternal generation—which is what the Athanasian creed is talking about—is not the same as \textit{the generation that is produced in the womb of a virgin.}’ But where does sacred Scripture or the synod make that distinction? [Hobbes goes on for a very learned half-page, chasing down and disposing of biblical passages that might seem to favour ‘from the Father alone’. Then:] In later times, men followed the Aristotelian philosophy somewhat more freely in their writings; some of them published Aristotelian treatises on logic and physics, this being an ambitious display of their Aristotelity! They liked Aristotle’s doctrine about separated forms better than the philosophy of any of the other sects, because they—or most of them—already had fixed in their minds a demonology that was almost the same as what find in Homer and Hesiod.

In the meantime, the Roman empire having been torn apart (and already completely obliterated in Italy),
the... royal power of Rome was committed to the bishop of Rome, i.e. the Pope. That made the papacy seem to be something worth fighting over, and fight over it they did! At the time when Charlemagne (king of France) conquered the Lombards (enemies of Rome), Pope Leo III was driven out of Rome by a schism within the church. But Charlemagne brought him back and confirmed him in the papacy. In return for that, Leo made Charlemagne emperor of the western empire, publicly presenting him, in the name of God, with the imperial crown, while the people shouted God has given it! That’s the ceremony that gave to the kings of France the permanent title ‘By the grace of God, King of France’. It also made permanent the domination of kings by popes.

In correspondence with Emperor Charlemagne a year or two later, Pope Leo urged him to establish universities throughout his dominions—ones where all letters and sciences would be taught. So Charlemagne established in Paris the first university; and later on other kings also set up universities, each in his own dominion. Once each university had been organized for study, which involved dividing it into distinct colleges, they were all to be governed by laws according to the discretion of the Pope. Finally, from masters such as Peter Lombard, Duns Scotus, and Thomas Aquinas, was born the theology that they call ‘scholastic’—a mixture of Aristotle’s philosophy and sacred Scripture. In the universities they teach Aristotle’s logic, his physics, his metaphysics, his ethics, and his politics, as if Aristotle contained the whole of the sciences and were also the greatest father of the Church! The students were exercised in public debates and speeches through which to maintain and preach the dogmas of the Roman church. (This was done so as to establish among those adolescents a demeanour of deference.) So by the sermons of ecclesiastics sent from the universities into almost all the cities, towns and parishes of the Christian world, and by published writings, it was fixed indelibly in the minds of all Christians that

- there is no rule of just and unjust except the dictates of the Roman church,
- kings are to be obeyed only when the Roman church permits this, and
- kings ought to obey the Roman Pope, like sheep.

And they accomplished what they set out to accomplish.

The universities also provided for the study of ancient Roman law, and of medicine; only the mathematical sciences were left out, not because they contained anything contrary to Christian doctrine, but because the knowledge and skills they would provide was utterly inconsistent with ignorance—the ignorance that was required for promotion within the church. Back in those days, someone’s knowing the mathematical arts, or believing the earth to be round, or believing that there are people living in the parts of the earth we call ‘antipodes’, was enough to block him from achieving the honour of a bishopric.

You will ask: ‘That Roman doctrine or scholastic philosophy that you are criticizing—what particular opinions of Aristotle’s is it derived from? and how?’ I shall tell you. The Greeks and the Latins and most Europeans make affirmations by linking two names by the verb ‘is’ or its equivalent, thus signifying that the two names are names of the same thing. So someone who says ‘Man is an animal’ wants to convey what would also be conveyed by ‘If we rightly call someone a man, we also rightly call the same being an animal’. We also sometimes attach ‘is’ to a single term, as when someone says ‘God is’, wanting to convey that God is something real, not a figment of the mind, a hypostasis, not a phantasm.

Those are the words that the Greeks use to distinguish true
things from ones that are only apparent—as when they say that a man looking at himself in the mirror is a hypostasis = a substance, whereas the image of himself that he sees in the mirror is a phantasm. When ‘is’ is taken in the former way, i.e. when it joins two names, it is called a ‘copula’; when it is taken in the latter way it is called a ‘substantive verb’. The Hebrews also occasionally used a substantive verb (as when God says simply that his name is I am (Exodus 3:14); but they never used it as a copula. Instead of the copula, the Hebrews simply put the two names side by side, as when it is said in Genesis 1:2 ‘the earth a thing without form’, which we have to express by saying ‘the earth was without form’.

Aristotle attended more to words than to things. So when he had the thought of a thing’s being brought under the two names ‘man’ and ‘animal’, he didn’t leave it at that but dug down to learn what thing was to be conceived under the copula ‘is’ [est] or at least under the infinitive form of the verb ‘to be’ [esse]. For he was sure that the word esse was the name of some thing, meaning that there was some thing in nature whose name was ‘being’ or ‘essence’. From this absurdity he tumbled down into a still worse one, namely asserting

• that certain essences are separated from the things whose essences they are,
• that these separated essences are present to the spheres of the heavens and drive them in a circular motion, and
• that the human soul, separated from the man, subsists by itself.

