

# Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order

Benedict Spinoza

Copyright © Jonathan Bennett

[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. This version contains some awkward repetitions of the word ‘God’. They could be avoided through the use of pronouns, but *they* present us with an unattractive choice. Using ‘he’, ‘him’, ‘his’ etc. of God invites the reader, over and over again, to think of God as a person; while using ‘it’, ‘itself’ etc. pokes the reader in the ribs, over and over again, with reminders that God is *not* a person. The former choice misrepresents Spinoza’s doctrine (his other name for God is ‘Nature’), while the latter misrepresents his style. Writing in Latin, which lacks the distinction between personal and impersonal pronouns, he didn’t have this problem.

First launched: July 2004

Last amended: December 2004

## Contents

### Part I: God

|                        |    |
|------------------------|----|
| Definitions . . . . .  | 1  |
| Axioms . . . . .       | 1  |
| Propositions . . . . . | 2  |
| Appendix . . . . .     | 17 |

### Part II: The Nature and Origin of the Mind

|                       |    |
|-----------------------|----|
| Definitions . . . . . | 22 |
| Axioms . . . . .      | 22 |

---

|   |            |
|---|------------|
| Propositions . . . . .                                      | 23         |
| ·Physical interlude· . . . . .                              | 28         |
| ·Back to the Mind· . . . . .                                | 31         |
| Concluding Note . . . . .                                   | 45         |
| <b>Part III: The Origin and Nature of the Affects</b>       | <b>49</b>  |
| Preface . . . . .   | 49         |
| Definitions and Postulates . . . . .                        | 50         |
| Propositions . . . . .                                      | 50         |
| Definitions of the Affects . . . . .                        | 75         |
| <b>Part IV: Human Bondage, or the Power of the Affects</b>  | <b>83</b>  |
| Preface . . . . .   | 83         |
| Definitions and Axiom . . . . .                             | 85         |
| Propositions . . . . .                                      | 86         |
| Appendix . . . . .  | 115        |
| <b>Part V: The Power of the Intellect, or Human Freedom</b> | <b>120</b> |
| Preface . . . . .   | 120        |
| Axioms . . . . .  | 122        |
| ·Propositions about freedom· . . . .                        | 122        |
| ·Looking beyond this present life· . . . .                  | 129        |

## Part III: The Origin and Nature of the Affects

### Preface

[In Spinoza's use of the term, 'affects' include emotions (such as anger) and immoderate desires (such as ambition). All they have in common is their tendency to influence human conduct, mostly for the worse.]

Most of those who have written about the affects and men's way of living write as though their topic was not •natural things that follow the common laws of Nature but rather •things that are outside Nature. Indeed they seem to think of man in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. They don't think of man as •following the order of Nature, •going through his life in accordance with the causal forces at work within him and impinging on him from the outside; rather, they think that man •acts upon and interferes with Nature, having absolute power over his own actions and being determined only by himself. And they don't explain human failings in terms of •natural causes, but instead invoke I know not what •vice of human nature which they bewail, or laugh at, or sneer at, or (as usually happens) curse. And the people who are regarded as godly are the ones who know how to censure most eloquently and cunningly the weakness of the human mind.

It is true that some very distinguished men (to whose work and diligence I admit that I owe much) have written many admirable things about the right way of living, and given men advice full of prudence. But no-one, so far as I know, has determined the nature and powers of the affects, nor what the mind can do to moderate them. I know, of course, that the famous Descartes, although he too believed that the mind has absolute power over its own actions, nevertheless sought to explain human affects through their first

causes, while also showing how a mind can have absolute dominion over its affects. But in my opinion, he showed nothing but the cleverness of his intellect, as I shall show in the proper place.

Let us now return to those who prefer to curse or laugh at the affects and actions of men, rather than understand them. To them it will doubtless seem strange that I should undertake to treat men's vices and absurdities in the geometric [here = 'deductive'] style, so that where *they* •proclaim various things to be *empty, absurd, and horrible* I aim to •prove rigorously that those things are *contrary to reason*.

My reason •for my procedure• is this: nothing that happens in Nature can be attributed to any *defect* in it; for •Nature is always the same—the laws and rules of Nature that govern all events are the same at every place and every time, which is to say that •Nature's excellence and power of acting are everywhere the same. So our way of *understanding* the nature of anything, no matter what it is, must also be uniform; specifically, it must be through the universal laws and rules of Nature. •And it is never appropriate to throw aside the attempt to *understand*, and instead rail against things that happen as *wrong*, as *mishaps* or *defects* in the natural order. So the affects of hate, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and force of Nature as other particular things. And therefore they •can be assigned to certain causes through which they are understood, and •have certain properties that are as worth knowing about as are the properties of other things that we find more attractive. So I shall treat the nature and powers of the affects, and the power of the mind over them, by the same method I used in Parts I and II in treating of God and the mind, approaching human actions and appetites in the way I would approach questions about lines, planes, and bodies. [In Spinoza's usage, an 'appetite' is just a conscious or

unconscious desire; he reserves 'desire' for the conscious ones.]

## Definitions and Postulates

D1: I call a cause 'adequate' if its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it. I call it 'partial' or 'inadequate' if its effect cannot be understood through it alone.

D2: I say that we 'act' when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause—that is (by D1) when something happens that follows from our nature, and can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. On the other hand, I say that we are 'acted on' when something happens in us . . . . of which we are only a partial cause.

D3: By 'affect' I understand •states of a body by which its power of acting is increased or lessened, helped or hindered, and also •the ideas of these states. Thus, if we can be the adequate cause of any of these states, the affect in question is what I call an 'action'; otherwise it is a 'passion'. Postulate

1: A human body can be in many states in which its power of acting is increased or lessened, and also in others which render its power of acting neither greater nor less. This postulate or axiom rests on postulate P1 and lemmas L5 and L7 ·in the physical interlude· after **II13**.

Postulate 2: While a human body undergoes many changes it can retain impressions or traces of objects ·that it has interacted with· (on this see postulate P5 between **II13** and **I14**; and consequently it can retain the same images of things. (For the definition of 'image' see the note on **II17**.)

## Propositions

**1: Our mind ·actively· does certain things and ·passively· undergoes other things; specifically, in having adequate ideas it necessarily does certain things, and in having inadequate ideas it necessarily undergoes other things.**

[The demonstration of this is needlessly difficult. It rests on understanding 'Idea x is adequate in (or: relative to) mind y' to mean 'Idea x occurs in mind y, and its causes also occur wholly in y'. That easily yields the result that a mind is active with respect to its adequate ideas and at least partly passive with respect to its inadequate ideas. Spinoza's version does bring out the important point that *every* idea is adequate relative to God's mind.]

**Corollary:** A mind is more liable to passions [= 'passive states'] the more it has inadequate ideas, and more active the more it has adequate ideas.

**2: A body cannot cause a mind to think, and a mind cannot cause a body to be in motion or at rest or in any other state (if there are any others).**

All modes of thinking have for a cause God-considered-as-thinking and not God-considered-as-having-A where A is any other attribute (by **II6**). So what causes a mind to think is some detail of the realm of thought and not of extension, that is (by **II1**, it is not the body. This was the first point. [The argument for the second half of **2** is strictly analogous to that: the motion and rest of a body must be caused by God-considered-as-extended, and thus not caused by the mind.]

**Note on 2:** These things are more clearly understood from what I said in the note on **II7**, namely that a mind and the

·corresponding· body are one and the same thing conceived under different attributes. The result is that there is just *one* natural order or connection of events, whether Nature is conceived under this attribute or that; so the order of actions and passions of our body naturally corresponds with the order of actions and passions of our mind. This is also evident from my way of demonstrating <sup>¶</sup>12.

But although there is no real room for doubt about these points, I don't expect people to be willing to consider them fairly unless I confirm them by experience. ·That is because· men are so firmly convinced that the body moves and stops moving at the mind's command, and that it does a great many things that depend only on the mind's will and its skill in thinking. ·This firm conviction is unreasonable, because· no-one has yet determined *what a body can do*—that is, experience hasn't yet taught anyone what a body can do •purely through the laws of physics and what ·if anything· a body can do only if it is •acted on by a mind. For no-one has yet come to know the structure of the ·human· body so accurately that he could explain all its functions—not to mention that many things are observed in the lower animals that far surpass human ingenuity, and that sleepwalkers do a great many things in their sleep that they wouldn't venture to do when awake. This shows well enough that the body itself, simply from the laws of its own ·physical· nature, can do many things that its mind is amazed by!

Again, no-one knows *how* the mind moves the body, or in how many ways it can make it move, or how fast. So when men say that this or that action of the body 'arises from the mind, which rules over the body', they don't know what they are saying. All they communicate in their fine-sounding words is an admission that •they are ignorant of the true cause of that action and that •they do not wonder at it!

But they will say that—whether or not they know *how* the mind moves the body—they still know by experience [i] *that* it does so, i.e. that if a human mind couldn't think the ·corresponding· body couldn't act. And then they know by experience [ii] that only the mind can decide whether a man shall speak or be silent, and other such things that they therefore believe depend on the mind's decision.

[i] As far as the first ·objection· is concerned, I reply:

Doesn't experience also teach that if a body is inactive the ·corresponding· mind can't think? For when a body is at rest in sleep, the mind at the same time remains senseless, with no power of thinking such as it has when awake. And I think everyone has found from experience that the mind isn't always equally capable of thinking of the same object, and that the man's ability to think about this or that object depends on how capable the body is of having the image of the object.

They will say, of course, that the causes of buildings, paintings, and other such products of human skill can't be stated purely in terms of the laws of physics; a human body—they will say—couldn't build a temple if it weren't pushed and guided by the ·corresponding· mind.

But I have already shown that they *don't know* what a body can do, or what can be explained purely through its physical nature, and that they do know from experience that many things happen through the laws of ·material· Nature alone which they would never have thought could happen without the direction of the mind—such as the things sleepwalkers do in their sleep, which amaze them after they have woken up.

Bear in mind also the ·astonishingly complex· *structure* of the human body, which in the ingenuity of its construction far surpasses anything made by human skill; not to mention

the fact (shown above) that Nature produces infinitely many things under *each* of its attributes.

[ii] As for the second objection, human affairs would of course go better if it *were* equally in a man's power to be silent or to speak! But experience teaches all too plainly that men have nothing *less* in their power than their tongues, and can do nothing *less* than moderate their appetites.

That is why most men believe that •the only things we do *freely* are the ones toward which we have a weak inclination (because desires for those things can be lessened by the memory of something else •that is relevant•), and •that we aren't at all free in doing things toward which we are strongly drawn, because those inclinations can't be damped down by the memory of something else. But nothing would prevent them from believing that we are free in *everything* we do if they hadn't found by experience that we do many things we afterwards repent, and that often we see the better and follow the worse (namely when we are conflicted, having contrary affects).

So the infant thinks that he freely wants the milk, the angry child that he freely wants vengeance, and the timid that he freely wants to flee. The drunkard think it is from a free decision of the mind that he says things which when he sobers up he regrets having said. So the madman, the chatterbox, the child, and a great many people of this kind believe they speak from a free decision of the mind, when really they cannot contain their impulse to speak.

So experience itself, no less clearly than reason, teaches that •men think they are free because they are conscious of their own actions and ignorant of the causes that make them act as they do, and that •the decisions of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, so they vary as the disposition of the body varies. Everyone governs all his behaviour on the basis of his affects; someone who is con-

flicted, having contrary affects, doesn't know what he wants; and someone who is not moved by any affect is very easily driven here and there.

All these things, indeed, show clearly that •the decision of the mind and •the appetite and physical drive of the body naturally exist together—or, rather, they are one and the same thing, •which we label differently according to the context•. We say that we •*decide* to do something when we are thinking about and explaining the event through the attribute of thought; and we say that •something *makes* us do it do it when we are thinking about it—the very same event—under the attribute of extension and explaining it in terms of •physics, that is•, the laws of motion and rest. This will be still more clearly evident from what I shall have to say shortly.

