Some Texts From Early Modern Philosophy
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A single sentence, translating a single sentence by Kant

To approach a new science - one that is entirely isolated and is the only one of its kind - with the prejudice that it can be judged by means of one’s putative cognitions already otherwise obtained, even though it is precisely the reality of those that must first be completely called into question, results only in believing that one sees everywhere something that was already otherwise known, because the expressions perhaps sound similar; except that everything must seem to be extremely deformed, contradictory, and nonsensical, because one does not thereby make the author’s thoughts fundamental, but always simply one’s own, made natural through long habit.

Modified version:

Suppose we are confronted by a new science that is wholly isolated and the only one of its kind. If we start with the assumption that we can make judgments about it in terms of knowledge that we have already gained - which is precisely what has first to be called in question ·when considering a new science· - all we shall achieve is to see everywhere things we already know, with the words sounding familiar but everything seeming (·so far as the content is concerned·) to be pushed out of shape, senseless, gibberish. That is because we’ll be relying on our own notions, which long habit has made second nature for us, instead of relying on the author’s.

A sentence by Hobbes:

And though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature, to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busy in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all men inexcusable, they have been contracted into one easy sum, intelligible, even to the meanest capacity; and that is, Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thyself; which sheweth him, that he has no more to do in learning the laws of nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their place, that his own passions, and self-love, may add nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these laws of nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable.

Modified version:

This ·chapter· may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature to be attended to by all men, most of whom are too busy getting food to understand it, and the rest are too careless to do so. However, these laws of nature have been contracted into one easy sum that can be grasped even by the poorest intelligence, namely: Don’t do to someone else anything that you wouldn’t want done to you. That shows a man that in learning the laws of nature all he has to do is this: When weighing the actions of other men against his own, if they seem too heavy then he should put them into the other pan of the balance, and his own into their pan, to ensure that his own passions and self-love are not adding anything to the weight. If he does that, all of these laws of nature that will appear to him very reasonable. ·Because this procedure is available·, he cannot excuse himself ·for not knowing the laws of nature on the ground that they are too complicated and difficult·.

A single sentence by Locke:

The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another man’s life, puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the other’s power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power.

Modified version:

The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction. So when someone declares by word or action - not in a sudden outburst of rage, but as a matter of calm settled design - that he intends to end another man’s life, he puts himself into a state of war against the other person; and he thereby exposes his life to the risk of falling to the power of the •other person or anyone that joins with •him in his defence and takes up his quarrel. For it is reasonable and just that I should have a right to destroy anything that threatens me with destruction, because the fundamental law of nature says that men are to be preserved as much as possible, and that when not everyone can be preserved the safety of the innocent is to be preferred. ·In line with this·, I may destroy a man who makes war on me or has revealed himself as an enemy to my life, for the same reason that I may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no rule except that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey - dangerous creatures that will certainly destroy me if I fall into their power.

Bacon
Berkeley
Boyle
Butler
Constant
Anne Conway
Descartes
Jonathan Edwards
Hobbes
Hume
Hutcheson
Kant
La Mettrie
Leibniz
Locke
Machiavelli
Malebranche
Mendelssohn
Mill
Newton
Richard Price
Reid
Rousseau
Shaftesbury
Sidgwick
Adam Smith
Spinoza
Wollstonecraft