These doctrines may be consistent with Homeric theology, but not with sacred Scripture. [The claim that they are to be found in Aristotle’s works is controversial.] For the term ‘essence’ is not to be found in Scripture, or in the liturgy, articles or canons of the Anglican church; nor is the corresponding Greek term ‘ousia’ (except in a different sense that isn’t relevant here); nor is ‘essential’, ‘essentiality’, ‘entity’, ‘entitative’ or any other term derived from the copula. No such term could occur in the language of the Hebrews, because it doesn’t have the copula. Conclusion: an essence isn’t a thing, whether created or uncreated, but only a made-up name. Aristotle single-handedly gave birth to new, bastard and empty beings of this kind, the first principles of a philosophy that St. Paul calls ‘empty deceit’. [Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.’ Colossians 2:8]

• The demonology of the Greeks has (I repeat) been deposited in the church through this doctrine about ‘essences’ and separate ‘substantial forms’; so also has • the superstition that the Greeks call ‘deisidaimonia’, i.e. fear of phantasm. That has led to • the use of exorcisms—with the sign of the cross, and holy water—to charm • the demons or drive them away. Next comes • a view about incorporeal substances (i.e. substances having no size at all), including the thesis that God himself, the best and greatest substance, has no size (though Scripture says nothing about incorporeal substance or immaterial substance). Similarly, • the view that the soul is wholly in the whole body, and wholly in each part of it. This same source has produced • the whole doctrine about purgatory, • the belief in the nocturnal appearance of souls, • the legends of miracles, and • questions about the souls of the reprobate [= ‘people who are rejected by God’]—such questions as ‘Where are they punished?’ and ‘Given that souls can’t be harmed, how are they punished?’—and • many other things that aren’t to be found in Scripture. Aristotle didn’t think that one body can be in many places at the same time, or that many bodies can be in one place at the same time; nor did any philosopher; nor indeed did any sane man! But it was useful to them—• the scholastics—to say this,
in order to maintain their doctrine of the real presence of Christ’s body in every piece of consecrated bread. *The will* is the cause of *willing*, i.e. the power is a cause of the act—this absurd doctrine is Aristotelian, and the Scholastics took it over, as a way of maintaining man’s free will (though it takes away God’s dominion over the human will).
Scholastic physics

Again, in physics they have offered absurd causes of things. For example, (1) heavy bodies are caused to fall by gravity [here = ‘weight’], and the cause of gravity is the fact that heavy bodies try to reach the centre of the earth for the sake of their own conservation. (2) The same body, with nothing added or taken away, is sometimes greater and sometimes less, because of condensation or rarefaction. (3) The soul is created by being poured in, and is poured in by being created (though Scripture says that all things were created by the word of God). (4) They assign as causes occult qualities such as ‘sympathy’, ‘antipathy’, ‘antiperistasis’, ‘specific qualities’, and chance or fortune;

which amounts to assigning their own ignorance as a source of causes, for if you take away ignorance there’s no fortune and no qualities are occult. (5) They hold that all sensing and all thinking happens through a certain motion of ‘species’. [The word ‘species’ in the sense that is relevant here is a scholastic technical term, belonging to a theory that Hobbes is about to discuss. A common version of it says that when you see a tree (for example), what happens is that something is given off by the tree and passes through the intervening space and enters your eyes, this ‘something’ being a species of the tree = (roughly) a look of the tree. The ‘species’ is a particular, but not a material thing; in some versions of the theory a species is an individual property or accident. (According to these versions, as well as this tree, which is a concrete particular, and greenness, which is an abstract universal property, which the tree shares with other things,

there is an individual accident or property—
• the greenness of this tree, which is an abstract particular that only this tree possesses.)

Although the basic meaning of the Latin word species involves visual appearance, the theory was extended to cover the other senses as well; and, according to Hobbes, it was further extended to say that when you understand an object, an ‘intelligible species’ of the object is somehow sent from it to your mind.]

What is a species? Anyone who knows Latin knows that a species is what you can know about a thing from the look of it, i.e. its shape and colour. . . . They say either • that the species or features of things are sent into the eyes, and thus seen, or • that certain species or features of things are sent from the eyes to the object, and that the object is seen thus; the scholastics still don’t have a consensus on which of these two is correct. They also say that hearing, smelling, tasting and understanding occur by species passing through the ears, nostrils, and organs of the intellect. (6) Further, they maintain that eternity is not serial time without beginning or end, but a ‘standing now’, so that something that is now for us was now for Adam, i.e. that there is no difference between now and then. . . .

(7) They say that if free will is denied, it follows that God is the author of sin and that therefore the sinner ought not to be punished; but they do accept that God is the first cause of things and events. • This looks like trouble: if God is the first cause of all events, that includes acts of the human will, including the free ones, which by the scholastics’ standards implies that no-one should be punished for anything he does, whether or not his will is free. • They try to escape this difficulty with help from Aristotle: they call sin anomia [Greek = ‘lawlessness’], so that something’s being a sin is its not fitting the law; and that is a mere • negation, and not any sort of • action. So they acknowledge that God is the cause of every act and of every law, while denying that he is the cause of the lack of fit • between an act and the law. • This is on a par with saying that when someone draws a straight line and a curve, he is the cause of the two lines but someone else is the cause of their not fitting one another! But when Aristotle spoke of a misfit [Latin incongruitas] he meant to be referring to • something clearly positive—a deed or resolution or plan that doesn’t
fit the law. The scholastics wanted to come across as very subtle in this, and in fact showed their stupidity. If they had been subtle, they would easily have discovered the difference between the cause of a deed and its author. The author of a deed is he who commands that it be done; the cause is he through whose powers it is done. God doesn’t command that anyone do (or try) anything contrary to the laws; but in everything we do we are using powers given us by God. You may want to ask: ‘If God is involved in the cause, why are we condemned?’ Well, tell me why God has from eternity elected some and rejected others, and how he condemned to eternal and most severe punishments people who hadn’t yet done (or thought) anything evil, and who couldn’t do or think evil unless God gave them the power to do so? Tell me also: isn’t it lawful for the potter to decide what he wants to do with the vase he has made? [This echoes Romans 9:21.] And, lastly, show me where Scripture plainly says that all those who are excluded from the kingdom of God will live without a second death, to be tortured to eternity.