First, there is something else I particularly wish to note here. We couldn't do anything from a decision of the mind unless we recollected it; for example, we can't speak a word unless we recollect it. And •everyone knows that• it is not up to the mind to decide freely whether to recollect a thing or to forget it! That is why the mind's •freely exercised• power is restricted •by the believers in such freedom• to deciding, given that we *do* recollect something, whether to be silent or to speak it.

But •even this very restricted theory of mental freedom is based on an *impression* of freedom that we know can't be trusted•. When we dream that we speak, we *think* we speak from a free decision of the mind—and yet we don't speak at all; or if we do it is from a spontaneous [here = 'involuntary'] motion of the body. . . .

So I should like to know: Are there in the mind two kinds of decisions—fantasizing ones •in dreams• and free ones •when we are awake•? And if you don't want to carry this madness that far, you must admit that this decision of

the mind that is believed to be free isn't marked off in any way that the imagination or the memory can detect. In fact, there is nothing to it except the affirmation that the idea necessarily involves just because it is an idea (see <sup>II</sup>49). So these decisions of the mind arise by the same necessity as the ideas of things that actually exist; and those who think they speak or are silent or do anything from a free decision of the mind, are dreaming with their eyes open.

**3: A mind's actions arise from adequate ideas alone; its passions depend on inadequate ideas alone.**

. . . . Insofar as a mind has inadequate ideas (by 1) it is acted on. Therefore, the actions of a mind follow from adequate ideas alone; hence, a mind is acted on only because it has inadequate ideas.

**Note on 3:** We see, then, that a mind's passions—its passive states—all come from its having something that involves a *negation*—that is, its being a part of Nature that *cannot* be perceived clearly and distinctly through itself without bringing in other things that act upon it. . . .

**4: No thing can be destroyed except through an external cause.**

This proposition is self-evident. For the definition of any thing affirms the thing's essence and doesn't deny it; that is, it posits the thing's essence and doesn't take it away. So if we attend only to the thing itself and not to any external causes, we shan't be able to find in it anything that could destroy it.

**5: If one thing can destroy another, those two things are of a contrary nature—that is, they cannot be in the same subject.**

If they could agree with one another or be in the same subject at once, then that subject could contain something that could destroy it, which (by 4) is absurd.

**6: Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, tries to stay in existence.**

Particular things are modes by which [= 'ways in which'] God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way (by the corollary to <sup>I</sup>25)—that is (by <sup>I</sup>34) things that express in a certain and determinate way God's power, by which God exists and acts. And no thing has in itself anything by which it can be destroyed or which can take its existence away (by 4). On the contrary, every thing is opposed to everything that can take its existence away (by 5). Therefore every thing tries, as far as it can through its own resources, to stay in existence.

[Very often, starting with the next proposition, Spinoza writes of 'effort' and of what a thing 'tries' to do. In his Latin these are expressed by the noun *conatus* and the related verb *conatur*. That link can be preserved in English by 'striving' and 'strive', but 'effort' and 'try' read better. Still, the link should not be forgotten.]

**7: The effort by which each thing tries to stay in existence is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.**

From the essence of each thing some things necessarily follow (by <sup>I</sup>36), and things can produce *only* what follows necessarily from their nature (by <sup>I</sup>29). So the power of each thing—that is, the effort by which it (either alone or with others) does anything or tries to do anything—that is (by 6) the power or effort by which it tries to stay in existence—is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself.

**8: The effort by which each thing tries to stay in existence involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.**

If the effort by which a thing tries to stay in existence involved a limited time which fixed how long the thing would last, then that very power by which the thing

exists would also imply that it couldn't exist *after* that limited time, and it would have to be destroyed. But (by 4) this is absurd. So the effort by which a thing exists involves no definite time. On the contrary, since (by 4) it will always continue to exist through the same power by which it now exists, unless it is destroyed by an *external* cause, this effort involves indefinite time.

**9: Having clear and distinct ideas and also having confused ones, a mind tries for an indefinite length of time to stay in existence and it is conscious of this effort that it makes.**

The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and by inadequate ideas (as I have shown in 3). So (by 7) it tries to stay in existence both as a possessor of inadequate ideas and as a possessor of adequate ones; and it does this (by 8) for an indefinite length of time. But since the mind (by <sup>II</sup>23) is necessarily conscious of itself through ideas of the body's states, it (by 7) is conscious of its effort.

**Note on 9:** When this effort is related only to the mind, it is called 'will', but when it is related to mind and body together it is called 'appetite'. This *appetite*, therefore, is nothing but *the very essence of the man*, from whose nature there necessarily follow the things that promote his survival. And so the man is caused to do those things.

Between *appetite* and *desire* there is no difference, except that men are usually said to have 'desires' when they are conscious of their appetite. So 'desire' can be defined as 'appetite together with consciousness of it'.

From all this, then, it is clear that we don't try for or will or want or desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we try for it, will it, want it, and desire it.

**10: An idea that excludes the existence of our body cannot be in our mind, but is contrary to it.**

Whatever can destroy our body can't be in it (by 5), and so the idea of this thing can't . . . (by <sup>II</sup>11 and <sup>II</sup>13) be in our mind. On the contrary, since (by <sup>II</sup>11 and <sup>II</sup>13) the first thing that constitutes the essence of a mind is the idea of an actually existing body, the first and principal tendency of the effort of our mind (by 7) is to affirm the existence of our body. And so an idea that denies the existence of our body is contrary to our mind.

**11: The idea of anything that increases or lessens, helps or hinders, our body's power of acting also increases or lessens, helps or hinders, our mind's power of thinking.**

This proposition is evident from <sup>II</sup>7, and from <sup>II</sup>14

**Note on 10 and 11:** We see, then, that the mind can undergo great changes, and pass now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection. These passions, indeed, explain to us the affects of pleasure and unpleasure. [Translators have rendered the Latin words *laetitia* and *tristitia* as 'joy' and 'sadness', as 'pleasure' and 'pain', and in other ways. Spinoza means them to mark the fundamental absolutely general difference between (emotionally) up and down, good and bad, pleasure and its opposite; 'joy' is too strong and specific for the former, and 'sadness' and 'pain' are too specific and strong for the latter. The best choice seems to be 'unpleasure'—a good English word, which has been used in translating Freud's *Unlust*; his *Lust/Unlust* dichotomy is not unlike Spinoza's *laetitia/tristitia*, and is used for it in a standard German translation of the *Ethics*.] By 'pleasure', therefore, I shall always mean: *the passion by which a mind passes to a greater perfection*. And by 'unpleasure' I shall mean *the passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection*. When the affect of pleasure is thought of in terms of the mind and

body at once, I call it *titillatio* or ‘cheerfulness’, and when unpleasure is thought of in that way I call it ‘pain’ or ‘sadness’. [*Titillatio* means, literally, the action of tickling someone.]

But it should be noted that *titillatio* and pain are ascribed to a man when one part of him is affected more than the rest, whereas cheerfulness and sadness are ascribed to him when all are equally affected.

Next, I have explained in the note on **9** what desire is, and these three—pleasure, unpleasure, and desire—are the only primary affects that I acknowledge. For I shall show that the rest arise from these three. But before continuing I want to explain **10** more fully here, so that you can clearly understand how one idea can be contrary to another.

In the note on **II17** I showed that •the idea constituting the essence of a mind involves the existence of the •corresponding• body so long as the body itself exists. Next, from what I showed in the corollary to **II7** and the note on it, it follows that •the present existence of our mind depends only on its involving the actual existence of the body. Finally, I showed that •the power of a mind by which it imagines things and recollects them also depends on its involving the actual existence of the •corresponding• body (see **II17** and **II18** and the note on it).

From these things it follows that a mind’s present existence and its power of imagining are taken away as soon as it stops affirming the present existence of the •corresponding• body. But (by **4**) a mind can’t cause itself to stop affirming the existence of the body, and it can’t be caused to do so by the body’s ceasing to exist. (Why? Because (by **II6** the cause of the mind’s *affirming* the body’s existence is not the body’s *starting* to exist; so by the same reasoning it isn’t caused to *stop affirming* the body’s existence by the body’s *ceasing* to exist.) By **II8**, the mind could cease to affirm the body’s existence only if caused to do so by another idea that ex-

cluded the present existence of our body, *and consequently of our mind*; such an idea would be contrary to the idea that constitutes our mind’s essence.

**12: A mind tries its utmost to imagine the things that increase or aid the •corresponding• body’s power of acting.**

So long as •a human body is in a state that involves the nature of an external body, •the •corresponding• mind will regard that external body as present (by **II17**), that is (by the note on **II17**), it will imagine it; and consequently (by **II7**) so long as •a human mind does that •the •corresponding• human body will be in a state that involves the nature of that external body. Hence, so long as a mind imagines the things that increase or aid our body’s power of acting, the body is in states that *do* increase or aid its power of acting (see Postulate 1), and consequently (by **11**) the mind’s power of thinking is increased or aided. Therefore (by **6** or **9** the mind tries its utmost to imagine those things.

**13: When a mind imagines things that lessen or hinder the body’s power of acting, it tries its utmost to recollect things that exclude their existence.**

So long as a mind imagines •anything of this kind, the power both of it and of the •corresponding• body is lessened or hindered (as I demonstrated in **12**); but the mind will continue to imagine this thing until it imagines something else that excludes the thing’s present existence (by **II17**; which means that the power of both mind and body is lessened or hindered until the mind imagines something else that excludes the existence of •this thing. So (by **9**) the mind will try its utmost to imagine or recollect that other thing.

**Corollary:** A mind avoids imagining things that lessen or hinder its power or that of the corresponding body.

**Note on 13:** From this we understand clearly what love and hate are. Love is just *pleasure with the accompanying idea of an external cause*, and hate is just *unpleasure with the accompanying idea of an external cause*. We see, then, that someone who loves will be bound to try to be in the presence of and to preserve the thing he loves; and on the other hand someone who hates will try to remove and destroy the thing he hates. All this will be discussed more fully later.

**14: If a mind has once had two affects at once, then afterwards when it has one of them it will also have the other.**

If a human body has once been affected by two bodies at once, then afterwards when the corresponding mind imagines one of them, it will immediately recollect the other also (by <sup>II</sup>18). But the imaginings of the mind indicate the affects of our body more than they do the nature of external bodies (by the second corollary to <sup>II</sup>16). Therefore, if the body—and consequently the mind (see D3)—has once had two affects at once, then afterwards when the mind has one of them it will also have the other.

**15: Anything can be the accidental cause of pleasure, unpleasure, or desire.**

[Spinoza's demonstration of this depends on 14. His point is that anything at all may be involved in an affect x which *happens to accompany* a different affect y of pleasure, unpleasure, or desire. Even if for you x is in itself neutral, neither up nor down, neither increasing nor lessening your power, it may through this association come to be connected in your mind with pleasure, unpleasure, or desire.]

**Corollary:** We can come to love or hate something because it has been associated for us with pleasure or unpleasure, even if we know that the thing wasn't the efficient cause of our pleasure or unpleasure.

[Spinoza offers a demonstration of this. Its relation to what has gone before is pretty obvious.]

**Note on 15:** From this we understand how it can happen that we love or hate some things without any cause known to us, but only (as they say) from sympathy or antipathy. A related phenomenon: some objects give us pleasure or unpleasure only because they somewhat *resemble* objects that usually give us these affects, as I shall show in 16. . . .

**16: We love or hate a thing x that we imagine to be LIKE an object y that usually affects the mind with pleasure or unpleasure, loving or hating it just because of that resemblance, even if the respect in which x resembles y has no part in y's causing those affects.**

[The demonstration of this is brief but hard to follow. It relies in a fairly obvious way on 14 and 15.]

**17: If we imagine that a thing that usually gives us an affect of unpleasure is like something else that usually gives us an equally great affect of pleasure, we shall hate the former thing and at the same time love it.**

[Spinoza's demonstration of this amounts to something fairly obvious: the hate is guaranteed by the note on 13, and the love by 16.]