Scholastic Ethics and Politics

Let us come now to ethics and politics. Scripture teaches that Christian subjects ought to obey their kings and sovereigns (and their ministers), even if they are pagan; not only out of fear, but also because it’s what God has commanded, for our own good. [This is based on Romans 13:1-7.] Now consider the civil wars concerning religion that have been fought in Germany, France, and England. They can’t have originated in Christianity, so their source must be the ethical and political philosophy of Aristotle and of the Romans who followed his lead. In every commonwealth the genuine standard of good and evil is the law. Aristotle, however, defined virtue and vice in terms not of laws but of praise and blame among the citizens. He calls the rule of kings—any kings—‘tyranny’, and says that only in democracy is there liberty. After him most Roman writers, because of their hatred of one king, Tarquin, take the vice of one man and transfer it to his form of rule—not by any argument but by a pernicious crowd-pleasing example. When our youth were taught these authors in the universities, for the sake of Greek and Latin philosophy and eloquence, they absorbed at the same time their poisonous doctrine, and took it on themselves to make their own individual decisions about good and evil, just and unjust, laws and religion. That was the start of our troubles. Preachers who felt themselves to have an excellent grasp of doctrine (as most of them did), along with others whose reading of Greek and Latin politics led them to see themselves as great political thinkers, ignited a civil war in which many thousands of citizens were killed and the king was condemned to a most unworthy death. They did this because things weren’t going in a way that favoured their ambition, whether churchly or secular.

Such was the cost of learning Greek and Latin eloquence and philosophy! If there isn’t a big improvement in how the preachers teach the people, and how our universities teach the preachers, perhaps Great Achilles will again be sent to Troy. [Footnote by Curley: ‘An allusion to Virgil’s fourth eclogue, implying that civil war will come again (and again) unless university education is improved.’]
Chapter 47. The benefit that comes from such darkness, and who gets it

People in this part of Christendom have for many years accepted these doctrines that are harmful to social peace. Who did that to them? That will be my question in this final chapter, and in tackling it I shall follow the clue of Cui bono? [That two-word Latin sentence, which still occurs in English sometimes, literally means 'For the benefit of whom?'—where the benefit may be known but the beneficiary is not. It is often wrongly taken to mean 'How will he/she/they benefit?'—where the beneficiary is known but the benefit is not. We'll see that Hobbes—though an accomplished Latinist—is guilty of that misuse.] Cicero praises a severe judge in ancient Rome for a custom he had in criminal causes: when the testimony of the witnesses wasn't sufficient, he would ask the accusers Cui bono?—which asked what profit, honour, or other satisfaction the accused got or expected from the deed of which he was accused. For amongst presumptions, there is none that so strongly points to the author of an action as does the benefit of the action. [A 'presumption' that P is the case is a state of affairs in which it is reasonable to believe P unless strong evidence against it turns up.]

I start with the erroneous doctrine that the present Church, now militant on earth, is the kingdom of God. (I mean the kingdom of glory, or the land of promise; not the kingdom of grace, which is merely a promise of the land!) This doctrine brings worldly benefits to the pastors and teachers in the Church; it gives them a right as God's public ministers to govern the Church; and therefore, because the Church and the Commonwealth are the same persons, to be rectors and governors of the Commonwealth. [Hobbes is here using 'person' as a technical term of his, introduced and explained in chapter 16.] It was through this that the Pope got the subjects of all Christian princes to believe that to disobey him was to disobey Christ himself, and to take his side in any dispute between him and other princes . . . . He was claiming, in effect, a universal monarchy over all Christendom. At first the Popes were given the right to be supreme teachers of Christian doctrine—given it by Christian emperors, to be exercised under those emperors, within the limits of the Roman Empire. The Popes themselves acknowledged this by taking the title Pontifex Maximus [='chief priest'], making them officers who were subject to the civil state. But after the Empire was divided and dissolved, it wasn't hard to obtrude on the people who were already subject to them a further title, namely the right of St. Peter—not only to preserve all the power they had been claiming over Rome, but to extend it over the Christian provinces that had been part of the Roman Empire but were so no longer. Considering how intensely men want to rule, this benefit of a universal monarchy is a sufficient presumption that the Popes who claimed it and for centuries enjoyed it were the authors of the doctrine by which it was obtained—namely that the Church now on earth is the kingdom of Christ. Once that is granted, we have to conclude that Christ has some lieutenant amongst us by who will tell us what he commands.

After certain Churches had renounced this universal power of the Pope, one might have expected the civil sovereigns of the relevant nations to reclaim all the power that they had possessed and been entitled to (and unwisely let go). In England that is pretty much what happened, except that those through whom the kings handled the government of religion maintained that their employment was in God's right. That seemed to claim that even if they weren't
above the civil power, they weren’t under it either; but they didn’t really make that claim, because they acknowledged the king’s right to deprive them of the positions in the church at his pleasure.

But in places where the leadership was in the hands of presbyteries [i.e. committees of priests and/or laymen], though they forbade the teaching of many other doctrines of the Church of Rome, they still held on to this one—namely that the kingdom of Christ has already come and that it began at the resurrection of our Saviour. But cui bono? What profit did they expect from it? The profit that the popes expected: to have a sovereign power over the people. When men excommunicate their lawful king, they are keeping him from all places of God’s public service in his own kingdom, and will resist him with force when he tries through force to correct them. And when men excommunicate any person without authority from the civil sovereign, they are depriving him of his lawful liberty, i.e. usurping an unlawful power over their brethren. So the authors of this darkness in religion are the Roman and the Presbyterian clergy. [Recall that ‘darkness’ occurs in the title of this Part and of this chapter.]

This account applies also to all the doctrines and practices that help these people to keep this spiritual sovereignty once they have acquired it. I’ll briefly deal with a dozen of these.

(1) ‘The Pope in his public capacity cannot err.’ Anyone who believes this will readily obey the Pope in whatever he commands.

(2) ‘All the other bishops, in whatever Commonwealth, have their right not immediately from God or indirectly from their civil sovereigns, but from the Pope.’ Through this doctrine every Christian commonwealth comes to have many powerful men (for bishops are indeed powerful) who depend on the Pope and owe obedience to him, although he is a foreign prince. That makes it possible for him to stir up a civil war against a state that doesn’t submit to being governed according to his pleasure and interest—and he has done that many times.

(3) ‘These bishops and all other priests, monks and friars are exempt from the power of the civil laws.’ A result of this is that in every Commonwealth a large minority enjoy the benefit of the laws and are protected by the power of the civil state, but make no contribution to the expenses of the state and aren’t subject to the same penalties for crimes as are the other subjects; so they aren’t afraid of anyone except the Pope, and ally themselves with him and him alone, upholding his universal monarchy.

(4) The practice of calling their priests... ‘sacerdotes’, i.e. sacrificers, which is the title the Jews gave to the civil sovereign and his public ministers at the time when God was their king. Also, the practice of making the Lord’s Supper a sacrifice gets the people to believe that the Pope has the same power over all Christians that Moses and Aaron had over the Jews—i.e. all power, both civil and ecclesiastical, as the high priest had then.

(5) ‘Matrimony is a sacrament.’ This lets the clergy judge what marriages are lawful, what children are legitimate, and thus who has the right of succession to hereditary kingdoms.

(6) Refusing to allow priests to marry serves to assure this power of the Pope over kings. If a king is also a priest, he can’t marry and transmit his kingdom to his posterity; if he isn’t a priest, then the Pope claims to have ecclesiastical authority over him and his people.

(7) From the practice of private confessions they obtain better intelligence about the plans of princes and great persons in the civil state than these can have of the designs of the ecclesiastical state; and this helps to keep the Church’s power secure.
(8) By the practice of canonising saints and declaring who are martyrs, they add to their power. How? By inducing in simple men an obstinacy against the laws and commands of their civil sovereigns, even if it costs them their lives, so as to avoid being excommunicated by the Pope and thus declared heretics or enemies to the Church. . . .

(9) They add to their power by crediting every priest with the ability to make Christ, and by being able to ordain penances, and to forgive (or not forgive) sins. [The ‘ability to make Christ’ is a mocking reference to the doctrine that in the Eucharist the wine and bread, after being blessed by the priest, become the blood and body of Christ.]

(10) By the doctrines of purgatory, of justification by external works, and of indulgences the clergy is enriched.

(11) By their demonology, and the use of exorcism and all the trappings of that, they keep the people more in awe of their power—or anyway they think they do.

(12) The metaphysics, ethics and politics of Aristotle, and the frivolous distinctions, barbarous terms and obscure language of the Schoolmen, serve them by keeping these errors from being detected, and making men mistake the will-o’-the-wisp of vain philosophy for the light of the Gospel. They operate by being taught in the universities, which have been all erected and regulated by the Pope’s authority.

If these weren’t enough, we could add other dark doctrines that they have, which bring profit for the setting up of an unlawful power over the lawful sovereigns of Christian people; or for the support of such a power after it has been set up, or for the worldly riches, honour and authority of those who sustain it. So, by the rule of cui bono? we can fairly identify as the authors of all this spiritual darkness the Pope, the Roman clergy, and all the others who try to settle in the minds of men this erroneous doctrine that the Church now on earth is the ‘kingdom of God’ mentioned in the Old and New Testaments.

The emperors and other Christian sovereigns, under whose rule these errors first crept in, disturbing their possessions and the tranquillity of their subjects, paid with their own suffering for their failure to see what the consequences would be, and their lack of insight into the designs of their ecclesiastical teachers. They can be judged to be accessories to their own and the public damage. Without their authority there couldn’t have been any seditious doctrine publicly preached in the first place. They could have blocked this at the outset; but once the people had been possessed by those spiritual men, no human remedy was possible.

As for the remedies supplied by God: he never fails to destroy all the machinations of men against the truth, at a time of his choosing. So we must wait for him to decide to bring us relief; and we know pretty well how he will do it. He often allows the prosperity and the ambition of his enemies to grow to such a height that . . . .they over-reach themselves, show too openly how violent they are, provoke the populace into rebellion, and lose everything—like Peter’s net, which broke because it held too many fishes. Rulers who couldn’t wait for such developments and tried to resist such encroachment by the church before their subjects’ eyes were opened, merely increased the power they resisted. So I don’t blame the Emperor Frederick for holding the stirrup—a customary way of paying homage—for our countryman Pope Adrian. The frame of mind of his subjects at that time was such that if he hadn’t knuckled under to the Pope he wasn’t likely to succeed in the empire. But do I blame the rulers who, in the beginning when their power was unbroken, allowed such doctrines to be developed in the universities of their own dominions. Because of this initial failure, they have held the stirrup to all the succeeding popes, when the popes mounted into the thrones of all Christian sovereigns, to ride them.
and tire them out—both them and their people—at their pleasure. [Hobbes is here offering a mild punning joke—mounting the throne likened to mounting a horse.]

The unravelling of a human invention is the reverse of the process in which it was woven in the first place. The web [that I am now discussing begins with the first elements of power, which are wisdom, humility, sincerity, and other virtues of the apostles, whom the converts obeyed out of reverence, not by obligation. Their consciences were free, and their words and actions were subject to the civil power and no other. Later on, as the flocks of Christ increased, the presbyters [= ‘church-governing committees’] assembled to consider what they should teach; in this way they obliged themselves to teach nothing against the decrees of these assemblies; this was thought to imply that the people were also obliged to follow their doctrine; and when anyone refused to do so, they refused to keep him company (or as they put it, they ‘excommunicated’ him), not as an unbeliever but as someone who had been disobedient. (1) This was the first knot upon their liberty. When the number of presbyters increased, the presbyters of a chief city or province helped themselves to authority over the presbyters of individual parishes, and called themselves ‘bishops’: and (2) this was a second knot on Christian liberty. Finally, the Bishop of Rome—i.e. the Bishop of the city that was the centre of the Empire—took upon himself an authority over all the other bishops of the Empire, (3) which was the third and last knot, and the final step in the synthesis, the construction of papal power. (This third step—the aggrandisement of the Bishop of Rome—was supported partly by the wills of the emperors themselves, partly by the title Pontifex Maximus, and partly—when the emperors had grown weak—by claiming the privileges of St. Peter.)