**Note on 17:** This constitution of the mind that arises from two contrary affects is called 'vacillation of mind'; it is strictly comparable with the vacillation with respect to the imagination that I spoke of in the note on <sup>II</sup>44. I didn't say back there, but do say now, that the latter kind of vacillation can also be called 'doubt', for it and doubt differ from one another only in degree.

Notice that in **17** I have explained how these ·affect-·vacillations of mind can arise from causes that are the *direct* cause of one affect and the *accidental* cause of the other. I did this so that they could more easily be understood in terms of what had gone before, not because I deny that such vacillations mostly arise from an object that is the efficient ·and direct· cause of each affect. For a human body (by postulate P1 just before **14**) is composed of a great many individuals of different natures, and so (by **A**” after **13** it can be affected in many different ways by one and the same body. And on the other hand, because one and the same thing can be in many different states, it will also be able to bring about many different affects in one and the same part of the body. From this we can easily conceive that one and the same object can be the cause of many and contrary affects.

**18: A man gets the same affect of pleasure or unpleasure from the image of a past or future thing as from the image of a present thing.**

So long as a man has the image of a thing, he will regard the thing as present even if it doesn't exist (by **17**) and its corollary); and all there is to his imagining it as past or future is his joining its image to the image of a past or future time (see the note on **47**). The image of the thing is *in itself* the same, whether it is related to the past, the future, or the present; that is (by the second corollary to **16**), the constitution of the body—i.e. *the affect*—is the same, whether the image is of a past thing, a future thing, or a present thing. And so, the affect of pleasure or unpleasure is the same, no matter what time is involved.

**First note on 18:** I call a thing past or future here insofar as we

have been affected by it or will be affected by it.

For example, insofar as we

have seen it or will see it,

Or insofar as it

has refreshed us or will refresh us, or

has injured us or will injure us.

When we imagine the thing in this way, we affirm its existence, that is, our body doesn't have any affect that excludes the thing's existence. And so (by **17** our body has the image of the thing in the same way as if it itself were present. However, people who have had much experience generally vacillate when they think about events as future or past, and are usually in doubt about event's outcome (see the note on **44**); and for that reason the affects arising from similar images of things are not so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things until the person becomes more certain of the event's outcome.

**Second note on 18:** From what I just have said, we understand what hope and fear, confidence and despair, gladness and regret are. [‘Regret’ is used to render a phrase of Spinoza's whose normal meaning is ‘remorse’, meaning a guilty regret for something one has done.] For hope is just an inconstant pleasure that has arisen from the image of a future or past event whose outcome we doubt, whereas fear is an inconstant unpleasure that has arisen from the image of a doubtful event. If the doubt involved in these affects is removed, •hope becomes •confidence, and •fear becomes •despair—that is, a pleasure or unpleasure arising from the image of a thing we feared or hoped for. Finally, gladness is a pleasure that has arisen from the image of a past thing whose outcome we had doubted, while regret is the corresponding unpleasure.

**19: Someone who imagines that what he loves is destroyed will have unpleasure, whereas someone who imagines it to be still in existence will have pleasure.**

The mind tries its utmost to imagine things that increase or aid the body's power of acting (by **12**), that is (by the note on **13**), things that it loves. But the imagination is helped to imagine a thing  $x$  by whatever posits the existence of  $x$ , and hindered by whatever excludes the existence  $x$  (by **17**). Therefore, the images of things that posit the existence of a loved thing help the mind's effort to imagine that thing, that is (by the note on **11**), give the mind pleasure. Whereas images that exclude the existence of a loved thing hinder that effort of the mind, that is (by the note on **11**), give the mind unpleasure.

**20: Someone who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will have pleasure.**

A mind (by **13**) tries to imagine things that exclude the existence of things by which the corresponding body's power of acting is lessened or hindered, that is (by the note on **13**), it tries to imagine things that exclude the existence of things it hates. So the image of a thing that excludes the existence of what the mind hates helps this effort of the mind, that is (by the note on **11**), it gives the mind pleasure. So someone who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will have pleasure.

**21: Someone who imagines what he loves to have pleasure or unpleasure will himself have pleasure or unpleasure; and each of those affects will be great in the lover in proportion as they are great in the object of his love.**

I have demonstrated in **19** that the images of things that posit the existence of a loved thing help the effort

by which the mind tries to imagine that thing. But pleasure posits the existence of the pleasurable thing, and the greater the pleasure the more it does this. For (by the note on **11**) pleasure is a transition to a greater perfection. So the image in the lover of the loved thing's pleasure helps his mind's effort, that is (by the note on **11**), gives him pleasure, which is great in proportion as the loved thing's affect is great. This was the first thing to be proved.

Next, any thing's unpleasure tends to its destruction, and the more so the greater the unpleasure that it has (by the note on **11**). So (by **19**) someone who imagines what he loves to have unpleasure will himself have unpleasure, which will be great in proportion as the loved thing's unpleasure is great.

**Note on 21:** This explains to us what pity is. We can define 'pity' as *unpleasure that has arisen from someone else's having been harmed*. I don't know what name we should give to the pleasure that arises from someone else's good. Next, love toward him who has done good to someone else I shall call 'favour', and hatred toward him who has done evil to someone else we shall call 'indignation'. [Spinoza uses the word *malum* equivalently to our adjective 'bad' and the noun-phrases 'thing that is bad'. We don't have one word for both roles except 'evil', which is really too strong in many of Spinoza's contexts. In this text, as a compromise, 'evil' is used for the noun and 'bad' for the adjective.]

Finally, it should be noted that we don't pity only things we have loved (as I showed in **21**). We will also pity one toward whom we have previously had no affect, provided that we judge him to be •like us (as I shall show below). Similarly, also we favour him who has benefited someone •like us, and are indignant at him who has injured someone •like us.

**22: If we imagine someone to give pleasure to something we love, we shall have love toward him. If on the other hand we imagine him to give that same thing unpleasure, we shall have hate toward him.**

Someone *x* who gives pleasure (or unpleasure) to something *y* that we love gives *us* pleasure (or unpleasure) . . . (by **21**). This pleasure (or unpleasure) of ours is accompanied by the idea of an external cause, namely our imagining of *x* as the cause of *y*'s affect. Therefore (by the note on **13**) if we imagine that someone gives pleasure (or unpleasure) to something we love, we shall have love (or hate) toward him.

**23: Someone who imagines what he hates to have unpleasure will himself have pleasure; whereas if he imagines it to have pleasure he will have unpleasure. Each of these affects will be great or small in proportion as its contrary is imagined to be great or small in the thing he hates.**

To the extent that a hated thing has unpleasure, it is destroyed; and the greater the unpleasure, the greater the destruction (by the note on **11**). Therefore (by **20**) someone who imagines a thing he hates to have unpleasure will himself have pleasure; and the greater the unpleasure he imagines the hated thing to have, the greater his own pleasure. This was the first point. Next, pleasure posits the existence of the pleasurable thing (by the note on **11**); and the more so, the greater the pleasure is conceived to be. So if someone imagines him whom he hates to have pleasure, this imagining (by **13**) will hinder his own effort to stay in existence. That is (by the note on **11**) someone who hates will have unpleasure, etc.

**Note on 23:** These affects can hardly be unmixed and without any conflict of mind. As I shall show in **27**, to the extent that one imagines a thing *like* oneself to have pleasure (or unpleasure), one must oneself have pleasure (or unpleasure). Hatred—my present topic—is a special case in which the relation between one person's affect and another's is the reverse of that.

**24: If we imagine someone to give pleasure to something that we hate, we shall have hate toward him also. On the other hand, if we imagine him to give unpleasure to that thing, we shall have love toward him.**

This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as **22**.

**Note on 24:** These and similar affects of hate are related to *envy* which, therefore, is simply *hate that disposes a man to be glad at another's ill fortune and displeased by his good fortune*.

**25: We try to affirm, concerning ourselves and what we love, whatever we imagine to bring pleasure to ourselves or what we love. And we try to deny whatever we imagine brings unpleasure to ourselves or what we love.**

Whatever we imagine brings pleasure or unpleasure to what we love brings pleasure or unpleasure to us also (by **21**). But the mind (by **12**) tries its utmost to imagine things that bring us pleasure, that is (by **17** and its corollary) to regard them as present; and on the other hand (by **13**) it tries to exclude the existence of things that bring us unpleasure. So we try to affirm whatever we imagine brings pleasure to ourselves or to what we love, and similarly with denial and unpleasure.

**26: We try to affirm, concerning what we hate, whatever we imagine to bring it unpleasure, and we try to deny whatever we imagine to bring it pleasure.**

This proposition follows from **23**, as **25** follows from **21**.

**Note on 26:** From these propositions we see that it easily happens that a man thinks more highly than he should of himself and of what he loves, and less highly than he should of what he hates. Thinking too highly of oneself is called ‘pride’. It is a sort of *madness*, because the man dreams—with open eyes—that he can actually do all the things that he achieves only in his imagination; he regards them as real, and exults in them; and this continues for as long as he can’t imagine things that exclude the existence of these achievements and set limits to his power of acting.

Pride, therefore, is *pleasure born of the fact that a man thinks more highly of himself than he should*. Pleasure born of the fact that a man thinks more highly of someone else than he should is called ‘overestimation’, while pleasure that comes from thinking less highly of someone else than one should is called ‘scorn’. [Oddly, English has no one idiomatic word that does what ‘overestimation’ is being made to do here.]

**27: If we imagine a thing like us, toward which we have previously had no affect, to have some affect, this gives us a similar affect.**

Images of things are states of the human body whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us (by the note on **II17**, that is (by **II16**), whose ideas involve the nature of our body *and* the present nature of the external body. So if the external body is like our body, then our idea of the external body will involve a state of our body like the state of the external body. Consequently, if we imagine someone like us to have some

affect, this imagining will express a state of our body that is like the affect in question. And so, by imagining a thing that is like us to have an affect, we have a similar affect ourselves. That supposes that we previously had no affect toward the thing or person in question. If we already hate a thing that is like us, then (by **23**) we shall have an affect *contrary* to its affect, not like it.

**Note on 27:** This imitation of the affects when related to unpleasure is called ‘pity’ (on which, see the note on **21**); when related to desire it is called ‘emulation’. So emulation is just *the desire we have for a thing because we imagine others like us to want it also*.

**First corollary:** If we imagine that someone toward whom we have had no affect gives pleasure to a thing like us, we shall have love toward him. On the other hand, if we imagine him to give it unpleasure, we shall have hate toward him.

This is demonstrated from **27** in the same way that **22** is demonstrated from **21**.

**Second corollary:** Pity is a form of unpleasure, but when we pity something our unpleasure can’t make us hate the thing we pity.

If we could hate it because of our unpleasure, then (by **23**) we would have pleasure in its unpleasure; but it has been stipulated that what we have is *unpleasure*.

**Third corollary:** We try our utmost to free a thing we pity from its suffering.

Something (x) that gives unpleasure to something that we pity gives it to us also (by **27**). And so (by **13**) we shall try to think of whatever can take away x’s existence; that is (by the note on **9**), we shall want to destroy it, that is, shall be causally set up to destroy it. And so we try to free the thing we pity from its suffering.

**Note on the third corollary:** This will or appetite to do good, born of our pity for the thing we want to help, is called ‘benevolence’. So benevolence is just *a desire born of pity*. As for love and hate toward him who has done good or done harm to a thing we imagine to be like us, see the note on **21**.

**28: We try to further the occurrence of whatever we imagine will lead to pleasure, and to avert or destroy what we imagine will lead to unpleasure.**

We try our utmost to imagine anything that we imagine will lead to pleasure (by **12**), that is (by **II17**), we try our utmost to regard such things as present, that is, as actually existing. But the mind’s effort or power of thinking is equal to and of the same nature as the body’s effort or power of acting (as clearly follows from the corollaries to **II7** and **II11**). Therefore, we try absolutely—not just try mentally or try physically, but all-out in-every-way *try*—to bring it about that it exists. . . . This was the first point.