And therefore the analysis or undoing of this power structure goes the same way in reverse. It starts with (3) the knot that was tied last, as can be seen in the dissolution of the praeterpolitical Church government in England. [That is, the undoing of Church power that lay outside the political power of the state.] The power of the popes in England was totally dissolved by Queen Elizabeth; and the bishops, who had previously held their positions by the authority of the Pope, came to hold the same positions by the authority of the Queen and her successors (though by retaining the phrase jure divino—‘by divine right’—they gave the impression that they were claiming to have their status by immediate right from God). And so (3) the third knot was untied. Later on, the Presbyterians recently in England had the system of bishops abolished; which (2) untied the second knot. And at almost the same time, the power was also taken from the Presbyteries [i.e. the committees of ‘elders’—not priests—who governed individual parishes]: this (1) untied the first knot too, and brought us back to the independence of the first Christians—each of us free to follow Paul or Cephas or Apollos, every man as he likes best. If this state of affairs can be kept free of contention, and free of the fault for which Paul criticised the Corinthians, namely characterizing a person’s Christianity in terms of his adherence to this or that Christian minister, it is perhaps the best state to be in, for two reasons. One is that there ought to be no power over the consciences of men except the word of God itself, making faith grow in everyone, according to the purposes not of those who plant and water but of God himself, who creates the growth. The other reason: it is unreasonable for people who teach that there is such danger in every little error to require of a man who has his own faculty of reason to follow the reason of any other man, or of the majority of his community—which isn’t much better than letting his salvation be settled by the flip
of a coin. Those teachers *ought not* to be displeased about losing the authority that they used to have; for they should know as well as anyone does that power is preserved by the same virtues through which it is acquired, i.e. by

• wisdom, humility, clearness of doctrine, and sincerity of conversation,

and not by any of these:

• suppression of the natural sciences, and of the morality of natural reason;
• obscure language, claiming more knowledge than they can show they have,
• pious frauds, or other such faults.

When these faults occur in Christian ministers, they are not merely faults but *scandals*, because they are apt to make men stumble. . .

But after this doctrine—that the Church that is now in this world is the ‘kingdom of God’ spoken of in the Old and New Testaments—came to be generally accepted, the ambition and jockeying for positions in it (especially for the great role as Christ’s lieutenant), and the extravagant showiness of those who had the best access to public money, gradually became so obvious that ordinary folk lost the inward reverence that they owed to the pastoral function. . . .

Once the Bishop of Rome had come to be acknowledged as universal bishop, through his claim to be St. Peter’s successor, the entire Roman Catholic hierarchy or kingdom of darkness was fairly comparable with the kingdom of *fairies*—i.e. with the old wives’ fables in England concerning ghosts and spirits, and the tricks they play in the night. If you think about how this great ecclesiastical power started, you’ll easily see that the papacy is nothing but the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire, sitting crowned on its grave. . . .

Think about the language they use, in the churches and in their public acts. It is Latin, which isn’t in common use anywhere in the world. So isn’t it just the ghost of the old Roman language?

• Fairies, in any nation that has stories about them, have only one universal king . . . .
• Ecclesiastics, in any nation that they are to be found in, acknowledge only one universal king, the Pope.
• Fairies are spirits and ghosts.
• Ecclesiastics are spiritual men and ghostly fathers.
• Fairies and ghosts inhabit darkness, solitudes, and graves.
• Ecclesiastics walk in the darkness of doctrine, in monasteries, churches, and churchyards.

• Fairies have their enchanted castles, and certain gigantic ghosts, that dominate the regions round about them.
• Ecclesiastics have their cathedrals, any one of which has the power—through holy water and certain charms called ‘exorcisms’—to turn the *town* it is in into a *city*, i.e. a seat of empire.

• Fairies aren’t arrested and made to answer for the harm they do.
• Ecclesiastics also vanish away from the tribunals of civil justice.

• Fairies are said to take children out of their cradles and change them into mischief-making natural fools, often called ‘elves’.
• Ecclesiastics deprive young men of the use of reason, by certain charms compounded of metaphysics, miracles, traditions, and misused Scripture, after which they are no use for anything except to obey orders.

• The old wives haven’t settled where—in what workshop or studio—the fairies make spells.
• The workshops of the clergy are well enough known to be the universities, which are shaped and operated by papal authority.

• When the fairies are displeased with someone, they are said to send their elves to pinch him.
• When ecclesiastics are displeased with any civil state, they preach sedition so as to get their elves (their superstitious, enchanted subjects) to pinch their princes; or they enchant one prince with promises, getting him to pinch another.

• The fables of fairies say that they enter dairies, and feast on the cream skimmed from the milk.
• The ecclesiastics take the cream of the land, through donations of ignorant men who are in awe of them, and through tithes.

• Fairies don’t exist except in the imaginations of ignorant people, put there by traditions of old wives or old poets.

• The Pope’s spiritual power (outside the borders of his own civil dominion [these days = the Vatican]) consists only in the fear of excommunication that seduced people are caused to have by false miracles, false traditions, and false interpretations of the Bible.

So it wasn’t very difficult for Henry VIII to cast them out by his exorcism, or for Queen Elizabeth to do the same by hers. [Hobbes is jokingly comparing • an English monarch’s • banning Roman Catholicism in England by • legislative action with • a priest’s • cleansing someone of devils by • a ceremony of exorcism.] This spirit of Rome has now left us, and gone walking (by its missionaries) through dry places in China, Japan, and the Indies—places that yield the Roman Church little fruit. But we don’t know that it won’t return. Nor do we know that our clean-swept house won’t be invaded by an assembly of spirits worse than the Roman Church, thus making us worse off than we were before Henry VIII. For the Roman clergy are not the only ones who claim that the kingdom of God is of this world, and on that basis claiming to have a power in the world distinct from that of the civil state. That completes the things I planned to say about political theory. When I have checked it over, I shall willingly expose it to the censure of my country.

* * * * * * *

• Last part of chapter 47 in the Latin version.

When I looked back over this treatise on civil and ecclesiastical power, I found nothing in it that conflicts with the meaning of Scripture or with the civil or ecclesiastical laws of my country. How could I have, when the only purpose of the whole work was to demonstrate that nothing can excuse a violation of the laws? I admit that in many places I have departed from the opinions of individual theologians. If I had written in uncorrupted hearts, as though on a blank page, I could have been briefer; for all I would have needed to say is this:

• Without law, men slaughter one another, because of the right all have over all things;
• Without punishments, laws are useless.
• Without a supreme power, punishments are useless.
• Without arms and wealth gathered in the hand of one person, power is useless—a mere word with no importance for peace or for the defence of the citizens.

And therefore

• All citizens, for their own good and not for their rulers’, are obliged to protect and strengthen the commonwealth with their wealth, as far as they can, doing this by the decision of the one to whom they have given the supreme power.

Those are the main points of the Parts 1 and 2. Next, since • eternal life and the salvation of each person are contained...
in Scripture (which our church has permitted and advised everyone to read); and since everyone reads them and interprets them for himself, at the peril of his soul; and since that makes it unfair to burden their consciences with more articles of faith than those that are necessary for salvation; I have explained in Part 3 what the needed articles are. Finally, in Part 4, lest the people be seduced by false teachers, I have exposed the ambitious and cunning plans of the opponents of the Anglican church.

As I said, that’s all I would have needed to say to readers whose minds were unclouded. But since I knew that for some time now men’s minds had been corrupted by contrary doctrines, I thought that all these things should be explained more fully, and I explained them as well as I could, in the English language. I did this at the time

- when the civil war that had started in Scotland over the issue of ecclesiastical discipline was raging in England and in Ireland,
- when not only the bishops but also the king, the law, religion and honesty had been abolished, and
- when treachery, murder, and all the foulest crimes dominated (though they were in disguise).

If someone had been brought here from a remote part of the world to witness the outrages perpetrated at that time, he would have been sure that there was absolutely no sense of divine justice here at that time.

So this teaching of mine was of little benefit at that time. Note that I say ‘little’, and not ‘no benefit’. And I hoped that it would be of more benefit after the war was over. The democrats won, and they established a democracy; but they paid for their great crimes by losing it in no time at all. A single tyrant, Cromwell, seized control of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and confounded their democratic prudence (both that of the laity and that of the ecclesiastics). The people, worn out by war, scorned him as much as they had previously admired him. When their legitimate king was finally restored, they asked for pardon (i.e. acknowledged their foolishness). Pardon was given...

Who will believe that those seditious principles are not now completely destroyed, or that there is anyone (except the democrats) who would want to suppress a doctrine whose tendency toward peace is as great as that of my teaching? So that this would not happen, I wanted it to be available in Latin. For I see that men’s disagreements about opinions and intellectual excellence cannot be eliminated by arms. In whatever way evils of this kind arise, they must be destroyed in the same way. The citizens’ minds were gradually corrupted by writers of pagan politics and philosophy. So that democratic ink is to be washed away by preaching, writing, and disputing. I do not understand how that could happen otherwise than by the universities. Let them hereafter do as much to defend the royal power as formerly they did to defend the papal power. In the meantime, we should all take pains to see that by our internal disagreements we do not allow ourselves all to be oppressed by an external enemy.

That concludes the Latin ending of chapter 47.
A Review and Conclusion

[Hobbes begins this with a reply to unnamed writers who have argued that the whole range of civil duties is so broad and various that no one man can be in good shape to perform all of them. This is supposed to be based on oppositions such as those between • severity of punitive judgment and reasonableness of pardon, • solid reasoning and eloquence, • courage and fearfulness, • what it takes to be on good terms with some people and what it takes to be on good terms with others. Hobbes replies that] these are indeed great difficulties, but not impossibilities; for they can be, and sometimes are, reconciled through education and discipline. [He gives details. Then:] So there is no such inconsistency between human nature and civil duties, as some think. . . .

• Adding a Law of Nature (ch. 15)

To the laws of nature listed in chapter 15, I want to add one:

Every man is bound by nature to do his very best to protect in wartime the authority by which he is himself protected in time of peace.

That is because someone who claims to have a natural right to preserve his own body can’t claim also to have a natural right to destroy him whose strength preserves him. To claim both rights would be a manifest contradiction. This law can be logically derived from some of the laws that I listed in chapter 15. I here state it separately because current events demand that it be inculcated and remembered.

• Introducing Further Thoughts About Conquest (ch. 21)

Various recently published English books show that the civil wars have not yet sufficiently taught men the truth about • when it is that a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror, or • what conquest is, or • how conquest obliges men to obey the conqueror’s laws. To fill this gap, I say: the point of time at which a man becomes subject to a conqueror is the point at which, being free to submit to him, he consents to be his subject, either explicitly in words or by some other sufficient sign.

• When a Man Is Free to Submit

As I showed at the end of Chapter 21, a man is free to submit • to an enemy • when the means for his staying alive are under the enemy’s control, because at that time he no longer has protection from his former sovereign and is protected by the opponent. (This concerns only someone who has no obligation to his former sovereign except that of an ordinary subject. I’ll come to the obligations of a soldier shortly.) Everyone agrees that in such a case it is lawful for the man in question to pay the conqueror whatever taxes or other contributions he demands, although paying it is giving aid to an enemy; so it is also lawful to submit completely, although this is just another aid to the enemy. And indeed complete submission is a kind of hindrance to the enemy: it leads to the enemy’s being enriched with some • part of the man’s wealth, whereas if he refused to submit, the enemy would take • all of it.