[The demonstration of the ‘second point’ makes it a special case of the ‘first point’. By **20** the destruction of what we think will lead to unpleasure brings us pleasure; so the endeavour to destroy such things is *itself* part of the endeavour to achieve what we think will bring pleasure.]

**29: We shall try to do whatever we imagine men to look on with pleasure, and shall be averse to doing what we imagine men are averse to.** [Spinoza adds a footnote saying: Here and in what follows you should understand men toward whom we do not have any affect.]

When we imagine men to love (hate) something, we love (hate) it too (by **27**), that is (by the note on **13**), we come to have pleasure (unpleasure) in the thing’s presence. And so (by **28**) we shall try to do whatever

we imagine men to love, or to look on with pleasure, etc..

**Note on 29:** This effort to do (or omit doing) something solely to please men is called ‘ambition’, especially when we try so eagerly to please the mob that our actions (or failures to act) bring harm to ourselves or to others. In other cases, the effort is usually called ‘human kindness’. When someone acts in an attempt to please us, the pleasure we have in thinking of his action I call ‘praise’. On the other hand, the unpleasure with which we are averse to his action I call ‘blame’.

**30: If someone has done something that he imagines brings pleasure to others, he will have pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause, that is, he will regard himself with pleasure. If on the other hand he has done something that he imagines brings unpleasure to others, he will regard himself with unpleasure.**

Someone who imagines that he brings pleasure (unpleasure) to others will thereby (by **27**) have pleasure (unpleasure) himself. But since (by **II19** and **II23**) a man is conscious of *himself* through the states that make him act, this man will have, along with his pleasure (unpleasure), a consciousness of *himself* as the cause; which is to say that he will regard himself with pleasure (unpleasure).

**Note on 30:** By the note on **13**, love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hate is unpleasure accompanied also by the idea of an external cause; so the pleasure and unpleasure spoken of in **30** are kinds of love and hate. [Adapting an expansion of the rest of this paragraph, proposed by Curley:] But love and hate, considered simply as such, involve *only* the idea of an external cause; whereas in the case treated in **30** my love (hate) has not only an external

cause (the pleasure (unpleasure) of others), it also has an *internal* cause (namely, *myself* as the cause of the external cause, and thus as the cause of my love or hate). So I shall give these two special names of their own: I shall call pleasure accompanied by the idea of an internal cause 'love of esteem', and the corresponding unpleasure I shall call 'shame'. I mean when the pleasure or unpleasure arise from the man's thinking he is praised or blamed by others. If it doesn't come from that source, I shall call pleasure accompanied by the idea of an internal cause 'self-satisfaction', and the contrary unpleasure I shall call 'repentance'.

Next, because (by the corollary to <sup>II</sup>17) it can happen that the pleasure that someone imagines that he gives to others is only imaginary, and (by 25) everyone tries to imagine concerning himself whatever he imagines will give him pleasure, it can easily happen that someone who is universally disliked is proud of how much pleasure he gives (he thinks) to everyone.

**31: If we imagine that someone loves, desires or hates something we ourselves love, desire, or hate, that will make us love, desire or hate it with greater constancy. But if we imagine that he is averse to what we love or loves what we hate, then we shall undergo vacillation of mind.**

Our imagining that someone loves something is (by 27) enough on its own to get us to love the same thing; but if we *already* love it, this imagining provides a new cause for our love, by which it is further encouraged. So we shall love the thing with greater constancy. Next, our imagining someone to be averse to something will make us averse to it (by 27). But if at the same time we love the thing, then we shall both love it and be averse to it, which is to say (see the note on

17) that we shall undergo vacillation of mind.

**Corollary:** From this and from 28 it follows that each of us tries his utmost to bring it about that everyone loves what *he* loves and hates what *he* hates. . . . **Note on: 31:** This effort to bring it about that everyone goes along with one's own loves and hates is really *ambition* (see the note on 29). And so we see that each of us, by his nature, wants others to live according to *his* temperament; when all alike want this, they are alike an obstacle to one another; and when all want to be praised or loved by all, they hate one another.

**32: If we imagine that someone enjoys something that only one person can possess, we shall try to bring it about that he does not possess it.**

Our imagining someone to enjoy something is (by 27 and its first corollary) enough to get us to love that thing and want to enjoy it. But in the present case where only one can possess the thing in question we imagine the other person's enjoyment of this thing as an obstacle to our own pleasure. Therefore (by 28) we shall try to stop him from possessing it.

**Note on 32:** We see, therefore, that for the most part human nature is so constituted that men pity the unfortunate and envy the fortunate; and (by 32) when x envies y, he does so with greater hate the more he (x) loves the thing he imagines y to possess. So we see that the property of human nature that makes men compassionate also makes them envious and ambitious.

Finally, if we consult experience we'll find that *it* teaches all these things, especially if we attend to early childhood. For we find that children, because their bodies are continually in a state of equilibrium (so to speak), laugh or cry simply because they see others laugh or cry. And they want to imitate whatever they see others do. And, finally, they

want for themselves everything that they imagine others find pleasing . . . .

**33: When we love a thing like ourselves, we try our utmost to bring it about that it loves us in return.**

We try our utmost to imagine, above everything else, the thing we love (by **12**). So if a thing is like us, we shall try to give it pleasure above all others (by **29**); which is to say that we shall try our utmost to bring it about that the thing we love has pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves ·as cause·, that is (by the note on **13**), that it loves us in return.

**34: The greater the ·favourable· affect we imagine a thing we love to have toward us, the more we shall exult**

[*gloriabimur* = ‘congratulate ourselves’, ‘gloat’, ‘silently boast’ or the like].

We try our utmost (by **33**) to get a thing we love to us back, that is (by the note on **13**) to bring it about that a thing we love should have pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves ·as cause·. So the greater the pleasure we imagine a loved thing to have on our account, the more this effort of ours is helped, that is (by **11** and the note on it), the greater the pleasure we have. But when we have pleasure because we have given pleasure to someone else who is like us, we regard *ourselves* with pleasure (by **30**). Therefore, the greater the ·favourable· affect with which we imagine a thing we love to have toward us, the greater the pleasure with which we shall regard ourselves—which is to say (by the note on **30**), the more we shall exult at being esteemed.

**35: If someone imagines that a an object of his love x is united with someone else y by a bond of friendship as close as, or closer than, the bond that HE used to have exclusively with x, he will hate x and envy y.**

If someone x loves someone else y, the more x imagines that y loves him the more he will exult at being esteemed (by **34**), that is (by the note on **30**), the more pleasure he will have. And so (by **28**) x will try his utmost to imagine y to be bound to him as closely as possible. This effort—this appetite—is •encouraged if he imagines someone else to want what he does (by **31**). But in the case now in question, this effort—this appetite—is •hindered by the image of y accompanied by the image of someone z with whom y is united. So (by the note on **11**) x will have *unpleasure*, accompanied by the idea of y as a cause, together with the image of z; that is (by the note on **13**), x will have hate toward y whom he loves, and at the same time toward z (by the corollary to **15**), whom x will envy because of the pleasure z takes in y whom x loves (by **23**).

**Note on 35:** This hatred toward a thing we love, combined with envy, is called ‘jealousy’, which is therefore just *a vacillation of mind born of love and hatred together, accompanied by the idea of someone else who is envied*. Moreover, this hatred the jealous man has toward the object of his love y will be greater in proportion to the pleasure he usually derived from the love returned to him by y, and also in proportion to the affect he has toward z, the person with whom he imagines y has united himself. For if the jealous man hates z, he will thereby hate the object of his love y (by **24**), because he imagines that y gets pleasure from what he (the jealous man) hates, and also (by the note on **15**) because he is forced to join the image of the object of his love to the image of the object of his hate.

This latter reason is found mostly in love toward a woman. For a man who imagines that the woman he loves has sexually surrendered herself to someone else will not only have unpleasure because his own desire is blocked, but will also

be disgusted by her because he is forced to picture her in contact with the private parts (including the excretory parts) of the other person. To this, finally, is added the fact that she no longer gives the jealous man the warm welcome she used to offer him; and this saddens him too, as I now show.

**36: Someone who recollects something by which he was once pleased wants to possess it in the same circumstances as when he first was pleased by it.**

Whatever a man sees together with something that pleased him will (by **15**) be the accidental cause of pleasure to him. And so (by **28**) he will want to possess it all, together with the thing that pleased him; which is to say that he will want to possess the thing with all the same attendant circumstances as when it first gave him pleasure.

**Corollary:** If the lover has found that one of those circumstances is lacking, he will have unpleasure.

[A demonstration is given, but hardly needed.]

**Note on the corollary to 36:** When this unpleasure concerns the absence ·not of an attendant circumstance, but· of what we love, it is called ‘longing’.

**37: The desire that arises from unpleasure or pleasure, and from hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the affect is great.**

Unpleasure lessens or hinders a man’s power of acting (by the note on **11**), that is (by **7**), it lessens or hinders the effort by which he tries to stay in existence; so it is *contrary* to this effort (by **5**), and all a man tries to do when he has unpleasure is to try to remove it. But (by the definition of ‘unpleasure’ ·on page 54·) the greater •the unpleasure, the more of •the man’s power of acting that it is opposed to; and so the greater •the unpleasure, the greater •the power of acting that he

will employ in trying to remove it; that is (by the note on **9**), the greater the desire or appetite with which he will try to remove the unpleasure.

Next, since pleasure (by the note on **11** again) increases or helps a man’s power of acting, it is easily demonstrated in the same way that the man who has pleasure wants nothing but to keep it going, and wants this more intensely the greater the pleasure is. Finally, since hate and love are themselves affects of unpleasure or of pleasure, it follows in the same way that the effort, appetite, or desire that arises from hate or love will be greater as the hate and love are greater.

**38: If someone begins to hate a thing he has loved, so that his love is completely extinguished, then... he will have a greater hate for it than if he had never loved it; and the greater his earlier love was, the greater his hate will now be.**

If x loves y and then starts to hate y, more of his appetites will be hindered ·by this hate· than if he had not loved y in the first place. For love is a pleasure (by the note on **13**) which x (by **28**) tries his utmost to preserve; and (by the note on **13**) he does this by regarding y as present and by giving y as much pleasure as he can (by **21**). This effort (by **37**) is great in proportion to the greatness of the love x has for y, as is x’s effort to bring it about that y loves him in return (see **33**). But, by the corollary to **13** and **23**, x’s hatred toward y hinders these efforts; therefore, the lover x will (by the note on **11**) get unpleasure from this cause also, and the more so as his love was greater. That is, apart from the unpleasure that was the cause of x’s hate, another unpleasure arises from

his having loved y. And consequently he will regard y with greater unpleasure—that is (by the note on **13**), he will have a greater hatred for y—than if he had not loved y. And this hate will be the greater as the love was greater.

**39: If someone hates someone else, he will try to do evil to him, that is, to harm him, unless he is afraid that this would bring a greater harm to himself; and the same mechanism brings it about that if someone loves someone else he will try to benefit him.**

To hate someone (by the note on **13**) is to imagine him as the cause of one's unpleasure; and so (by **28**), someone who hates someone will try to remove or destroy him. But if he is afraid that that would lead to something more unpleasant—that is, more harmful—for himself, and thinks he can avoid this by not harming the one he hates in the way he was planning, he will want to abstain from doing that harm (by **28** again)—and (by **37**) he will put more effort into this abstention than there was in his drive to do harm. So this greater effort will prevail, as **39** says.

The second part of this demonstration proceeds in the same way.

**Note on 39:** By 'good' here ·in this book· I understand every kind of pleasure and whatever leads to it, and especially what satisfies any kind of longing. By 'evil' ·I understand here· every kind of unpleasure, and especially what frustrates longing. For I have shown above (in the note on **9**) that we don't want a thing because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary we call it 'good' because we want it; and so what we are averse to we call 'evil' ·or 'bad'·.