A man who has not only the obligation of a subject but the further obligation of a soldier isn’t free to submit to a new power as long as the old • army • still functions and provides him with the means of subsistence. . . . Such a soldier can’t complain that he doesn’t have protection and means to live as a soldier. But when even that fails, he too may seek protection wherever he has the best chance of getting it, and may lawfully submit himself to his new master. . . .
•What a conquest is:

This enables us to understand •what it takes for a man to be rightly described as ‘conquered’, •what the nature of conquest is, and •what the right of a conqueror consists in—because all three of these are implied by the submission that I have been talking about. Conquest is not •the victory itself but •the acquisition through victory of a right over the persons of men. Thus, someone who is killed is overcome, but he isn’t conquered; and the same is true for someone who is captured and put into prison or chains—he isn’t conquered because he is still his captor’s enemy, and may escape if he can. But someone who is allowed to retain his life and liberty in return for a promise of obedience is then conquered and a subject, but not until then. The Romans used to say •that a general had pacified such and such a province, i.e. (in English) that he had conquered it; and •that a territory was pacified by victory when its people had promised to do what the Roman people commanded them. This was being conquered.

This promise •of obedience •may be either explicit (by promise) or tacit (by other signs). Consider for example a man from whom an explicit promise of obedience hasn’t been demanded, perhaps because his power isn’t considerable; if he openly lives under the conqueror’s protection, he is understood to submit himself to that government •by tacit promise •. If he lives there secretly, he is liable to anything that may be done to a spy and enemy of the state. I'm not saying that it is wrong for him to lie low •in the territory the conqueror has taken over •, because it wouldn’t be wrong for him to engage in acts of open hostility. All I am saying is that he may be justly put to death. [The next sentence is very poignant, in the light of Hobbes’s personal history. In 1640, when Charles I’s army was defeated by the Scots, Hobbes fled to Paris, where he remained for eleven years, through the English civil war, the execution of the king, and some years of the rule of Oliver Cromwell. While there he wrote Leviathan. The royalist exiles were upset by his views about submission to conquerors, and when Lord Clarendon reproached him for this he replied ‘The truth is I have a mind to go home’, which he did soon thereafter.] Similarly, if a man is out of his country at the time when it is conquered, he is not conquered, and is not a subject •of the new régime •; but if on his return he submits to the government, he is bound to obey it. So this is my definition: ‘conquest’ means ‘the acquiring of the right of sovereignty by victory’. This right is acquired through the people’s submission, in which they make a contract with the victor, promising obedience in return for life and liberty.

•Two other causes of the dissolution of commonwealths (ch. 29).

In Chapter 29 I have listed among the causes of the dissolutions of commonwealths their having set off on the wrong foot. A civil sovereign who doesn’t have absolute power to legislate just as he chooses is apt to handle the sword of justice unsteadily, as if it were too hot to hold. I omitted to mention in chapter 29 one reason for this unsteadiness, namely: a sovereign whose power is not absolute will try to justify the war through which he came to power, thinking that his right to rule depends on

•the rightness of his cause in making the war that gave him power to rule,

whereas really it depends on

•his having the power to rule.

According to this way of thinking, the right of the kings of England has depended on •the goodness of the cause of William the Conqueror, and •on their being more directly descended from him than anyone else. By that standard, there may be no present-day sovereign anywhere in the world who is entitled to his subjects’ obedience! [He adds, in a carelessly written sentence, that any sovereign who gets
into this ‘justification for seizing power’ game opens the door to potential rebels to think they can justify seizing power from him. Then:

So I count this as one of the most effective causes of the death of any state: that its founder requires that men not only • submit to him in their future actions but also • approve of his past actions.

Another cause of the downfall of commonwealths is their allowing people to express their hatred for tyranny. What’s wrong with that? Well, ‘tyranny’ means ‘sovereignty’ together with an expression of the speaker’s anger towards the sovereign(s) he is talking about; so that • hatred for tyranny is tantamount to • hatred for commonwealth in general—i.e. hatred for political organisation as such. To justify his own cause a conqueror usually needs to criticise the cause of the people he has conquered; but the reason why they are obliged to obey him has nothing to do with the merits of his cause or of theirs.

That completes what I have thought fit to say on looking back over Parts 1 and 2 of this book.

• The Appointment of Executioners (ch. 35)

In Chapter 35 [not included in this version] I have used the Bible to make it clear enough that in the Jewish commonwealth God himself was made to be sovereign by pact with the people (which is why they have been called his ‘special people’). . . . and that in this kingdom Moses was God’s lieutenant on earth, who told them what laws God had laid down for them to be ruled by. I didn’t say who were appointed as officers to enforce the laws, because I didn’t think there was any need to go into that. But I have changed my mind: this topic does need to be discussed, especially in connection with capital punishment. It is well known that in • almost all commonwealths corporal punishments have been • carried out by the guards or other soldiers of the sovereign power, or • assigned to people who wanted to do the job because in them the three relevant factors coincided: poverty, indifference to their moral reputation, and hardness of heart. But amongst the Israelites it was a law laid down by God their sovereign that anyone convicted of a capital crime should be stoned to death by the people, with the witnesses casting the first stones and then everyone else joining in. This law laid down who were to be the executioners, but it didn’t say that anyone should throw a stone at someone who hadn’t yet been convicted and sentenced by the entire congregation as judge. Before anyone was executed, witnesses against him had to be heard (unless the crime had been committed in the presence of the congregation itself, i.e. in sight of the lawful judges; for in that case the judges themselves were the witnesses). However, misunderstandings of this procedure have given rise to a dangerous opinion, namely:

• In some cases one man is entitled to kill another, by a right of zeal;

as if the executions of offenders in the ancient kingdom of God were based not on the sovereign command but on the authority of private zeal. If we consider the texts that seem to favour this view, none of them support it. [Hobbes proceeds to brief discussions of seven biblical passages that might seem to involve the alleged ‘right of zeal’ entitling one private individual to kill another; he contends that in each case that’s not what is going on. He concludes:] There is nothing in all this, or in any other part of the Bible, to countenance executions by private zeal. When such executions occur they are often nothing but a combination of ignorance and passion, and are inimical to both the • justice and the • peace of a commonwealth. [Hobbes next has a short paragraph adding to what he said in chapter 36 on the topic of how God spoke supernaturally to Moses. After that, a closing set of reflections about the book as a whole:]
Why Leviathan deserves to succeed.

As for the over-all doctrine that I have presented: so far as I can see, its premises are true and proper and the inferences from them are solid. I base the civil right of sovereigns, and the duty and liberty of subjects, on the natural inclinations that mankind are known to have, and on parts of the law of nature that ought to be known by anyone who claims to be intellectually competent to govern his personal family. As for the ecclesiastical power of those same sovereigns, I base that on biblical texts that are evident in themselves and in line with the general thrust of the Bible as a whole, which convinces me that anyone who reads those passages in a spirit of wanting to be informed will be informed. It will be harder to satisfy those who have already committed themselves—through writings or public debates or their conspicuous actions—to contrary opinions. In those cases it is natural for a reader to proceed while at the same time letting his attention be distracted by the search for objections to what he has read earlier. And there are bound to be plenty of such objections at a time when the interests of men are changing, because much of the doctrine that serves to establish a new government must conflict with the doctrine that conduced to dissolving the old.

In Part 3, discussing a Christian Commonwealth, there are some new doctrines which it might be wrong to make public without permission in a state where contrary doctrines had already been fully determined—wrong because that would be usurping the place of a teacher. But when I offer (to those who are still making up their minds) doctrines that I think are true, and that obviously tend to peace and loyalty, doing this at the present time when men are calling not only for peace but also for truth, I am merely offering new wine to be put into new casks, so that both may be preserved together. I’m assuming that when there’s something new that can’t breed trouble or disorder in a state, men aren’t so devoted to antiquity that they would prefer ancient errors to new and well-proved truth!

Why Leviathan is free of ornamentation.

There is nothing I distrust more than my writing-style, but I am confident that my writing in this book hasn’t been obscure (except through the odd typographical error). Unlike most writers these day, I have neglected the ornament of quoting ancient poets, orators, and philosophers. Whether this is good or bad, I have done it deliberately, for many reasons. (1) All truth of doctrine depends either on reason or on Scripture; both of these make many writers credible, but no writer ever made them credible! (2) The issues under discussion are not about matters of fact but questions of right, and there’s no place for witnesses in such questions. (3) It’s true of almost every one of those ancient writers that he sometimes contradicts both himself and others, which weakens any testimony he might give. (4) When a contemporary writer accepts something said by an ancient writer, he isn’t really acting on an independent judgment that what the quoted writer says is true. All this quoting-from-the-ancients procedure is just passing words on from mouth to mouth—comparable to what happens when someone in a group yawns and this starts the others yawning. (5) It is often with a fraudulent design that men stick cloves of other men’s wit into their corrupt doctrine. [This likens the use of decorative quotations to the practice of sticking cloves into ‘corrupt’ = rotten meat to hide its smell.] (6) I haven’t see the much-quoted ancient writers ornamenting their writings with quotations from still earlier writers. (7) Greek and Latin sentences are brought up again unchewed—i.e. quoted unchanged, verbatim—which is evidence that they haven’t been digested. (8) Though I reverence the men of ancient times who have written truth clearly or put us in a better
position to discover it for ourselves, I don’t pay any kind of homage to antiquity as such. If you revere the antiquity of a time, the present time is the oldest [he means that the world is older now than it was in so-called ancient times]; and if you revere writers who are themselves ancient, then I doubt if the ancient writers who are so much honoured were older when they wrote than I am now [Hobbes was about 59 when he wrote this]. But if you look into it carefully you’ll see that the praise of ancient authors comes not from reverence for the dead but from the competitiveness and mutual envy of the living. [That sentence expresses a view that Hobbes makes clearer in Part 1, chapter 11: ‘Competition for praise tends to produce reverence for antiquity, for in this context men are contending with the living, not with the dead: they are ascribing to the ancient dead more than their due, so that this will dim the glory of the others, i.e. their living competitors.’]

To conclude: as far as I can see, nothing in this whole book... is contrary to the word of God, to good morals, or to public tranquillity. So I think it would be a good thing if it were printed, and an even better thing if it were taught in the universities (as long as that is also the opinion of those who have to decide such matters). The universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine, from which the preachers and the gentry draw what water they can find, and sprinkle it on the people in general, in sermons and in conversation; and therefore great care should be taken to ensure that the water is pure, not contaminated by either the venom of heathen politicians or the incantation of deceiving spirits. That would create a state of affairs in which (1) most men would know their duties, making them less likely to serve the ambition of a few discontented persons in their plans against the state, and (2) less aggrieved by the taxes that are necessary for their peace and defence; and (2) the governors themselves would have less reason to maintain, at the public expense, any army bigger than is needed to secure the public liberty against the invasions and encroachments of foreign enemies.

And thus I have brought to an end my work on civil and ecclesiastical government, prompted by the disorders of the present time. I have written this without bias, without fawning on anyone, and with no purpose except to set before men’s eyes the two-way relation between protection and obedience. This is a relation that we are required to respect absolutely, this being required by the condition of human nature, and the divine laws—those legislated by God and those that are demands of nature. [The next sentence is a metaphor borrowed from astrology.] In the ups and downs of states there can’t be any very good constellation for truths of this sort to be born under: those who are dissolving an old government scowl at them, and those who are setting up a new government turn their backs. And yet I can’t think that the book will be condemned at this time, either by the public judge of doctrine or by anyone who wants the continuance of public peace... [About thirty-six years after this, four years after Hobbes’s death at the age of 91, Leviathan and another work of his were condemned and burned in Oxford.]