So each person on the basis of his own affect judges (evaluates) what is good or bad, better or worse, best or

worst. The greedy man judges wealth as best and poverty as worst. The ambitious man wants public acclaim more than anything else, and fears disgrace above all. To the envious nothing is more agreeable than another's unhappiness, and nothing more burdensome than another's happiness. And so each one judges a thing good or bad, useful or useless, on the basis of his own affect, .

The affect by which a man is so disposed that he doesn't do what he would like to do, and does do what he would prefer not to do, is called 'timidity', which is therefore just *fear that disposes a man to put up with an evil in order to avoid a greater evil that he thinks is threatening* (see **28**). If the feared greater evil is shame, then the man's timidity is called his 'sense of shame'. Finally, if the desire to avoid a future evil is hindered by timidity regarding *another* evil, so that the man doesn't know *what* he would rather do, then his fear is called 'consternation', particularly if each evil he fears is of the greatest.

**40: Someone who imagines he is hated by someone, and thinks he has given the other no cause for hate, will hate the other in return.**

Someone x who imagines someone y to have hatred ·toward something· will thereby also have hatred (by **27**), that is (by the note on **13**), will have unpleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But in the present case the only cause x imagines for this unpleasure of his is the person y who hates him. So from imagining himself to be hated by y he will come to have unpleasure accompanied by the idea of y, which is to say that he will hate y in return.

**Note on 40:** Another source of this returning of hatred for hatred is the fact that hatred is followed by an effort to harm the person who is hated (by **39**). Because of that, a per-

son who imagines that someone hates him will imagine the other to be the cause of harm, that is of unpleasure. So he will have unpleasure—specifically, *fear*—accompanied by the idea of the hater as its cause, which is to say that he will hate the person in return. (If the man imagines he has given just cause for the other’s hatred, he will suffer shame (by 30 and the note on it). But this rarely happens (by 25).)

**First corollary:** Someone who imagines one he loves to have hate toward him will be tormented by love and hate together. [Spinoza explains why; it is pretty obvious.]

**Second corollary:** If someone imagines that another person toward whom he has previously had no affect has done him some harm, out of hatred, he will immediately try to return the same harm.

If x imagines y to hate him, he will hate y in return (by 40), and (by 26) will try to think of everything that can bring unpleasure to y, and will be eager to bring it to him (by 39). But in the present case the first thing x imagines of this kind is the harm that he imagines y has done to him. So he will immediately try to harm y in the same way.

**Note on the second corollary:** The effort to harm someone we hate is called ‘anger’; and the effort to return a harm that has been done to us is called ‘vengeance’.

**41: If someone imagines that someone loves him, and doesn’t believe he has given any cause for this, he will love ·that person· in return.**

This is demonstrated in the same way as 40.

**Note on 41:** But if he believes that he has given just cause for this love, he will exult at being esteemed (by 30 and its note). This indeed happens rather frequently (by 25) and is the opposite of what I said happens when someone imagines that someone hates him (see the note on 40),

This reciprocal love, and the consequent (by 39) effort to benefit someone who loves us and tries (also by 39) to benefit us, is called ‘gratitude’.

So it is evident that men are far more ready for vengeance than for returning benefits.

**Corollary:** Someone who imagines he is loved by someone he hates will be conflicted, having hate and love together.

This is demonstrated in the same way as the first corollary to 40.

**Note on corollary to 41:** But if the hate has prevailed, he will try to do evil to the person who loves him. This affect is called ‘cruelty’, especially if it is believed that the one who loves has given no ordinary cause for hatred.

**42: Someone who has benefited someone else—whether moved to do so by love or by the hope of esteem—will have unpleasure if he sees his benefit accepted in an ungrateful spirit.**

Someone who loves a thing like himself tries his utmost to be loved by it in return (by 33). So someone who has benefited someone else from love does this from a tenacious longing to be loved in return—that is (by 34) from the hope of esteem, which is pleasure; so (by 12) he will try his utmost to imagine this cause of esteem, regarding it as actually existing. But in the case in question he imagines something else that excludes the existence of this cause. So (by 19) he will have unpleasure.

**43: Hate is increased by being returned, but can be destroyed by love.**

Someone who imagines that someone he hates has hate toward him will feel a new hate (by 40) while the original hate continues. But if he imagines that the person he hates has love toward him, then to the

extent that he imagines this he regards himself with pleasure (by 30) and tries to please the one he hates (by 29), that is (by 41) tries not to hate him and not to give him unpleasure. This effort (by 37) will be greater or lesser in proportion to the affect from which it arises. So if it is greater than his hate-caused effort to bring unpleasure to the thing he hates, then it will prevail over it and efface the hate from his mind.

**44: Hate completely conquered by love gives way to love, and the love is therefore greater than if hate had not preceded it.**

The proof of this proceeds in the same way as that of 38. For someone who begins to love a thing he has hated—that is, used to regard with unpleasure—has pleasure because he loves, and to this pleasure that love involves (see its definition in the note on 13) there is added a further pleasure arising from the fact that the effort to remove the hate-caused unpleasure is greatly helped by the accompaniment of the idea of the one he hated, ·who is now regarded· as a cause ·of pleasure·.

**Note on 44:** Although this is so, no-one will try to hate a thing . . . . in order to have this greater pleasure ·when hate gives way to love·; that is, no-one will want to injure himself in the hope of recovering, or long to be sick in the hope of getting better! For everyone will always try to stay in existence and to avoid unpleasure as far as he can. If it were conceivable that a man should want to hate someone in order afterwards to love him all the more, he would *always* want to hate him. For as the hate intensified, so would the love, and so he would always want his hate to become greater and greater. . . .

**45: If someone x imagines that someone y like himself hates a thing z that is also like himself (x) and that he (x) loves, he will hate that ·person· y.**

If y hates z, then z hates y in return (by 40); so x, who imagines that someone y hates z the object of x's love, thereby imagines z to have hate, which is unpleasure. And consequently (by 21) x has unpleasure which is accompanied by the idea of y regarded as the cause ·of this unpleasure·, which means (by the note on 13) that x will hate y.

**46: If ·someone has been given pleasure or unpleasure by someone of a class or nation different from his own, and ·this pleasure or unpleasure is accompanied by the idea of that person as its cause, with that person being thought of as belonging to that class or nation, then ·he will love or hate not only that person but everyone of the same class or nation.**

The demonstration of this is obvious from 16.

**47: The pleasure that arises from our imagining that a thing we hate is destroyed or harmed in some way is not devoid of some unpleasure.**

This is evident from 27. For to the extent that we imagine a thing like us to have unpleasure, we have it too.

**Note on 47:** This proposition can also be demonstrated from the corollary to <sup>II</sup>17. For as often as we recollect a thing—even if it doesn't actually exist—we still regard it as present, and the body is in the same state ·as if the thing were present·. So when a man's memory of a hated thing is strong, he is caused to regard it with unpleasure. For as long as the image of the thing still remains, this push toward unpleasure will remain also (though it maybe hindered by the memory of things that exclude the existence of the hated

thing). And so the man has pleasure only to the extent that this push toward hatred is hindered.

That is how it comes about that the pleasure arising from the misfortune occurring to the thing we hate is repeated as often as we bring the thing to mind. For, as I have said, the aroused image of this thing involves the existence of the thing, and so it makes the man regard the thing with the same *unpleasure* as he used to back at the time when it existed. But because the man in question has joined to the image of this hated thing other images that exclude its existence, this push toward unpleasure is immediately hindered, and the man has pleasure again. This happens as often as this sequence of events is repeated.

This is also the cause of men's rejoicing when they recall some evil now past, and why they get pleasure from telling of dangers from which they have been freed. For when they imagine a danger, they regard it as future, and are made to fear it. This push toward fear is hindered anew by the idea of •freedom, which they have joined to the idea of the danger because they have been •freed from it. So they are safe again, and have pleasure again.

**48: Love or hate for someone (call him Peter) is destroyed if the unpleasure involved in the hate, or the pleasure involved in the love, is attached to the idea of another cause; and each is lessened to the extent that we imagine that Peter was not the only cause of the pleasure or unpleasure.**

This is obvious simply from the definitions of love and hate—see the note on **13**. For this pleasure (unpleasure) is called love (hate) *of Peter* only because he is considered to be its cause. If his causal role is taken away or reduced, the affect toward him is also taken away or reduced.

**49: Our love for a thing will be greater if we imagine the thing to be free than it would be, other things being equal, if we imagined it to be necessary. And similarly for hate.**

[The demonstration of this can be put simply. If you love or hate something that you think is necessitated in all its behaviour, your love or hate will be distributed across the thing itself and the causes that make it as it is. But if you imagine it to be free—not acted on from outside itself—your love or hate is concentrated entirely on the thing itself, not dissipated by being spread across the thing and its causes.]

**Note on 49:** From this it follows that because men consider themselves to be free they have a greater love or hate toward one another than toward other things. To this is added the imitation of the affects, on which see **27**, **34**, **40** and **43**.

**50: Anything whatever can be the accidental cause of hope or fear.**

This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as **15**. Consult it together with the second note on **18**.

**Note on 50:** Things that are accidental causes of hope or fear are called good or bad 'omens'. And these omens, by being causes of hope or fear, are causes of pleasure or unpleasure (see the definitions of 'hope' and 'fear' in the second note on **18**); and so (by the corollary to **15**) we love them or hate them, and try (by **28**) either to use them as means to the things we hope for or to remove them as obstacles or causes of fear.

Also, as follows from **25**, we are so constituted by Nature that we easily believe the things we hope for, but believe only with difficulty those we fear, and that we regard such things more or less highly than is just. This is the source of the superstitions by which men everywhere are troubled.

For the rest, I don't think it worth the trouble to set out in detail here the vacillations of mind that stem from hope and fear—since it follows simply from the definition of these affects that there is no hope without fear, and no fear without hope (as I shall explain more fully in due course). Moreover, in hoping for or fearing something, we love it or hate it; so what I have said about love and hate can easily be applied to hope and fear.

**51: Different men can be affected differently by one object; and one man can be affected differently at different times by one object.**

A human body (by postulate P3 between **II13** and **II14**) is affected in a great many ways by external bodies. Therefore, two men can be differently affected at the same time, and so (by A1" between **II13** and **II14**) they can be affected differently by a single object.

Next (by postulate P3 again) a human body can be affected now in this way, now in another. Consequently (by A1" again) it can be affected differently at different times by one and the same object.

**Note on 51:** This shows us that it can happen that one man loves what another hates, one fears what another does not, and one now loves what he used to hate and now dares what he used to be too timid for.

Next point: because each person judges on the basis of his own affect what is good and what bad, what is better and what worse (see the note on **39**), it follows that men can vary as much in judgment as they do in affect. (I have shown in the note on **II17** that this can be so even though human minds are parts of the divine intellect.) So it comes about that when we compare people with another, we distinguish them only by the differences in their affects; we call some 'fearless', others 'timid', and others by other names again.

For example, I shall describe as 'fearless' someone who disdains an evil that I usually fear. If his fearlessness shows in his wish to harm someone he hates or benefit someone he loves, I shall describe him as 'daring'. Someone will seem timid to me if he is afraid of an evil that I disdain. If his timidity shows in his wish to harm those he hates and benefit to those he loves, I shall call him 'cowardly'. This is how everyone judges. [Following Curley, 'disdain' is used here and below to render Spinoza's *contemptus*. The meaning is weaker than our meaning for 'contempt'; disdaining something, in the sense used here, usually means something like *treating it as negligible*—for example, plunging ahead with some project and disdaining the risks.]

Finally, because this is what men are like—

- because of the inconstancy of their judgment,
- because they often judge things purely on the basis of an affect,
- because many of the things they think will make for pleasure or unpleasure (and which they therefore try to promote or prevent (by **28**) are only imaginary, and
- because of various other things that I proved in Part II about the uncertainty of things

—we can easily understand that a man can often be the cause of both his own unpleasure and his own pleasure, that is, that he has both pleasure and unpleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as their cause. So we easily understand what repentance and self-satisfaction are: Repentance is *unpleasure accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause*, and self-satisfaction is *pleasure accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause*. Because men believe themselves free, these affects are very violent (see **49**).

**52: If we imagine an object to have something special about it, we shall attend to it for longer than we would to an object that we had previously seen as one in a**

**crowd, or one that we imagine has no properties that aren't common to many things.**

As soon as we imagine an object that we have seen along with others, we shall immediately recollect the others as well (by **II18** and the note on it), and so from considering the one object we immediately pass to considering the others. Similarly with an object that we imagine to have no properties that aren't common to many things: when we imagine *that* we assume that we have nothing to consider in it except properties that we have previously seen in other objects.

But in supposing that we imagine in an object something special to it that we have never seen before, we are only saying that when the mind considers that object it is not led thereby to consider something else (such as its recollections of previous encounters with related objects). And so it is caused to consider only that one object. From this **52** follows.

**Note on 52:** This state of the mind—this imagining of a special thing—is called 'wonder' when it occurs alone. When aroused by something that we fear, it is called 'consternation', 'a kind of confusion', because wonder at a 'threatened' evil keeps a man so paralysed 'by fear' that he can't think of things he could do to avoid that evil. But if what we wonder at is someone's prudence, diligence, or the like, because we see him as far surpassing ourselves in this respect, then our wonder is called 'veneration'. And if what we wonder at is the man's anger, envy, or the like, our wonder is called 'horror'.

If we wonder at the prudence, diligence, etc. of someone whom we love, our wonder will (by **12**) increase our love; and this combination of love and wonder—this veneration—we call 'devotion'. In this way we can also conceive hate, hope, confidence, and other affects to be combined with wonder, and so we can explain affects other than the ones there are

standard labels for. So it is clear that the names of the affects owe more to the ordinary usage of words than to an accurate knowledge of the affects. If that weren't so, we would have names for more kinds of affects than we actually do.

The opposite of wonder is disdain. The cause of this attitude is generally the following. We are caused to wonder at, love or fear something by seeing that others do so, or by seeing that the thing is like other things that we admire, love, fear, etc. (by **15** and its corollary and **27**); but then we come into the thing's presence, or we consider it more accurately, and have to admit that there is nothing about it that could cause wonder, love, fear, etc. In that case, our mind is caused by the thing's presence to think more about what it *doesn't* have than about what it *does*, thereby treating the thing itself as negligible. Usually an object's presence makes the mind think chiefly of the properties it does have.

Just as devotion stems from wonder at a thing we love, and veneration from wonder at someone's prudence, so mockery stems from disdain for a thing we hate or fear, and contempt comes from disdain for someone's folly. Finally, we can conceive love, hope, love of esteem, and other affects combined with disdain; those combinations yield other affects—ones for which we don't have any one-word labels.

**53: When the mind considers itself and its power of acting it has pleasure, which is greater in proportion to how distinctly the mind imagines itself and its power of acting.**

A man knows himself only through states of his body and the ideas of them (by **II19** and **II23**). So when it happens that the mind can consider itself, it is thereby supposed to pass to a greater perfection, that is (by the note on **11**), to have pleasure, and the more so the

more distinctly it can imagine its power of acting.

**Corollary:** This pleasure is encouraged when the man imagines himself to be praised by others.

The more he imagines himself to be praised by others, the greater the pleasure he thinks he gives to others, a pleasure accompanied by his idea of himself (by the note on **29**). And so (by **27**) he himself has a greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself.

**54: A mind tries to imagine only those things that affirm its power of acting.**

A mind's effort—its power—is its very essence (by **7**); but it is self-evident that a mind's essence affirms only what the mind is and can do, not what it isn't and can't do. So it tries to imagine only what affirms its power of acting.

**55: When a mind imagines its own lack of power, this brings it unpleasure.**

... It is of the nature of the mind to imagine only things that affirm its power of acting (by **54**). So when we say that a mind in considering itself imagines its lack of power, we are saying that its effort to imagine something that affirms its power of acting is hindered, which (by the note on **11**) is to say that it has unpleasure.

**Corollary:** This unpleasure is encouraged if we imagine ourselves to be blamed by others.

This is demonstrated in the same way as the corollary to **53**.

**Note on 55:** This unpleasure, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is called 'humility'. But when we get pleasure from considering ourselves, this is called 'self-love' or 'self-satisfaction'. And because this is renewed as often as a man considers what he is capable of—considers his power

of acting—it comes about that everyone is anxious to tell of his own exploits and to show off his powers of body and of mind; which makes men annoying to one another.

From this it follows also that men are by nature envious (see the notes on **24** and **32**)—that is, that they are glad of their equals' weakness and displeased by their equals' strengths. For whenever anyone imagines his own actions, he has pleasure (by **53**), and the pleasure is greater in proportion to how much perfection his actions express and to how clearly he imagines them—that is (by the first note on **40**) to how thoroughly he can distinguish his own actions from other people's, and regard them as special. So everyone will have the greatest gladness from considering himself, when he considers something in himself which he denies concerning others.

But if he thinks of what he affirms of himself in terms of the universal idea of *man* or *animal*, he will not be so greatly gladdened. (·We don't congratulate ourselves on having the use of language, or on being able to walk·.) And if he imagines that his own actions are weaker than those of others, he will have unpleasure (by **28**), and will try to get rid of it either by misinterpreting his equals' actions or by magnifying his own as much as he can. It is clear, therefore, that men are •naturally inclined to hate and envy. Not only naturally, but also •by their upbringing; for the main incentives that parents use to spur their children on to excellence are honour and envy.

You may be doubtful about this on the grounds that not infrequently we admire and venerate men's capacities. To remove this doubt I shall add the following corollary.

**Corollary:** No-one envies another's virtue unless he is an equal.

Envy is hatred (see the note on **24**), that is (by the note on **13**), an unpleasure, that is (by the note on **11**) a

state by which a man's power of acting—his effort—is hindered. But a man (by the note on 9) doesn't try or want to do anything that can't follow from his given nature. So no-one wants to have attributed to him any power of acting that is special to someone else's nature and alien to his own. Hence, his desire is not hindered—that is (by the note on 11), he cannot have unpleasure—from considering a power in someone unlike himself. So he cannot envy such a person either. But he can envy *his equal*, who is supposed to be of the same nature as he.

**Note on this corollary:** In the note on 52 I spoke of our venerating a man because we wonder at his prudence, strength of character, etc. As the word 'wonder' makes clear, this is a case where we imagine these virtues to be special to that man, and not as common to our nature. So we shan't envy him these virtues any more than we envy trees their height, or lions their strength.

**56: There are as many kinds of pleasure, unpleasure, and desire as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected. And so there are also just as many kinds of affect composed of these (like vacillation of mind) or derived from them (like love, hate, hope, fear, etc.).**

Pleasure and unpleasure—and consequently the affects composed of them or derived from them—are passions (by the note on 11). ·Having a passion involves being passive, being acted on·. But we are necessarily acted on (by 1) when we have inadequate ideas; and *only* when we have them (by 3) are we acted on. That is to say (see the note on <sup>II</sup>40) we are acted on only when we imagine, that is (see <sup>II</sup>17 and the note on it) when we have an affect that involves both the nature of our body and the nature of an external

body. So a full account of the nature of each passion must bring in the nature of the ·external· object by which the person having the passion is affected.

For example, the pleasure arising from object A involves the nature of A, that arising from object B involves the nature of B; so these two affects of pleasure are by nature different, because they arise from causes that are unlike. So also the affect of unpleasure arising from one object is different in nature from the unpleasure stemming from another cause. The same holds for love, hate, hope, fear, vacillation of mind, etc.

Therefore, there are as many kinds of pleasure, unpleasure, love, hate, etc., as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected.

As for desire: A man's desire ·to do x· is that aspect of his essence or nature that causes him—*given the rest of his constitution*—to act in a certain way, ·specifically, to try to do x· (see the note on 9). Therefore, as external causes give varying kinds of pleasure, unpleasure, love, hate, etc. to a man, thus varying his constitution, so his desires must vary, with one desire being as unlike another as the affects leading to one are unlike those that lead to the other.

Therefore, there are as many kinds of desire as there are kinds of pleasure, unpleasure, love, etc., and consequently (through what I have already shown) as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected.

**Note on 56:** Noteworthy among these kinds of affects—which (by 56) must be very numerous—are gluttony, drunkenness, lust, greed, and ambition, which are only kinds of love or desire differentiated by the ·external· objects to which they are related. For by 'gluttony', 'drunkenness', 'lust', 'greed', and 'ambition' we understand simply an immoderate

love or desire for eating, drinking, sexual union, wealth, and esteem.

When affects are thus classified in terms of the objects to which they are related, they don't have opposites that are also affects. For moderation which we usually oppose to gluttony, sobriety which we usually oppose to drunkenness, and chastity which we usually oppose to lust, are not affects or passions; but indicate the power of the mind, a power that moderates these affects.

I cannot explain the other kinds of affects here—for there are as many as there are kinds of objects. And anyway, there is no need to. For my purpose, which is to determine the powers of the affects and the power of the mind over them, it is enough to have a general definition of each affect. All we need is to understand the common properties of the affects and of the mind, so that we can work out what sort of power, and how great a power, the mind has to moderate and restrain the affects. So though there is a great difference between this or that affect of love, hate or desire—for example, between your love for your children and your love for your wife—we don't need to know these differences, or to go any further into the nature and origin of the affects.

**57: Each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another individual as much as the essence of the one from the essence of the other.**

This proposition is evident from "A1" on page 29. Still, I shall demonstrate it from the definitions of the three basic affects. All the affects are related to desire, pleasure, or unpleasure, as the definitions I have given of them show. But desire is the very nature or essence of the individual who has the desire (see the definition of desire in the note on 9). So the desires of two individuals differ from one another as much as

do their the natures or essences.

As for pleasure and unpleasure: [The remainder of the demonstration is hard to grasp. The basic idea seems to be that pleasure and unpleasure can variously help or hinder the individual's effort to stay in existence, which means that they can variously encourage or impede his desires; from which Spinoza infers that the variousness of the desires is passed along to the other affects, making them various in the same way.]

**Note on 57:** From this it follows that •the affects of animals that are said not to have reason differ from •men's affects as much as •their nature differs from •human nature. Both the horse and the man are driven by a lust to procreate; but the one is driven by an equine lust, the other by a human lust. So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fish, and birds must vary. Therefore, though each individual lives content with its own nature, . . . that is not significantly something that all individuals have in common. For the life with which each individual is content, and his contentment with it, are simply the idea—the mental aspect—the soul—of that individual. So the gladness of one differs from the gladness of another as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other. (I spoke of animals that are said to lack reason, not of animals that lack minds altogether. Now that we know how minds fit into the over-all scheme of things, we can't possibly doubt that the lower animals have feelings.)

Finally, I note in passing that from 57 it follows that the gladness by which a drunkard is led differs greatly from the gladness a philosopher possesses.

That is enough about the affects that men have •passively. I shall now add a few words about affects that men have when they •act.

**58: Apart from the pleasure and desire that are passions, there are other affects of pleasure and desire that we have because we act.**

When the mind conceives itself and its power of acting, it has pleasure (by **53**). But the mind necessarily considers itself when it conceives a true idea—that is (by **II43**), an adequate idea. Now, the mind does conceive some adequate ideas (by the second note on **II40**). Therefore, it also has pleasure when conceiving adequate ideas, that is (by **1**) in acting.

Next, the mind tries to stay in existence, both when having clear and distinct ideas and when having confused ideas (by **9**). But by ‘effort’ we understand *desire* (by the note on **9**). Therefore, desire also is something we have when we understand, that is (by **1**), when we act.

**59: Affects that a mind has in acting are all related to pleasure or desire.**

All the affects are related to desire, pleasure, or unpleasure, as the definitions I have given of them show. But by ‘unpleasure’ we understand a lessening or hindering of a mind’s power of acting (by **11** and the note on it). So to the extent that a mind has unpleasure its power of understanding—that is (by **1**), its power of acting—is lessened or hindered. So no affects of unpleasure can be related to a mind because of its activity; only affects of pleasure and desire can do that.

**Note on 59:** All actions that follow from affects that a mind has because it *understands* I classify as examples of *strength of character*, which I divide into *resoluteness* and *nobility*. By ‘resoluteness’ I understand the desire by which everyone tries, solely from the dictate of reason, to stay in existence.

By ‘nobility’ I understand the desire by which everyone tries, solely from the dictate of reason, to help other men and make them his friends.

So I classify under ‘resoluteness’ actions that aim only at the agent’s advantage; actions aiming at someone else’s advantage I count as ‘nobility’. Thus, moderation, sobriety, calmness in the face of danger, etc., are kinds of resoluteness, whereas courtesy, mercy, etc., are kinds of nobility.

I think I have now explained and shown through their first causes the main affects and vacillations of mind arising from combinations of the three basic affects—desire, pleasure, and unpleasure. What I have said makes it clear that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, and that we toss about like waves on the sea driven by contrary winds, not knowing our outcome and fate.

I have shown only *the main ·affects·*, not *all* the conflicts of mind there can be. For by proceeding in the same way as I have done we can easily show that *·there can be ever so many others; for example, that·* love can be combined with repentance, contempt, shame, etc. Indeed, I think that what I have already said will make it clear to everyone that the various affects can be combined with one another in so many ways, yielding so many variations, that there is no way of enumerating them all. For my purpose it was sufficient to enumerate only the main affects. *·To consider·* the ones I have omitted would be more curious than useful.

Nevertheless, this remains to be noted about love: it very often it happens that while we are getting pleasure from a thing we have wanted, this pleasure makes changes in the constitution of our body; these alter how it is acted on, and other images of things are aroused in it; and at the same time the mind begins to imagine other things and want other things.

For example, when we imagine something that usually pleases us by its taste, we desire to enjoy it—that is, to consume it. But while we are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body constituted differently. So if (while the body has this new constitution) the presence of the food or drink encourages the image of it and consequently also the effort or desire to consume it, the new constitution will oppose this desire or effort; and so the presence of the food or drink that we used to want will repel us. This is what we call ‘satiety’ and ‘weariness’.

As for the external states of the body that are observed in the affects—such as trembling, paleness, sobbing, laughter, etc.—I have left them out because they involve the body only, with no relation to the mind. Finally, there are certain things to be noted about the definitions of the affects. I shall therefore repeat them here in order, adding the observations required on each one.

## Definitions of the Affects

**1. Desire** is a man’s essence, insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given state of it, to do something. [This seems to mean: ‘A man’s *desire* to do x is just the aspects of his nature that tend to cause him to do x’.]

**Explanation:** I said in the note on **9** that desire is appetite together with the consciousness of it. And appetite is the essence of a man, insofar as it is determined to do what promotes his survival.

But in the same note I also warned that I really recognize no difference between human appetite and desire. For an appetite is exactly the same whether or not the man is conscious of it. And so—not wanting to seem to be guilty of a tautology—I didn’t want to explain ‘desire’ by ‘appetite’, and wanted to define it so that it covers all the efforts of human

nature that we label as ‘appetite’, ‘will’, ‘desire’, or ‘impulse’. [Spinoza goes on to explain that he stated the definition in terms of ‘insofar as it *is conceived to be* determined’ rather than merely ‘insofar as it *is* determined’ because—he says (obscurely)—the latter version doesn’t imply ‘that the mind could be conscious of its desire or appetite’. He continues:] By ‘a state of a man’s essence’ I understand *any* constitution of that essence, whether it is innate or caused from outside, and whether conceived through the attribute of thought alone, or through extension alone, or through both at once.

By the word ‘desire’, therefore, I understand here any of a man’s efforts, impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary as the man’s constitution varies, and which are often so opposed to one another that the man is pulled different ways and doesn’t know where to turn.

**2. Pleasure** is a man’s passing from a lesser perfection to a greater.

**3. Unpleasure** is a man’s passing from a greater perfection to a lesser.

**Explanation:** I say ‘passing’. For pleasure is not perfection itself. If a man had been born with the perfection to which he passes, he would have possessed it without an affect of pleasure.

This is clearer from the affect of unpleasure, which is the opposite of pleasure. For no-one can deny that unpleasure consists in passing to a lesser perfection, not in the lesser perfection itself. That is because the lesser perfection would still be a *perfection*, and a man can’t have unpleasure from participating in a perfection. Nor can we say that unpleasure consists in the lack of a greater perfection. For a lack is *nothing*, whereas the affect of unpleasure is a *happening*, and the only happening it can be is the man’s passing to a lesser perfection, that is, an event through which the man’s

power of acting is lessened or hindered (see the note on **11**).

As for the definitions of *titillatio* [see explanation in the note on **11**], ‘cheerfulness’, ‘pain’ and ‘sadness’, I omit them because they are chiefly related to the body, and are merely kinds of pleasure or unpleasure.

**4. Wonder** is an imagining of a thing in which the mind remains fixed because this particular imagining has no connection with any others. (See **52** and note on it.)

**Explanation:** In the note on **118** I showed the cause why the mind immediately passes from considering one thing to thinking of another—namely because the ·bodily· images of these things are connected with one another, and so ordered that one follows the other. And of course this can’t happen ·for this reason· when the image of the thing is a strange ·and unprecedented· one, ·because there won’t have been any past experience to connect the image of it with any other images·. Rather, the mind will be held by the same thing until other causes make it think of other things.

[Spinoza goes on to say that an episode of wondering is in itself just like any other imaging, and that he therefore doesn’t count wonder as an affect. He defends this choice, apparently thinking of the prominent place Descartes give to wonder in *his* catalogue of ‘passions’.]

So as I pointed out in the note on **11**, I recognize only three primitive, or primary, ·or basic· affects: pleasure, unpleasure, and desire. I have spoken of wonder only because it has become customary for some writers to give special names to these when they are related to objects we wonder at. For the same reason I shall also add the definition of ‘disdain’.

**5. Disdain** [see page 69] is an imagining of a thing that makes so little impact on the mind that its presence moves the mind to imagining what is *not* in it more than what *is*. See

the note on **52**. I omit here the definitions of ‘veneration’ and ‘contempt’ because no affects that I know of derive their names from them.

**6. Love** is a pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

**Explanation:** This definition explains the essence of love clearly enough. But the definition of those authors who define ‘love’ as *the lover’s wish to be united with the object of his love* expresses •a property of love, not •its essence. And these authors didn’t ·even· have a clear concept of this property, because they didn’t see clearly enough the essence of love. That is why everyone has found their definition to be quite obscure.

Be it noted that when I say that the lover ‘wishes to be united with the object of his love’ I don’t mean by ‘wish’ a consent, or a deliberation of the mind, or a free decision (for I have demonstrated in **48** that this freedom is a fiction). Nor do I mean that the lover wants •to unite with the object of his love when it is absent or wants •to continue in its presence when it is present. For love can be conceived without either of these desires. Rather, by ‘wish’ I mean that the lover gets contentment from the presence of the object of his love, a contentment by which his pleasure is strengthened or at least encouraged.

**7. Hate** is unpleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

**Explanation:** The things to be noted here can easily be seen from what I have just said in explaining ‘love’. See also the note on **13**.

**8. Inclination** is pleasure accompanied by the idea of a thing that is the accidental cause of the pleasure.

**9. Aversion** is unpleasure accompanied by the idea of something that is the accidental cause of the unpleasure. On this

see the note on **15**.

**10. Devotion** is a love of someone whom we wonder at.

**Explanation:** I showed in **52** that wonder arises from the newness of the thing; so if it happens that we often imagine something that we wonder at ·it will cease to be new to us, and so· we shall cease to wonder at it. This shows that the affect of *devotion* easily changes into simple *love*.

**11. Mockery** is pleasure born of the fact that we imagine something that we disdain in a thing that we hate.

**Explanation:** To the extent that we disdain a thing that we hate, we deny existence to it (see the note on **52**), and to that extent we have pleasure (by **20**). But since we are supposing that what a man mocks he also hates, it follows that this pleasure is not unalloyed. (See the note on **47**.)

**12. Hope** is an inconstant pleasure, born of the idea of a future or past thing whose outcome we are in some doubt.

**13. Fear** is an inconstant unpleasure, born of the idea of a future or past thing whose outcome we to some extent doubt. See the note on **18**.

**Explanation:** From these definitions it follows that there is no hope without fear and no fear without hope. For someone who is in suspense, hoping for something while being unsure that he will get it, is assumed (from his unsureness) to be imagining something that would exclude the existence of the thing he hopes for; to that extent he has unpleasure (by **19**); and so while he is in his suspenseful hope he fears that the thing that ·he imagines· will happen ·and thus that thing he hopes for won't happen·.

Conversely, someone who is in fear—that is, who doubts the outcome of a thing that he hates—also imagines something that excludes the existence of the thing he fears. So (by **20**) he has pleasure, and thus to that extent he has hope that the ·feared· thing won't happen.

**14. Confidence** is a pleasure born of the idea of something—future or past—concerning which the cause of doubting has been removed.

**15. Despair** is an unpleasure born of the idea of something—future or past—concerning which the cause of doubting has been removed.

**Explanation:** So confidence is born of hope, and despair is born of fear, when the cause of doubt about the thing's outcome is removed. This ·doubt-free condition· occurs because ·a man imagines that the past or future thing is right at hand, and regards it as present, or because ·he imagines other things that exclude the existence of the things that had put him in doubt. For though we can never be certain of the outcome of particular events (by the corollary to **II31**), it can still happen that we have no doubt about their outcome. As I have shown (see the note on **II49**), it is one thing *not to doubt* a thing and another *to be certain of* it. And so it can happen that the image of a past or future thing gives us the same pleasure or unpleasure as the image of a present thing (as I showed in **18**; see also the first note on it).

**16. Gladness** is pleasure accompanied by the idea of a past thing that has turned out better than we had hoped.

**17. Regret** is unpleasure accompanied by the idea of a past thing that has turned out worse than we had hoped.

**18. Pity** is unpleasure accompanied by the idea of an evil that has happened to someone else whom we imagine to be like us. (See the notes on **21** and **27**.)

**Explanation:** There seems to be no difference between pity and compassion, except perhaps that 'pity' applies to the particular affect—the particular episode—whereas 'compassion' refers to the habitual disposition to pity things.

**19. Favour** is love toward someone who has benefited someone else.

**20. Indignation** is hate toward someone who has harmed someone else.

**Explanation:** I know that in their common usage these two words mean something else. But my purpose is to explain the nature of things, not the meanings of words. I intend to indicate these things by words whose usual meaning is not entirely opposed to the meanings I want to give them. You have been warned! As for the causes of these two affects, see the first corollary of **27** and the note on **21**.

**21. Overestimation** is thinking too highly of someone, out of love.

**22. Scorn** is thinking not highly enough of someone, out of hate.

**Explanation:** Overestimation, therefore, is an effect or property of love, and scorn an effect of hate. So ‘overestimation’ can also be defined as *love that affects a man so that he thinks too highly of the object of his love*. And ‘scorn’ can be defined as *hate that affects a man so that doesn’t think highly enough of the object of his hate*. See the note on **26**.

**23. Envy** is hate that affects a man so that he has unpleasure from another person’s happiness and rejoices at that person’s misfortune.

**Explanation:** Envy is commonly opposed to compassion, which can therefore . . . . be defined as follows.

**24. Compassion** is love that affects a man so that he is glad at someone else’s good fortune and gets unpleasure from his misfortune.

**Explanation:** Regarding envy, see the notes on **24** and **32**. These—that is, affects 4-24—are the affects of pleasure and unpleasure that are accompanied by the idea of an •external

thing as cause, either directly through itself or accidentally (see **15**). I now move to the other affects, which are accompanied by the idea of an •internal thing as cause.

**25. Self-satisfaction** is pleasure that a man has from considering himself and his own power of acting.

**26. Humility** is unpleasure that a man has from considering his own lack of power, his weakness.

**Explanation:** Taking self-satisfaction to be pleasure arising from our considering our power of acting, it is the opposite of humility. But taking it to be pleasure accompanied by the idea of something we think we have done from a free decision of the mind, it is the opposite of repentance, which I define as follows.

**27. Repentance** is unpleasure accompanied by the idea of some deed we think we have done from a free decision of the mind.

**Explanation:** I have shown the causes of these affects in the note on **51**, **53**, **54**, and **55** and its note. On the free decision of the mind see the note on **II35**.

It isn’t surprising that absolutely all the acts that are customarily called wrong are followed by unpleasure, and that the acts customarily called right are followed by pleasure. What I have said above makes it easy to see that this depends chiefly on upbringing. Parents blame acts of the former kind and scold their children for performing them, and approve and praise acts of the latter kind; which brings it about that unpleasant emotions are joined to the one kind of act, and pleasant ones to the other.

Experience itself also confirms the role of upbringing in forming moral consciousness. For people don’t all have the same custom and religion. What is holy for some is unholy for others; what is honourable for some is dishonourable for

others. So each individual repents of a deed or exults [see **34**] in it, depending on how he has been brought up.

**28. Pride** is thinking too highly of oneself, out of self-love.

**Explanation:** So pride differs from overestimation in that the latter is related to an external object whereas pride is related to the man himself, who thinks more highly of himself than he should. Also, just as overestimation is an effect or property of love, so pride is an effect or property of self-love. So pride can also be defined as *love of oneself, or self-satisfaction, which leads a man to think more highly of himself than he should* (see the note on **26**).

This affect has no opposite. For no-one thinks less highly of himself than he should out of hate ·for himself·. Indeed, no-one is led to think less highly of himself than he should by imagining that he can't do this or that. For when a man imagines that he can't do x necessarily imagines x; and this imagining makes him genuinely unable to do x. For so long as he imagines that he can't do x, he is not caused to do it, so it is impossible for him to do it. ·Thus, his thoughts about what he can't do don't make him think less highly of himself than he should because he actually *can't* do those things·.

But if we attend to mere opinions that a man may have about himself—·specifically, beliefs about himself that are *not* actually true·—we can see how a man might think less highly of himself than he should. ·Here are three examples of that·. •A man contemplates his own weakness, with unpleasure, and imagines that he is looked down on by everyone—though in fact their attitude to him is nothing like that. •A man thinks less highly of himself than he should because of some belief he has about himself in the future—for example, he ·wrongly· thinks he will never become certain of anything, or will never want or do anything that is right and honourable. •We can infer that someone thinks less highly

of himself than he should when we see that his exaggerated fear of failure stops him from risking things that others equal to him would risk.

So this affect—which I shall call 'despondency'—can be seen as the opposite of pride. For as pride is born of self-satisfaction, so despondency is born of humility. We can therefore define it as follows.

**29. Despondency** is thinking less highly of oneself than one should, out of unpleasure.

**Explanation:** We often treat *humility* and pride as opposites; but that is when we are attending less to the nature of the two affects than to the behaviour they lead to. For •we usually call someone 'proud' if he: exults too much at being esteemed (see the note on **30**), who talks all the time about his own virtues and the faults of others, who wants to be given precedence over everyone else, or goes about with the pomp and style of dress usually adopted by those who are far above him in station. And •we call someone humble if: he quite often blushes, confesses his own faults and recounts the virtues of others, gives precedence to everyone else, or walks with his head bowed and shabbily dressed.

These affects—humility and despondency—are very rare. For basic human nature strains against them as hard as it can (see **13** and **54**). Those who are *thought* to be the most despondent and humble are usually the most ambitious and envious.

**30. Love of esteem** is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of ours that we imagine that others praise.

**31. Shame** is unpleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of ours that we imagine that others blame.

**Explanation:** On these see the note on **30**. Notice that *shame* is not the same as *sense of shame*. For *shame* is the unpleasure that follows a deed one is ashamed of; whereas

*sense of shame* is the fear of shame that hinders a man from doing something dishonourable. Sense of shame is usually taken to be the opposite of shamelessness, but the latter is not really an affect, as I shall show in the proper place [which in fact Spinoza never does]. But, as I have already pointed out, the names of the affects are guided more by usage than by their natures.

That brings me to the end of what I had to say about the affects of pleasure and unpleasure. I turn now to the affects that I relate to desire.

**32. Longing** is a desire—an appetite—to possess something, a desire encouraged by the memory of that thing and at the same time hindered by the memory of other things that exclude its existence.

**Explanation:** As I have often said already, our recollecting a thing disposes us to regard it with the same affect as if it were present. But while we are awake, this disposition—this effort—is generally hindered by images of things that exclude the existence of the thing we recollect. So when we remember a thing that gives us some kind of pleasure, we try to regard it as present with the same affect of pleasure—an effort which is of course immediately hindered by the memory of things that exclude the thing's existence.

So longing is really an unpleasure that is opposite to the pleasure that arises from the absence of a thing we hate (see the note on 47). But because the word 'longing' seems to involve desire, I include this affect among the affects of desire.

**33. Emulation** is a desire for a thing which we have because we imagine that others have the same desire.

**Explanation:** If someone flees because he sees others flee, or is timid because he sees others timid, or on seeing someone else burn his hand withdraws his own hand and moves his

body as if his hand were burned, we say that he 'imitates' the other's affect, but not that he 'emulates' it. It's not that we know of any difference in how emulation and imitation are caused; it's just that in ordinary usage we reserve 'emulous' for the person who imitates what we judge to be honourable, useful, or pleasant. As for the cause of emulation, see 27 and the note on it; and on why envy is generally joined to this effect, see 32 and the note on it.

**34. Gratitude** is the desire—the eagerness of love—by which we try to benefit one who has benefited us from a similar affect of love. See 39 and the note on 41.

**35. Benevolence** is a desire to benefit someone whom we pity. See the note on 27.

**36. Anger** is a desire by which we are spurred, out of hate, to harm a person we hate. See 39.

**37. Vengeance** is a desire by which, out of reciprocal hate, we are roused to harm someone who from a similar affect has injured us. See the second corollary to 40 and the note on it.

**38. Cruelty** is a desire by which someone is roused to harm someone whom *we* love or pity.

**Explanation:** Cruelty is the opposite of mercy, which is not a passion but a power of the mind by which a man governs anger and vengeance—something active, not passive.

**39. Timidity** is a desire to avoid a greater evil that we fear, by a lesser one. See the note on 39.

**40. Daring** is a desire by which someone is spurred to do something dangerous which his equals fear to undertake.

**41. Cowardice** is ascribed to someone whose desire is hindered by timidity concerning a danger that his equals are willing to risk.

**Explanation:** So cowardice is just •fear of some evil which most people don't usually fear; so I don't count it among the affects of •desire. But I wanted to include it here because it is the opposite of daring so far as its relation to desire is concerned.

**42. Consternation** is attributed to someone whose desire to avoid an evil is hindered by wonder at the evil he fears.

**Explanation:** So consternation is a kind of cowardice. But because it arises from a double timidity, it can be more conveniently defined as *a fear that keeps a man senseless or vacillating so that he can't avert the evil*. I say 'senseless' because part of the meaning is that his desire to avert the evil is hindered by wonder; and I say 'vacillating' because part of the meaning is that the desire is hindered by timidity concerning another evil which torments him equally, so that he does not know which of the two to avoid. On these see the notes on **39** and **52**. For cowardice and daring, see the note on **51**.

**43. Human kindness**—or in other words, courtesy—is the desire to do what pleases men and not do what displeases them.

**44. Ambition** is an excessive desire for esteem.

**Explanation:** Ambition is a desire by which *all* the affects are encouraged and strengthened (by **27** and **31**); so this affect can hardly be overcome. For as long as a man is bound by *any* desire he must at the same time be bound by *this* one. As Cicero says, 'The best men are those who are most led by love of esteem. Even philosophers who write books disparaging esteem put their names on them!'

**45. Gluttony** is the immoderate desire for and love of eating.

**46. Drunkenness** is the immoderate desire for and love of drinking.

**47. Avarice** is the immoderate desire for and love of wealth.

**48. Lust** is the desire for and love of sexual intercourse.

**Explanation:** This desire for sexual union is usually called 'lust', whether or not it is moderate.

These five affects (as I pointed out in the note on **56**) have no opposites. For courtesy is a sort of ambition (see the note on **29**), and I have already pointed out also that moderation, sobriety, and chastity indicate the •power of the mind and not •passions. Even if it can happen that an avaricious, ambitious, or timid man abstains from too much food, drink, and sex, that doesn't make greed, ambition, and timidity opposites of gluttony, drunkenness, or lust.

For the •greedy man generally longs to gorge himself on other people's food and drink. And the •ambitious man won't be moderate in anything, provided he can hope not to be discovered; if he lives among the drunken and the lustful, then his ambition will make him all more inclined to these vices. And the •timid man does what he wants not to do; for although he may hurl his wealth into the sea to avoid death, he is still avaricious. And if the lustful man has unpleasure because he can't indulge his inclinations, that doesn't mean that he has stopped being lustful.

Basically these affects have less to do with the acts of eating, drinking, and so on than with the •underlying• appetite itself and the love. So their only opposites are nobility and resoluteness, which will be discussed later on.

I pass over the definitions of jealousy and the other vacillations of mind, both because they arise from combinations of affects that I have already defined and because most of them don't have names. Their not having names shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to know them only in a general way. Furthermore, from the definitions of the affects that I have explained it is clear that they all •arise from

desire, pleasure, or unpleasure—or rather, that they •are nothing but those three, with different names given to them according to their different contexts and relations to other things. If we want now to attend to these basic affects, and to what I have said about the nature of the mind, we can define the mental side of the affects as follows.

### General Definition of the Affects

An affect that is called a *passion* of the mind is a confused idea through which a mind affirms of its body (or of some part of it) a greater or lesser force of existing than it had before—an idea which, when it is given, makes the mind think of one thing rather than another.

**Explanation:** I say that an affect—a passion of the mind—is a *confused* idea because I have shown (3) that it is only when it has inadequate or confused ideas that the mind •is passive, that is, is acted on.

Next, I say ‘through which a mind affirms of its body (or of some part of it) a greater or lesser force of existing than it had before’ because *all* the ideas that we have of bodies indicate the actual constitution of our own body (by the second corollary to <sup>II</sup>16) more than the nature of the external body. But an idea that makes an affect what it is has to be one indicating or expressing a state of the body (or of some part

of it) which the body (or the part) is in because its power of acting—its force of existing—is increased or lessened, helped or hindered.

Please understand what I say about ‘a greater or lesser force of existing than before’. I do *not* mean that the mind compares its body’s present constitution with a past constitution and *thinks that* its force has increased or lessened, but rather that the idea which makes the affect what it is affirms of the body something that *really does* involve more or less of reality •or force• than before.

And because •the essence of the mind consists in this (by <sup>II</sup>11 and <sup>II</sup>13), that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and •we understand by ‘perfection’ the very essence of a thing, it follows that •the mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it happens to affirm of its body (or of some part thereof) something that involves more or less reality than before. So when I said above that the mind’s power of thinking is increased or lessened, I meant merely that the mind has formed of its body (or of some part of it) an idea that expresses more or less reality than it had previously affirmed of the body.

Finally, I added ‘which makes the mind think of one thing rather than another’ in order to bring *desire* within the scope of the definition along with *pleasure* and *unpleasure*.